UC-NRLF 


B33b3MSM 


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ALVMNVS  BOOK  FVND 


X 


NEW  YORK  UNIVERSITY  STUDIES 
IN  PHILOSOPHY  AND  RELIGION 


VALUES 

IMMEDIATE  AND  CONTRIBUTORY 

AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 


VALUES 

IMMEDIATE     AND 

CONTRIBUTORY 

AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 


By 

MAURICE  PICARD,  Ph.D. 

Lecturer  in  Philosopny  in  Barnard  College 


»     •    »       ^ 


THE    NEW    YORK    UNIVERSITY    PRESS 

32  Waverly  Place,   New  York  City 
1920   - 


u  ^  ^  ^  ^ 

Copyright  1920,  by 
The  Nbw  York  Univbbsity  Press 


THE  NEW   YORK   UNIVERSITY    PRESS 

COMMITTEE    OF    PUBLICATION 

Arthur  Huntington  Nason,  Ph.D.,    Chairman 
Director  of  the  Press 

Earle  Brownell  Babcock,  Ph.D. 

Harold  Dickinson  Senior,  M.B.,  Sc.D.,  F.R.C.S. 


f^-. 


(^ 


KENNEBEC  JOURNAL  PRESS,  AUGUSTA,  MAINE 


PREFACE 

IT  would  seem  that  an  apology  is  due  from 
me  to  Professor  W.  M.  Urban  for  not 
having  discussed  his  significant  contribu- 
tion to  value-philosophy,  entitled,  Valuation,  Its 
Nature  and  Laws.  My  omission  is  not  due  to 
any  failure  to  recognize  that  Professor  Urban 
is,  in  this  country,  the  most  eminent  repre- 
sentative of  a  large  school  of  value-philosophers, 
among  whom  are  A.  Meinong,  C.  V.  Ehrenfels, 
and  G.  Simmel.  My  reason  for  not  discussing 
their  views  in  the  present  work  is  similar  to  that 
which  prompted  me  to  pass  by  Miinsterberg's 
The  Eternal  Values,  Here  are  two  schools  of 
value-philosophy  with  presuppositions  radically 
different  from  my  own.  That  school  which 
Professor  Urban  so  well  represents  finds  the 
locus  of  value  in  the  "worth-fundamental,"  dis- 
covered by  an  analysis  of  mental  life.  Miinster- 
berg  finds  value  in  the  region  of  the  human  will, 
and  he  believes  that  value  implies  an  over- 
personal,  metaphysically  absolute  will.  Both 
find  value  primarily  to  be  a  quality  which  colors 
certain  mental  states  —  Miinsterberg  believes 
that  it  points  toward  an  objective  "  Overself/' 
In  contrast  to  this   subjective  point  of  de- 


vi  PREFACE 

parture,  I  have  treated  value  as  relational,  occur- 
ring in  definite  situations.  I  have  used  the 
psychological  basis  of  values  not  as  the  sum  and 
substance  of  valuation,  but  as  a  description  of 
one  term  of  value-relations,  the  other  term,  that 
of  the  environment,  calling  for  equal  attention. 
Thus  I  have  been  able  to  avoid  the  acrostic  phil- 
osophy of  the  value-psychologists,  which  tends 
in  the  direction  of  epistemological  realism,  and 
the  lack  of  concreteness  incidental  to  it.  I  may 
note,  however,  that  Professor  Urban  considers 
briefly,  in  the  last  chapter  of  his  book,  some  of 
the  problems  which  I  discuss  in  detail. 

To  Professor  Herman  Harrell  Home  of  New 
York  University,  I  am  indebted  for  numerous 
suggestions  and  for  a  final  reading  of  the  proof; 
and  to  Professor  Arthur  Huntington  Nason, 
Director  of  the  New  York  University  Press, 
for  critical  oversight  of  publication.  Above 
all,  however,  my  gratitude  is  due  to  Professor 
Dickinson  S.  Miller  of  General  Theological 
Seminary,  for  his  kindness  in  reading  my  man- 
uscript and  making  many  helpful  suggestions 
as  to  the  method  of  treatment  of  my  subject. 

M.  P. 
New  York  City, 
January  31,  1920. 


CONTENTS 


Introduction 


PART   I 

THE  INTERRELATION  OF  VALUES 

Chapter      I.    Two  Ci.asse:s  o^  Vai^uks 7 

Values  as  means  or  ^given  as  good/ 
7. — Their  psychological  basis  in  cog- 
nition and  feeling,  9. — Independent 
character  of  contributory  values,  13. — 
Objective  and  subjective,  14. — Ques- 
tionable status  of  logical,  moral,  and 
aesthetic  values,  15. — Distinction  be- 
tween values  and  value- judgments,   16. 

Chapter  II.  Truth  and  Immediate  Vai.ue  . .  20 
Verification  vs.  recognition,  20. — Rick- 
ert's  argument,  21. — Metaphysics  and 
epistemology,  24. — Truth  a  matter  of 
inference,  not  simple  affirmation,  25. — 
Rickert's  psychologizing  tendency,  26. 
— Various  oppositions,  28. 


Chapter  III.    The   Interrei^ation   of   Values 

with  Respect  to  Their  Origin.  .  31 
Values  not  dependent  upon  presence 
of  judgment,  32. — Standpoints  of  the 
agent  and  the  observer,  33. — Value  and 
the  earliest  stage  of  consciousness,  36. — 

vii 


viii   VAI.UES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

Presence  of  interest  the  criterion  of 
presence  of  value,  38. — Biological  con- 
comitants of  the  earliest  value-situation, 
39. — Values  from  the  observer's  stand- 
point all  contributory,  43. — Introspec- 
tive and  sympathetic  methods,  44. — 
Earliest  stage  of  the  standpoint  of 
the  individual,  45. — Introspective  deter- 
mination of  values  of  this  stage,  46. — 
Values  in  the  earliest  stages  of  con- 
sciousness, 48. — Sensations  and  feeling- 
attitudes,  48. — Two  directions  of  the 
•  development  of  conscious  activity,  50. 

Chapter  IV.    The^   Interre^lation   o^  Vai^ues 

WITH  Respect  to  Knowi^edge  . .  54 
Judgments  as  values  and  judgments 
of  values,  54. — The  value  of  acts  of 
judgment,  57. — Content  of  judgments 
and  their  future  usefulness,  59. — True 
judgments  and  their  value,  61. — Value 
of  false  judgments,  66. — Degrees  of 
contributory  value,  69. — Value  of  theo- 
retical judgments,  73. — Limits  of  the 
discussion  of  judgments  of  values,  y6. 
Origin  of  immediate  judgments,  78. — 
Origin  of  contributory  judgments,  80. — 
Tendency  of  contributory  judgments 
to  become  independent  of  particular  in- 
dividual needs,  82. 


Chapter  V.  The  InterrEi^ation  of  Values 
with  Respect  to  Their  Co-exis- 
tence       85 


CONTENTS  ix 

Different  uses  of  the  term  'environ- 
ment', 85. — Biological  and  psychological 
uses,  88. — Difference  between  the  bio- 
logical viewpoint  and  that  of  instru- 
mental pragmatism,  90. — Environment 
and  perception,  92. — Relevant  disputes 
about  aspects  of  consciousness,  94. — 
Conscious  activity  related  to  environ- 
ment through  cognition  and  feeling,  97. 
Contact  with  environment  through  feel- 
ing, 99. — Cognitive  and  affective  rela- 
tions of  conscious  activity,  104. — Rela- 
tion of  mature  to  primitive  conscious 
activity,  106. — Sensation  as  a  bridge 
between  cognition  and  feeling,  no. — 
Further  deductions,  112. 

PART  II 

WINDELBAND'S  THEORY  OF  NORMS 

Chapter   VI.    Subjective  and  Objective 119 

The  place  of  function  in  value-rela- 
tions, 119. — Are  tastes  objective  or  sub- 
jective? 121. — Possible  existence  of 
norms,  122. — Attractiveness  of  theory 
of  objective  immediate  values,  124. 

Chapter  VII.    The  Theory  of  Norms 126 

I.     Kant  or  Realism? 128 

Windelband's  contradictory  theories, 
129. — Norms  and  natural  laws,  130. — 
Relation  of  norms  to  particular  con- 
sciousnesses, 132. 


X     VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

II.     Evolution  and  the  Norms 134 

Qualitative  and  quantitative  factors, 
135. — Their  incompatability  v^ith  the 
theory  of  natural  selection,  136. 

III.  The     Parallel     between     Denken, 

Fuhlen,   and    W oil  en 137 

Falsity  of  the  parallel  between  Den- 
ken and  W  oil  en,  137. — A  psychological 
scruple,  139. 

IV.  The  Independence  of  the   Norms 

of  Particular  Consciousnesses  . .  140 
Independence  of  particular  conscious- 
nesses not  proved  for  norms,  141. — The 
case  for  parallelism  of  three  realms  of 
norms,  145. — Evolution  of  morality 
does  not  presuppose  norms  of  morality, 
148. — Supposition  of  moral  and  logical 
norms  unnecessary,  152. — Aesthetic 
appreciations  and  the  law  of  sur- 
vival, 153. 

V.     Freedom  and  Responsibility 155 

Freedom  said  to  subsist  in  determined 
processes,  157. — Assumption  of  auton- 
omy on  part  of  the  individual,  160. — 
Causality,  necessity,  and  responsibility, 
162. — Ambiguity  in  use  of  the  word 
'character',  165. — Choice  of  possible  de- 
cisions, 166. — Responsibility  as  a  func- 
tion of  the  judgment,  169. 

Windelband's  General  Position  . .     172 

CONCIvUSION 175 


VALUES 

IMMEDIATE  AND  CONTRIBUTORY 

AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 


INTRODUCTION 

IN  this  thesis,  I  purpose  taking  as  my  start- 
ing point  the  general  agreement  among 
writers  as  to  the  existence  of  values  be- 
longing to  two  distinct  classes,  immediate  and 
contributory.  In  order  to  put  the  distinction 
between  the  two  classes  beyond  question,  I  shall 
limit  the  class  "  immediate  "  to  those  immediate 
values  which  are  agreed  to  be  subjective,  i.e., 
dependent  for  their  existence  upon  some  par- 
ticular individual  who  holds  them  as  values. 
The  propositions,  therefore,  which  I  shall  as- 
sume to  be  matters  of  general  agreement  are, 
"  There  is  a  class  of  values  which  may  be  named 
*  contributory  '."  "  All  contributory  values  are 
objective."  "  There  is  another  class  of  values 
which  may  be  termed  *  immediate  '."  "  Some 
immediate  values  are  subjective." 

Having  distinguished  two  classes  of  values 
as  subject-matter  for  discussion,  I  proceed  to 
treat  of  their  interrelations.  But,  before  this 
can  be  done  effectually,  it  is  found  to  be  neces- 
sary to  disprove  a  theory  which,  if  true,  would 
render  the  distinction  between  immediate  and 


4- '" '  VX'Ltf ES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

contributory  values  of  slight  importance.  It 
has  been  held  that  the  values  known  as  con- 
tributory are  dependent  for  their  validity  upon 
certain  a  priori  immediate  values  because  all 
truth  is  said  to  rest  upon  immediate  recognition 
of  its  presence.  I  therefore  devote  a  chapter 
to  disproving  this  theory. 

With  two  classes  of  values  of  unquestioned 
distinction,  I  next  discuss  their  interrelation 
with  reference  to  their  origin,  with  reference 
to  knowledge,  and  with  reference  to  their  co- 
existence. 

Part  II  examines  immediate  values  with  a 
view  to  demonstrating  that  there  are  no  ob- 
jective immediate  values.  This  result  confirms 
the  validity  of  the  initial  distinction  between 
objective-contributory  and  subjective-immediate 
values,  and  carries  the  proposition  "  Some  im- 
mediate values  are  subjective "  to  the  wider 
application  of  the  proposition  "  It  cannot  be 
proved  that  there  are  any  immediate  values 
which  are  not  subjective.'* 


PART   I 
THE   INTERRELATION   OF   VALUES 


CHAPTER     I 

TWO   CLASSES  OF  VALUES 

THE  method  to  be  pursued,  as  stated  in 
the  introduction,  is  to  begin  the  dis- 
cussion by  finding  some  point  of  agree- 
ment among  writers  on  value.  It  is  not  to  be 
expected  that  there  may  be  discovered  groups 
of  values  to  whose  clear  cut  distinctions  all 
writers  will  subscribe.  It  is  not  unlikely,  how- 
ever, that  there  may  exist  a  fundamental  dis- 
tinction in  kind  between  certain  values  and  cer- 
tain other  values,  and  that  the  points  at  issue 
may  be  due  to  differences  of  opinion  as  to  the 
correct  assignment  of  other  particular  values. 
First,  I  shall  point  out  two  radically  different 
types  of  value;  secondly,  I  shall  indicate  the 
nature  of  those  values  which  may  not  be  as- 
signed summarily  to  one  of  the  two  classes. 

§  I.  The  distinction  which  I  have  in  mind 
is^  between  contributory  or  instrumental  values 
and  immediate  values.  The  adjectives  "  instru- 
mental "  and  "  immediate ''  indicate  that  the 
distinction  is  a  logical  one,  distinguishing  values 
as    given   goods    or   as    means.      Contributory 

7 


8   VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

values  are  not  self-sufficient;  they  look  beyond 
themselves  to  some  end-in-view.  They  com- 
prise objects  that  are  "good  for''  something, 
or  acts  that  conduce  to  the  attainment  of  some 
specific  end.  Thus,  this  pen  is  good  for  writ- 
ing; apples  are  good  for  food.  I  visit  my 
physician  in  order  to  obtain  treatment  from 
him;  he  prescribes  for  me  in  order  that  I  may 
get  well.  Pen,  apples,  and  the  acts  of  visiting 
and  treatment  are  of  contributory  value. 

Immediate  values,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
"  non-mediate."  They  do  not  look  forward  to 
an  end,  but  are  intrinsic,  self-sufficient.  They 
are  ends-in-themselves  in  the  sense  that  they 
are  simply  given  as  good  when  stated,  requiring 
neither  reference  to  any  object  or  act  beyond 
themselves,  nor  verification  of  any  kind.  Of 
such  character  are  objects  and  acts  which  I  like, 
demand,  admire,  approve,  wish,  want,  etc.  I 
admire  a  beautiful  vase;  it  thus  becomes  of 
value  to  me,  irrespective  of  any  other  vases 
that  I  admire.  I  disapprove  of  the  act  of  taking 
human  life;  the  act  of  killing  thereby  becomes 
of  negative  value  to  me.  Sailing  and  smoking 
are  valuable  to  me. 

§  2.     The  fundamental  character  of  the  dis- 


TWO   CLASSES    OF    VALUES  9 

tinction  between  immediate  and  contributory 
values  will  appear  when  their  psychological 
basis  is  taken  into  account.  Observe  first  that 
objects  and  acts  of  contributory  value  demand 
for  their  existence  other  objects  or  acts  to  which 
they  may  be  related.  They  cannot  stand  alone. 
For  a  government  note  to  be  of  the  value  of 
ten  dollars,  the  ten  dollars  must  actually  exist 
somewhere.  Apples,  considered  as  good  for 
food,  imply  the  existence  of  some  suitable  diges- 
tive apparatus.  If  my  visit  to  my  physician  is 
to  be  valuable  as  a  means  to  getting  well,  I  must 
now  be  capable  of  improvement  in  health  beyond 
my  present  state.  Now,  as  both  contributory 
and  instrumental  values  are  here  spoken  of  with 
reference  to  man,  it  is  obvious  that  the  psycho- 
logical basis  of  contributory  values  must  be 
sought  in  some  aspect  of  the  human  mind  by 
which  objects  and  acts  may  be  related  to  other 
objects  and  acts.  Cognition  alone  satisfies  this 
requirement.  We  may  say,  therefore,  that  con- 
tributory values  are  closely  associated  with 
the  cognitive  aspect  of  consciousness,  where 
comparison,  memory,  and  reasoning  furnish  a 
mechanism  for  relating  portions  of  our  ex- 
perience. 


10      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

Immediate  values,  on  the  other  hand,  do  not 
require  relation  of  two  ideas  in  consciousness. 
They  are  simple,  unique,  self-sufficing  facts. 
They  are  matters  of  taste,  and  "  de  gustibus 
non  disputandum."  What  is  the  importance  of 
the  cognitive  aspect  of  conscious  activity  with 
respect  to  such  values?  Must  I  know  them  in 
order  to  have  them?  Not  any  more  than  that 
the  leopard  must  know  that  he  has  spots  in 
order  to  have  them.  Knowledge  of  values, 
therefore,  is  quite  distinct  from  values  them- 
selves, and  we  shall  do  well  always  to  bear  this 
fact  in  mind. 

If  cognition  is  merely  incidental  to  immediate 
values,  the  psychological  basis  of  immediate 
values  must  be  sought  in  some  aspect  of  con- 
sciousness other  than  the  cognitive  aspect.  There 
remain,  in  the  popular  division,  the  fields  of  will 
and  feeling.  The  words  "  like,"  "  demand," 
"want,"  "admire,"  "approve,"  "wish,"  etc., 
which  describe  the  type  of  relation  that  exists 
between  the  individual  and  the  objects  or  acts 
which  he  immediately  values,  are  all  expressive 
of  feeling.  It  is  also  noteworthy  that,  if  the 
feeling  is  toward  an  object  or  act  which  the 
individual   is   not  possessing   or   doing   at   the 


TWO   CLASSES    OF   VALUES  ii 

time,  there  is  also  frequently  present  an  impulse 
to  gain  possession  of  the  object  or  to  do  the  act. 
If  I  am  sufficiently  eager  to  sail,  I  am  impelled 
to  go  down  to  the  lake  to  get  the  boat  ready. 
If  my  liking  for  peanuts  affects  me  deeply,  I 
am  likely  to  go  out  and  buy  some.  It  appears, 
therefore,  that  immediate  values  are  also  closely 
associated  with  the  will-aspect  of  consciousness, 
and  this  can  be  said  without  committing  oneself 
to  any  particular  theory  as  to  the  nature  of  that 
will-aspect.  In  the  case  of  contributory  values, 
however,  there  is  a  hypothetical  characteristic 
which  makes  their  relation  to  will  quite  differ- 
ent. Apples  are  good  for  food  if  I  am  hungry. 
My  pen  is  good  for  writing  when  1  want  to 
write.  In  these  examples,  there  is  no  impulse 
aroused  by  the  act  of  contributory  valuation; 
I  may  put  the  object  or  the  act  valued  to  service 
whenever  a  suitable  occasion  is  presented,  but 
the  object  or  act  will  not  itself  create  the  occa- 
sion. I  may  conclude,  therefore,  that  will  and 
-feeling  are  peculiarly  associated  with  immediate 
values,  and  cognition  with  contributory  values. 
§  3.  I  must  not  leave  this  preliminary  con- 
sideration of  the  psychological  basis  of  value 
without  a  caution  and  a  deduction.     The  cau- 


12      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

tion  is  that  the  assignment  of  two  classes  of 
values  to  different  fields  of  psychological  mani- 
festation must  not  be  held  to  imply  that  the 
individual  ever  acts  exclusively  in  any  one 
*'  field  "  of  consciousness.  Cognition,  feeling, 
and  will  are  aspects  of  a  conscious  activity 
which  is  undivided.  The  distinction  with  refer-  \ 
ence  to  value  is  one  of  emphasis  rather  than 
one  of  division.  More  than  that,  the  distinction 
implies  that  we  human  beings,  in  our  discussion 
and  discrimination  of  values,  recognize  that  we 
value  things  in  different  ways,  according  as  we 
think,  feel,  or  do  them.  But  this  is  not  to  deny 
the  presence  of  a  minimum  of  feeling  and  im- 
pulse necessary  to  the  presence  of  a  thought. 
There  are  all  gradations  of  emphasis  of  cog- 
nition, feeling,  and  will  in  conscious  activity, 
and  it  is  not  unlikely  that  we  may  find  situa- 
tions of  conscious  activity  in  which  both  classes 

^of  value  are  simultaneously  present.'  The  inter- 
relation of  the  two  classes  is,  in  fact,  a  subject 
of  future  discussion  in  this  thesis.  At  this 
juncture,  it  is  necessary  only  to  point  out  that 

'  I  do  not  mean  to  isolate  any  "  field  "  of  con- 
sciousness in  the  act,  but  only  to  emphasize  that 
the  two  classes  of  value  refer  exclusively  to 
different  aspects  of  conscious  activity.  / 


TWO    CLASSES    OF   VALUES  13 

The  deduction  which  I  wish  to  make  is  that 
contributory  values  have  a  measure  of  inde- 
pendence of  any  one  individual,  which  imme- 
diate values  cannot  claim.  Two  facts  make 
this  evident:  (a)  The  cognitive  function  by  its 
process  of  comparison  and  relation  of  ideas  one 
to  another  makes  contributory  values  independ- 
ent of  a  particular  time  or  moment  in  the  activ- 
ity of  the  individual.  If  my  umbrella  is  good 
for  keeping  off  the  rain,  it  is  good  for  that 
purpose  when  next  it  rains,  be  it  today,  next 
Wednesday,  or  next  month.  I  may  verify  con- 
tributory values.  I  may  find  out  what  my  um- 
brella is  good  for.  (b)  The  cognitive  function 
has  developed  the  convenient  method  of  expres- 
sion of  ideas  of  one  individual  to  another  by 
means  of  speech.  It  is  conceivable  that  I  might 
demonstrate  the  use  of  my  umbrella  to  a  soaked 
friend  by  gestures,  but  words  greatly  facilitate 
the  process.  In  this  way,  contributory  values 
are  made  independent  not  only  of  any  special 
moment  in  the  life  of  an  individual,  but  also  of 
any  particular  individual.  This  is  in  marked 
contrast  with  immediate  values:  the  communi- 
cation of  my  likes  and  dislikes  to  my  neighbor 
is  a  matter  of  some  difficulty,  and  sympathetic 


14      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

feeling  always  lacks  something  of  the  flavor  of 
the  original  experience. 

§  4.  ^  With  some  care,  the  terms  "  objective  " 
and  "  subjective  "  may  be  used  to  signify  the 
distinction  between  immediate  and  contributory 
values.  The  independence  which  has  just  been 
recognized  as  characteristic  of  contributory 
values  makes  "  objective  '*  an  appropriate  des- 
ignation for  them.  If  such  values  pass  as  coin 
among  the  members  of  a  community,  they  must 
cling  to  the  object  rather  than  to  the  persons 
who  employ  them.  This  is  not  to  say,  however, 
that  they  would  be  values  at  all  apart  from  the 
relation  of  the  objects  to  individuals  who  value 
them,  but  they  may  be  called  "  objective  *'  in 
deference  to  the  fact  that  they  do  not  depend 
for  their  existence  upon  any  particular  member 
of  a  community. 

§  5.  The  term  "  subjective,'*  in  contrast,  is 
applicable  to  at  least  some  immediate  values,  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  they  cannot  exist  apart 
from  the  conscious  activity  of  some  particular 
individuaj^ 

§  6.  The  second  task  which  I  set  for  myself 
at  the  beginning  of  the  chapter  was  that  of 
indicating  certain  classes  of  values  over  whose 


TWO   CLASSES    OF    VALUES  15 

position  there  is  some  dispute.  The  current 
differences  of  opinion  are  nearly  all  due  to  one 
fact,  namely,  that  it  is  possible  to  use  the  cog- 
nitive function  of  conscious  activity  to  express 
in  thought  and  language  facts  of  immediate 
value. 

As  we  have  seen,  it  is  necessary  that  there 
be  a  cognitive  minimum  in  order  to  be  conscious 
of  an  immediate  value.  This  element,  however, 
at  first  at  a  minimum,  may  grow  to  the  very 
limit  of  cognitive  development  and  attain  ex- 
pression in  the  judgment.  If  apples  are  of 
immediate  value,  I  may  think  of  them  as  such, 
and  I  may  make  the  judgment,  "  I  like  apples." 
Some  writers  now  argue  thus :  **  I  like  apples  " 
is  a  judgment.  Judgments  are  capable  of  veri- 
fication. But  immediate  values  do  not  demand 
verification.  Therefore  judgments  of  immedi- 
ate values  are  immediately  true.  It  is  further 
argued  that  truth,  not  only  of  value- judgments 
but  also  all  truth,  is  of  immediate  value,  because, 
it  is  claimed,  in  judgment  there  is  always  an 
element  of  approval  or  disapproval  on  the  part 
of  the  judging  individual.  Clearly,  therefore, 
truth  is  a  value  whose  assignment  is  in  dispute, 
if,  indeed,  it  be  a  value  at  all. 


i6      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

Again,  in  the  judgment  "  I  admire  the  vase/' 
there  is  expressed  a  fact  of  immediate  value. 
Suppose  that,  in  my  admiration,  I  pronounce  it 
beautiful.  Is  the  beauty  a  quality  of  the  vase, 
or  only  my  feeling  toward  it?  If  the  beauty 
is  in  the  vase,  there  must  be  some  standard  of 
beauty  outside  my  consciousness,  and  the  imme- 
diate value  of  appreciation  of  the  beautiful  will 
not  be  subjective,  but  objective.  The  place  of 
aesthetic  values,  therefore,  is  in  dispute. 

Again,  in  judging  an  action  to  be  good,  am 
I  expressing  only  my  feeling  toward  it,  or  is  my 
feeling  governed  by  the  presence  of  an  objective 
standard  of  moral  value  which  I  instinctively 
recognize?  Is  it  true  that  there  is  nothing 
good  or  bad,  but  thinking  makes  it  so?  Or  is 
there  a  moral  standard,  quite  independent  of 
my  sentiments,  which  is  valid  for  all  time?  The 
place  of  moral  values,  therefore,  is  in  dispute. 

§  7.  To  discuss  these  disputed  points  will  be 
a  part  of  what  follows.  At  this  point,  however, 
it  is  suitable  to  distinguish  carefully  between  a 
fact  of  immediate  value,  and  the  expression  of 
that  same  fact  in  a  judgment  about  immediate 
value.  My  feeling  toward  the  vase  is  quite  a 
distinct  and  separate  thing  from  the  judgment 


TWO   CLASSES    OF   VALUES  17 

**  The  vase  is  beautiful."  The  one  does  not 
necessitate  the  other.  I  might  Hke  the  vase, 
and  never  put  my  Hking  into  words;  or  I  might 
say,  "  The  vase,  no  doubt,  is  beautiful,  but  I 
feel  no  liking  for  it."  Judgments  of  immediate 
values,  therefore,  do  not  derive  immediacy  from 
the  immediate  values  which  they  state.  The 
psychological  basis  outlined  earlier  in  the  chap- 
ter must  be  preserved.  Judgments,  even  judg- 
ments of  immediate  value,  since  they  fall  within 
the  field  of  cognition,  must  be  classed  with  con- 
tributory values,  if  they  are  values  at  all.  And 
strange  as  it  may  appear,  the  judgment  that  a 
vase  is  immediately  beautiful  will  be  found  to 
be  of  contributory  value."^  .  3 

Discussion  of  the  possible  existence  of  ob- 
jective moral  and  aesthetic  standards  may  be 
postponed  to  a  later  chapter.  But  discussion 
of  the  status  of  truth  may  not  be  postponed, 
because,  if  truth  should  be  found  to  be  imme- 
diate and  antecedent  to  judgment,  the  distinc- 
tion between  immediate  and  contributory  values 
would  be  of  slight  consequence.  There  would 
then  be  too  little  separation  between  certain 
values  with  reference  to  the  cognitive  function 

1  Cf.  page  58. 


i8      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

and  certain  other  values  with  reference  to  the 
feeling-function  of  conscious  activity  to  make 
the  distinction  worth  while.  My  next  task, 
therefore,  is  that  of  discussing  the  place  of 
truth  in  a  classification  of  values. 

The  substance  of  this  chapter  may  be  sum- 
marized as  follows: 

§  I.  It  is  generally  agreed  that  there  are  two 
groups  of  values  which  are  distinct  and  separate 
and  which  may  be  named  immediate  and  con- 
tributory values. 

The  distinction  is  a  logical  one:  contributory 
values  are  means  to  ends;  immediate  values  are 
given  as  good. 

§  2.  The  psychological  basis  of  contributory 
values  is  the  cognitive  aspect  of  conscious  activ- 
ity; that  of  immediate  values  is  the  feeling- 
aspect,  often  joined  with  the  will-aspect. 

§  3.  It  is  not  implied  that  any  aspect  of  con- 
sciousness functions  without  the  presence  of  the 
other  aspects. 

§  4.  "  Objective  '^  applied  to  contributory 
values  means  that  they  do  not  depend  for  their 
existence  upon  a  particular  individual.  "  Sub- 
jective "    applied    to    immediate    values    means 


TWO   CLASSES    OF   VALUES  19 

that  they  do  depend  for  their  existence  upon 
some  particular  individual. 

§  5.  It  is  generally  agreed  that  contributory 
values  are  objective  in  this  sense;  and  that  some 
immediate  values  are  subjective. 

§  6.  Whether  there  are  objective  immediate 
values,  in  the  realms  of  truth,  beauty,  and  mor- 
ality, is  a  disputed  question. 

§  7.  Confusion  between  the  classes  of  con- 
tributory and  immediate  values  has  been  due 
largely  to  the  fact  that  it  is  possible  to  make 
judgments  as  to  immediate  values. 


y 


CHAPTER     II 

TRUTH    AND    IMMEDIATE    VALUE 

A  CHIEF  distinction  between  immediate 
and  contributory  values  is  that  the 
latter  admit  of  verification,  while  the 
former  do  not.  If  a  friend  tells  me  that  a  cer- 
tain brand  of  soap  is  good  for  taking  off  dirt, 
I  can  very  quickly  find  out  for  myself  whether 
what  he  says  is  true  or  not.  I  can  discover 
whether  soap  is  contributory  to  the  end  of  cleans- 
ing. But  if  my  friend  tells  me  that  he  likes  a 
perfume,  I  cannot  verify  the  immediate  value  of 
his  liking.  He  simply  likes  it,  and  it  is  valuable 
to  him  without  any  ado.  Whether  I  find  it 
agreeable,  or  what  his  other  friends  think  about 
it,  makes  no  difference;  for  him,  it  is  of  imme- 
diate value. 

Certain  writers,  however,  tell  us  that  the  veri- 
fication of  the  soap  as  contributory  to  cleansing 
is  not  merely  a  matter  of  using  it  and  watching 
its  effect  upon  the  skin.  They  say  that  the 
process  of  trial  and  observation  is  of  secondary 
importance  beside  recognition  of  the  truth  that 
soap  cleanses.     And  this  recognition,  they  say, 

20 


TRUTH   AND    IMMEDIATE   VALUE         21 

has  nothing  to  do  with  verification,  but  is  based 
on  a  powerful  compulsion  of  the  feeling-side  of 
consciousness  to  assent  to  it  as  true.  Truth, 
they  say,  is  thus  an  immediate  value. 

Now  if  truth  be  an  immediate  value,  all  those 
values  which  I  designated  as  contributory  are, 
in  the  last  analysis,  immediate,  or,  at  least,  based 
on  immediate  values.  My  whole  thesis,  on  the 
other  hand,  assumes  that  there  are  the  two 
classes  of  values,  immediate  and  contributory, 
and  that  they  are  coordinate  in  rank.  It  be- 
comes of  first  importance,  therefore,  to  disprove 
the  theory  that  truth  is  an  immediate  value. 

A  very  subtle  psychological  argument  has 
been  advanced  to  prove  this  theory.  The  keen- 
est piece  of  analysis  in  its  support  has  been 
made  by  H.  Rickert  in  his  Der  Gegenstand  der 
Erkenntnis}  It  will  be  profitable  to  summarize 
and  criticize  Rickert's  position. 

Starting  with  the  classic  conception  of  truth 
as  located  in  the  judgment,^  Rickert  emphasizes 
the  practical  character  of  knowledge.  He  ob- 
serves that  there  is  no  truth  where  there  is  only 
a  succession  of  perceptions,  and  that  the  fully 

1  Rickert,  H.,  Der  Gegenstand  der  Erkenntnis,  Tubingen  und 
Leipzig,  2  Aufl.,  1904. 

2  Op.  cit.,  84  ff. 


N 


22      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

developed  logical  judgment  appears  only  when 
the  individual  takes  an  interest  (Anteil)  in  the 
perceptions.  He  says  that  affirmation  or  nega- 
tion is  logically  implied  in  all  judgments  which 
are  held  to  contain  knowledge  in  the  sense  of 
true  knowledge.  Thus,  knowing  is  appreci- 
ating (Kennen  ist  Erkennen).  But  apprecia- 
tion has  to  do  only  with  values;  therefore  truth 
is  a  value.  The  value  truth  is  coordinate  with 
values  derived  from  willing  and  feeling;  that 
is,  truth  is  an  immediate  value.  The  usual 
opposition  made  between  perceptions  and  judg- 
ments, on  the  one  hand,  and  feeling  and  willing, 
on  the  other,  is  false;  the  true  opposition  is 
between  perceiving,  on  the  one  hand,  and  judg- 
ments of  affirmation  and  negation  together  with 
feeling  and  willing,  on  the  other.  Affirmation 
and  negation,  since  they  are  expressive  of  inter- 
est, are  a  kind  of  approval  or  disapproval,  pleas- 
ure or  displeasure.  Knowing  is  a  process  deter- 
mined through  the  feelings.  But  truth  differs 
from  the  appreciation  that  comes  with  feelings 
other  than  affirmation  or  negation,  in  that  the 
appreciation  that  comes  with  chance  feelings 
(i.e.,  immediate  values)  is  unstable,  whereas 
the   feeling  that  appreciates  truth  is  timeless. 


TRUTH   AND    IMMEDIATE    VALUE         23 

A  necessity  of  judgment  is  here  felt,  different 
from  the  necessity  of  perceiving  (causal  neces- 
sity). Necessity  of  judgment  is  logical  neces- 
sity, Sollen,  in  contradistinction  to  Miissen. 
Sollen  precedes  Sein  in  existential  judgments, 
because  Sein  is  only  expressible  by  a  judgment. 
Now  if  this  doctrine  is  sound,  it  is  obvious 
that  any  separation  of  two  classes  of  values, 
one  of  which  excludes  the  element  of  judgment, 
is  vitiated.  For  Rickert  makes  the  true  judg- 
ment dependent  upon  a  necessary  feeling  of 
appreciation;  that  is,  he  makes  of  it  an  imme- 
diate value.  According  to  his  theory,  the  truth 
of  my  judgment  "  The  tree  is  green  "  is  ground- 
ed in  a  transcendental  Sollen  which  compels  me 
to  judge  it  as  green,  if  I  judge  at  all.  There 
is  an  immediate  feeling  of  affirmation,  appreci- 
ation, recognition,  which  requires  me  to  say 
"  green  "  rather  than  blue  or  red.  Every  fact 
implies  a  judgment.^  In  the  preceding  chapter,* 
I  made  the  distinction  between  facts  of  imme- 
diate value  and  judgment  concerning  the  truth 
or  falsity  of  these  facts.  According  to  Rickert, 
I  must  have  fallen  into  that  ''  Positivismus,  der 
die  '  Tatsache '  und  ihre  Konstatieriing  fUr  das 

3  op.  cit.,  130. 
*Page  16. 

3 


24      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

einzige  und  letzte  ansieht,  was  den  Philosophen 
kummert/'  ^  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  at  this 
point  to  criticize  Rickert's  position: 

§  I.  The  doctrine  that  Sein  depends  upon  a 
transcendental  Sollen,  is  equivalent  to  saying 
that  metaphysics  is  dependent  upon  epistemol- 
ogy,  and  many  are  the  objections  against  such 
a  position/  Here  it  may  be  remarked  that 
Rickert,  as  all  others  who  adopt  that  standpoint, 
does  not  live  up  to  his  doctrine.  If  it  be  true, 
as  he  states  on  p.  130,  that  existential  facts 
imply  a  prior  judgment,  correct  method  would 
demand  the  proof  of  his  theory  on  the  basis  of 
necessary  judgments.  Such  a  theory  must  not 
be  constructed  from  any  materials  outside  the 
sphere  of  judgments  recognized  (appreciated) 
as  true.  What  apparently  contradicts  such  a 
requirement  is  to  be  found  on  pp.  88-89.  I^ 
these  pages,  Rickert  distinguishes  between  the 
quaestio  facti  of  psychology  and  the  quaestio 
juris  of  epistemology.  He  says  that  psychology 
is  concerned  with  Sein,  but  he  adds,  '' Sieht 
man  die  Feststellung  solcher  Tatsacken  als 
Aufgabe  der  Psychologie  an,  so  muss  auch  die 

5  Rickert,  op.  cit.,  130. 

«  Cf.  Marvin,  W.  T.,  The  New  Realism,  43-95. 


TRUTH  AND   IMMEDIATE   VALUE         25 

Behandlung  der  Frage  nach  dem  erkenntnis- 
theoretischen  Wesen  des  Urteils  mit  psycho- 
logischen  Feststellungen  beginnen,  um  dann  zu 
sehen,  welchen  Dienst  sie  fur  das  Verstdndnis 
des  logischen  Urteilshe griff es  leisten  konnenf 
This  is  to  say,  you  must  start  with  certain  ex- 
istential facts  in  order  to  obtain  a  basis  for 
consideration  of  the  judgment.  Later/  he  says 
that  it  is  immaterial  whether  all  judgments,  psy- 
chologically speaking,  contain  either  an  affirma- 
tion or  a  negation,  for  the  epistemological  prob- 
lem concerns  only  those  which  do  imply  one. 
His  developed  theory,  however,  claims  that  all 
knowledge  (true  knowledge  —  even  existential 
facts)  contains  an  affirmation  or  a  negation. 
What  of  the  facts  taken  from  psychology  which 
he  used  to  erect  his  theory?  He  has  assumed 
the  knowledge  of  certain  facts  in  order  to  prove 
a  theory  of  the  dependence  of  reality  on  knowl- 
edge.    It  is  an  error  of  method. 

§  2.  The  position  of  Rickert,  in  holding  that 
-existential  facts  imply  judgments,  is  to  the  effect 
that  there  are  immediate  truths.  We  know 
existential  truth  with  existence,  and  the  latter 
cannot  be  regarded  as  independent  of  the  for- 

^  Rickert,  op.  cit.,  96. 


26      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

mer.  Rickert  is  not  alone  in  supposing  that 
there  are  immediate  truths.  This  theory  is  held 
by  Russell  ^  and  by  James,  among  moderns.  In 
the  case  of  James,  however,  perhaps  it  is  more 
a  question  of  terminology,  as  knowledge,  in  his 
use  of  the  word,  is  not  restricted  to  propositions. 

Dewey  (in  a  conversation  with  the  writer) 
has  brought  a  cogent  argument  in  criticism  of 
this  doctrine  of  immediate  truths.  In  the  prop- 
osition "  It  is  green,"  a  whole  background  of 
experience  is  presupposed,  the  comparison  of 
colors.  If  the  judgment  is  to  be  verified,  the 
use  of  spectrum  analysis  will  be  required.  The 
truth  of  the  simplest  "  atomic "  proposition, 
therefore,  is  dependent  upon  a  great  number  of 
"  molecular  "  propositions.  "  It  is  green  ''  may 
be  a  "  snap  judgment,''  associating  a  particular 
phenomenon  with  others  that  I  have  experi- 
enced, or  it  may  involve  the  services  of  an  ex- 
pert physicist,  as  in  a  law  court.  In  either  case, 
truth  is  a  matter  of  inference,  and  the  process 
is  no  simple,  compelling  affirmation,  but  a  har- 
monization with  past  experience  by  comparison. 

§  3.  If,  therefore,  truth  always  involves  some 
kind  of  inference,  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as 

8  Cf.  Russell,  Bertrand,  Scientific  Method  in  Philosophy,  52  ff- 


TRUTH  AND    IMMEDIATE   VALUE         27 

an  "  immediate  truth."  But  what  shall  we  say 
of  the  affirmation  or  negation  which  we  are 
"compelled"  to  give  to  existential  judgments? 
It  seems  to  me  that  Rickert  has  been  misled  by 
his  polemic  against  the  object  of  knowledge 
conceived  as  "  independent "  of  the  individual. 
He  feels  that,  if  this  conception  is  abandoned, 
a  substitute  must  be  found,  not  so  crude,  but 
still  independent.  Thereupon  he  infers  an  in- 
dependent Sollen  from  our  feeling  of  necessity 
in  affirming  existential  judgments.  My  criti- 
cism here  is  that  the  question  of  what  is  the 
object  of  knowledge  need  not  be  introduced  to 
account  for  the  affirmation  or  negation  that  we 
feel  compelled  to  make.  We  need  postulate 
only  a  center  of  experience,  a  succession  of 
phenomena,  memory,  and  association.  Affirma- 
tion or  negation  will  then  be  accounted  for  on 
the  basis  of  agreement  or  disagreement  of  the 
phenomena  by  comparison  in  memory.  Truth 
will  then  be  applicable  to  those  judgments  which 
'state  relations  that  have  proved  constant.  From 
the  epistemological  standpoint,  it  is  wholly  naive 
to  seek  an  object  that  compels  us  to  recognize 
similarity. 

§  4.     Perhaps  it  may  be  urged  that,  in  the 


28      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

preceding  section,  terms  have  been  assumed 
wrongfully  to  be  given  before  relations,  and 
that  we  have  no  right  to  use  terms  to  explain 
the  judgment,  inasmuch  as  terms  themselves 
imply  existential  judgments.  My  answer  to 
this  objection  is:  How  then  does  Rickert  feel 
justified  in  speaking  of  an  opposition  between 
perceiving  (Vorstellen)  and  a  class  comprised 
of  judgments  of  affirmation  and  negation,  Fuh- 
len,  and  Wollen?  What  are  perceptions  if  not 
terms?  And,  if  they  are  existential  judgments, 
how  may  they  be  opposed  to  judgments?  And 
how  can  Rickert  say  that,  when  there  is  only  a 
succession  of  perceptions,  truth  cannot  enter? 

My  conclusion  is  that  affirmation  or  negation 
must  not  be  held  to  be  of  more  than  incidental 
importance  where  the  truth  of  judgments  is 
concerned,  and  that  its  psychological  explana- 
tion is  ultimate. 

§  5.  Rickert's  correlation  of  Bejahen  oder 
Verneinen  with  Billigen  oder  Missbilligen  and 
Gef alien  oder  Missf alien  is  crude  and  super- 
ficial. Because  there  is  an  "  either-or  "  in  the 
case  of  Fuhlen  and  Wollen  which  distinguishes 
positive  and  negative  immediate  values,  he  con- 
cludes, without  justification,  that  the  "  either- 


TRUTH   AND    IMMEDIATE    VALUE         29 

or "  of  affirmation  or  negation  in  Denken  is 
similar  in  kind.  It  is  undeniably  true  that, 
when  we  affirm  or  deny  a  proposition,  the  ele- 
ments of  will  and  feeling  are  present  in  the 
act  of  affirming  or  denying.  This  is  to  say  no 
more  than  that  the  fields  of  cognition,  feeling, 
and  activity  are  never  isolated.  It  is  quite 
another  matter,  however,  to  conclude  that  feel- 
ings determine  knowledge.^  The  true  correla- 
tion is,  that,  in  connection  with  judgments  and 
feelings  and  desires,  there  is  a  removal  of  some 
kind  of  opposition;  but  this  is  not  to  say  that 
the  determining  factor  is  one  of  the  elements, 
any  more  than  another.  It  would  be  just  as 
warrantable  to  say  that  cognition  determines  all 
feelings  or  all  desires.  No,  there  is  opposition 
that  is  removed  in  Fiihlen,  Denken,  and  Wollen, 
but  the  same  factor  does  not  operate  in  each  of 
the  three  classes.  One  would  have  expected 
that  Rickert  would  have  hesitated  to  make 
Fiihlen  responsible  for  Erkennen,  in  view  of 
Jhis  recognition  of  the  timeless '^'^  character  of 
the  "  either-or "  of  affirmation  and  negation. 
It  would  seem  that  this  timeless  character 
should  have  made  it  evident  to  him  that  the 

•Rickert,  op.  cit.,  106.  10  0/>.  cit.,  112. 


30      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

factor  of  interest "  on  the  part  of  the  individual 
is  entirely  incidental  to  the  truth  or  falsity  of 
judgments.     It  is  psychological,  not  logical. 

To  summarize  the  arguments,  it  may  be  said 
that  truth  is  not  an  immediate  value  because: 

§  I.  The  theory  rests  on  a  false  derivation 
of  metaphysics  from  epistemology ; 

§  2.  Truth,  even  existential  truth,  is  infer- 
ential ; 

§  3.  A  transcendental  Sollen  is  superfluous, 
and  unwarranted  by  the  "  feeling  of  the  neces- 
sity of  judgment"; 

§  4.  The  theory  does  not  account  for  the 
existence  of  perceptions  apart  from  judgment, 
though  it  presupposes  them; 

§  5.     The  theory  of  the  dependence  of  truth 
on  the  interest  of  individuals  is  logically  un- 
sound. 
"  Op.  cit,  105. 


CHAPTER     III 

THE     INTERRELATION     OF     VALUES 
WITH   RESPECT   TO   THEIR  ORIGIN 

NOW  that  it  has  been  demonstrated 
that  truth  is  not  an  immediate  value, 
the  way  is  cleared  for  discussion  of 
the  interrelations  of  the  two  classes  of  values. 
I  purpose  following  an  order  which  might  be 
called  the  "  natural  history  of  values."  I  shall 
endeavor  successively  to  answer  the  questions, 
"  Where  do  values  begin  in  the  development  of 
conscious  life?"  "What  is  their  progress  in 
the  course  of  evolution?"  "What  happens 
when  we  talk  about  them?"  and  "How  are 
the  two  classes  related  in  our  daily  experi- 
ence? "  The  first  part  of  my  discussion,  there- 
fore, will  be  biological  and  psychological,  the 
second,  epistemological,  and  the  third,  biological 
and  psychological. 

Before  proceeding  with  the  first  part  of  my 
task,  it  will  be  necessary  to  describe  the  stand- 
point from  which  discussion  of  the  origin  of 
values  is  possible.  Then  I  shall  describe  a 
series  of  steps  in  the  development  of  contribu- 
tory  and   immediate   values   from   the   earliest 

31 


32      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

Stages  of  conscious  activity  to  the  mature,  re- 
flective consciousness  of  the  educated  man. 

§  I .  It  was  stated  in  the  first  chapter  ^  that 
knowledge  of  an  immediate  value  is  not  neces- 
sary to  its  existence.  This  thesis  bears  two 
interpretations,  both  of  which  are  true  and 
applicable.  It  may  mean :  When  I  like  a  thing, 
I  don't  have  to  think  or  speak  of  it  as  a  value. 
It  may  also  mean:  The  feeling  I  have  toward 
an  object  that  I  like  is  quite  distinct  from  my 
knowledge  of  that  feeling.  Now  these  two 
interpretations  of  the  independence  of  immedi- 
ate value  of  knowledge  thus  express  the  truths 
that  (a)  the  immediate  value  is  independent  of 
the  judgment,  and  (b)  the  immediate  value  is 
independent  of  its  being  thought.  More  ex- 
plicitly, the  latter  proposition  means  that  my 
actual  liking  for  grapes  is  different  in  kind 
from  my  thought  about  that  actual  liking. 

We  may  also  argue  that  contributory  values 
may  exist  apart  from  the  judgment.  Objects 
may  be  valued  as  means  without  judging  them 
to  be  such.  A  man  may  find  a  branch  useful 
for  raising  a  stone.  We  may  suppose  him  to 
be  so  accustomed  to  raising  stones  with  branches 

1  Page  10. 


WITH    RESPECT    TO   ORIGIN  33 

that  he  gives  no  thought  to  the  means  which  he 
employs.  He  simply  picks  up  a  stick  and  uses 
it  as  a  lever.  Such  actions,  in  which  we  utilize 
past  experience  habitually  without  the  medium 
of  judgment,  are  of  every-day  occurrence.  We 
may  even  use  means  instinctively,  without  ever 
having  made  judgment.  The  baby  who  searches 
for  its  mother's  breast  with  hands  and  mouth 
is  employing  the  latter  as  means  without  under- 
standing them  to  be  such.  Birds  search  in- 
stinctively for  materials  out  of  which  to  build 
their  nests.  The  judgment  evidently  represents 
a  very  high  level  in  the  development  of  con- 
tributory values. 

§  2.  In  seeking  for  a  standpoint  from  which 
to  discuss  the  origin  and  development  of  values, 
it  is  evident  that  we  must  go  back  of  the  judg- 
ment. It  is  evident  that  values  of  both  classes 
may  be  present  in  consciousness  without  the 
presence  of  judgment.  There  is  a  difficulty, 
however,  that  confronts  us  when  we  come  to 
discuss  the  development  of  values  from  the 
earliest  stage  of  consciousness.  It  is  not  an 
epistemological  difficulty,  but  rather  a  difficulty 
of  standpoint. 

In   discussing  value,   it  is   quite  possible  to 


34      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

confine  oneself  to  the  standpoint  of  the  one 
who  values.  We  may  consider  how  much  a 
man  likes  or  dislikes  something,  or  the  value 
which  he  places  on  certain  things,  or  the  use- 
fulness of  certain  articles  to  him  in  accomplish- 
ing what  he  aims  to  accomplish. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  quite  possible  to  take 
the  standpoint  of  the  spectator  or  observer,  from 
the  vantage-ground  of  the  high  plane  of  judg- 
ment. Then  we  may  point  out  that  certain 
things  or  actions  were  valuable  to  the  man, 
were  to  his  advantage.  He  may  quite  accident- 
ally have  engaged  room  and  board  at  a  house 
where  one  who  was  to  become  his  lifelong  friend 
was  staying.  We  may  say  that  his  coming  to 
that  house  was  a  valuable  action  on  his  part, 
in  view  of  the  good  fortune  that  came  to  him 
later  from  the  friendship.  We  may  say  that 
the  value  which  contributed  most  to  Henry's 
success  was  his  up-bringing  in  a  home  of  cul- 
ture. In  these  cases,  the  values  of  which  we 
speak  are  means  to  definite  ends,  but  they  are 
means  to  ends  of  which  the  observer,  not  the 
agent,  is  thinking.  From  the  standpoint  of  the 
agent,  they  are  simply  causes  leading  to  effects. 
This  is  indeed  the  difference  between  a  con- 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   ORIGIN  35 

tributory  value  and  a  cause:  to  be  of  contribu- 
tory value,  the  element  of  interest  must  be 
added.  And  this  interest  may  be  that  of  the 
agent  or  of  the  spectator. 

If  it  appear  that  the  distinction  just  drawn  is 
confined  to  contributory  value,  observe  also  that 
immediate  value  was  seen  to  be  independent  of 
its  being  thought.^  I  very  much  doubt  whether 
any  one  will  claim  that  the  feelings  of  a  man 
when  he  was  a  baby  and  could  not  understand 
them,  were  more  than  mechanical.  One  would 
hardly  say  that  they  were  the  same  in  signifi- 
cance as  the  likes  and  dislikes  of  later  years. 
And  yet,  from  our  standpoint,  we  can  look  down 
and  say  that  the  infantile  pleasures  and  pains 
were  exhibitions  of  felt  goods  as  much  as  the 
likes  and  dislikes  of  later  life.  We  are  again 
confronted  with  the  distinction  between  the 
standpoints  of  the  agent  and  the  observer. 

What  point  of  view  are  we  to  adopt  in  the 
discussion  of  the  origin  and  development  of 
values?  That  of  the  observer,  surely,  for  our 
subject  in  this  aspect  reaches  back  long  before 
ideation  reached  perfection.  And  yet  we  must 
bear  the  distinction  in  mind,  for  we  shall  dis- 
2  Page  32. 


36      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

cover  that  two  equally  reasonable  interpreta- 
tions of  certain  situations  are  made  harmonious 
only  by  being  shown  to  proceed  from  two  differ- 
ent points  of  view.  This  preliminary  word  on 
standpoint,  therefore,  is  in  the  nature  of  a  cau- 
tion and  a  warning. 

§  3.  It  is  quite  obvious  that  the  meaning  of 
the  earliest  stage  of  consciousness  in  terms  of 
value  can  be  discussed  only  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  observer.  There  could  be  neither  a  felt 
good  nor  an  instrument  directed  toward  an  end, 
where  no  consciousness  was  present.  What  do 
we  mean  when  we  speak  of  a  value  in  connec- 
tion with  the  appearance  of  the  earliest  stage  of 
consciousness?  We  cannot  mean  a  felt  good, 
for  our  whole  process  of  observation  is  bound 
up  with  judgment  on  our  part.  We  can  only 
mean  that  the  appearance  of  the  earliest  stage 
of  consciousness  was  valuable  to  an  end  which 
we  have  in  view,  viz.,  the  development  of  con- 
scious life.  It  may  be  said,  therefore,  that, 
from  the  observer's  standpoint,  the  earliest 
stage  of  consciousness,  whatever  may  have  been 
the  nature  of  its  elements,  was  of  contributory 
value  to  the  developing  organism. 

§  4.     This  is  not  the  place  to  frame  a  general 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   ORIGIN  37 

theory  of  the  origin  of  consciousness.      It  is 
necessary,  however,  that  we  examine  the  origin 
of  the  earhest  stage  to  such  an  extent  that  we 
may  learn  what  element  there  is  in  it  to  cause 
us  to  ascribe  value  to  the  stage.      Perhaps  it 
may  be  said  that  it  is  sufficient  that  conscious-. ^ 
ness  led  to  the  creation  of  value  on  the  part  of 
the  individual  himself,  and  this  is  a  true  answer. 
But  we  may  inquire  further:  what  are  the  con- 
ditions of  the  earliest   stage  of   consciousness 
which  cause  us  to  recognize  it  as  a  means  to 
the  appearance  of  value  in  the  individual  him- 
self?    Perhaps  there  are  general  conditions  ap- 
pearing which  are  biological  concomitants  of  all 
values.     Unless  some  such  thing  be  found  to  be 
true,   we  might   say  that   all  evolution  in  the 
organic  world  was  of  contributory  value  with 
respect  to   the   development   of  conscious   life, 
and  value  would   thereby  be   indistinguishable 
from  causation  viewed  anthropocentrically.     It 
is,  of  course,  permissible  for  the  spectator  to 
look  at  the  whole  universe  from  the  standpoint 
of  man;  an  individual  human  being  may  even 
consider  all  past  progress  in  every  sphere  of 
development  as  focussed  on  the  great  event  of 
his  appearance  in  the  world.     But  such  a  way 


/ 


38      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

of  thinking  would  be  regarded  justly  as  one- 
sided, in  view  of  the  existence  of  so  many  other 
human  standpoints.  And  so  we  must  look  upon 
man  as  man,  and  life  as  life,  and  not  commit 
ourselves  to  an  evaluation  of  the  universe  which 
will  neglect  the  claims  of  other  entities. 

If  we  are  right,  therefore,  in  ascribing  con- 
tributory value  to  the  earliest  stage  of  conscious- 
ness, there  must  be  some  aspect  of  the  causal 
elements  of  the  situation  which  is  of  interest  to 
the  development  of  consciousness.  The  observer 
will  here  assume  the  standpoint  of  consciousness 
itself.  He  might  say,  "  I  am  conscious  activity. 
When  the  causal  nexus  brought  me  into  being, 
what  were  the  factors  that  were  responsible  for 
my  appearance  ?  I  shall  regard  these  as  of  con- 
tributory value  to  my  very  existence." 

It  should  be  observed  that  an  earliest  value 
of  the  kind  that  I  have  described  will  be,  by  its 
very  nature,  not  an  individual  element  of  the 
causal  chain,  or  even  several  individual  elements ; 
it  will  rather  be  a  certain  situation  that  occurs 
in  the  course  of  evolution.  This  situation  will 
not  be  identical  with  the  sum  of  all  the  factors 
concerned  in  the  event;  it  will  rather  be  a  selec- 
tion  of   those    factors   which   characterize   the 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   ORIGIN  39 

complete  situation  as  being  conscious,  not  un- 
conscious. 

To  recapitulate:  we  are  seeking  a  situation 
which  is  marked  by  interest,  as  contrasted  with 
previous  situations  which  do  not  contain  this. 
This  situation  will  be  the  earliest  contributory 
value  from  the  standpoint  of  consciousness,  as 
interpreted  by  a  spectator. 

If  we  attempted  to  describe  the  whole  situa- 
tion that  marks  the  transition  from  the  uncon- 
scious to  the  conscious,  we  should  be  trying  to 
solve  a  problem  which  has  baffled  psychologists 
for  centuries.  This  is  not  our  task,  let  me 
repeat.  We  seek  a  minor  situation,  the  point 
at  which  we  spectators  see  interest  to  enter. 

Whatever  may  be  the  ultimate  factors  which 
distinguish  the  presence  of  life  from  its  absence, 
it  is  certain  that,  in  the  lowest  forms  of  life, 
we  have  a  substance  of  highly  complex  chemical 
structure  which  is  extremely  sensitive  to  con- 
tact. This  substance,  protoplasm,  is  capable  of 
reacting  to  a  variety  of  stimuli.  As  long  as 
the  reactions  are  separate  events,  unrelated  to 
previous  reactions  in  more  than  a  mechanical 
way,  we  cannot  speak  of  value  in  connection 
with  the  process.    It  is  when  the  living  structure 


40      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

reacts  to  its  environment  in  a  round-about  way, 
when  some  factor  appears  within  the  organism 
and  overcomes  an  opposition,  that  we  can  first 
say  that  a  contributory  value  is  present.  To 
illustrate,  suppose  a  living,  motile  cell  to  be 
subject  to  a  variety  of  stimuli.  It  swims  about 
in  a  pool  of  water,  drawn  hither  and  thither  by 
the  influence  of  light,  currents  of  water,  tem- 
perature, perhaps  color.  If  you  could  reckon 
all  the  stimuli  and  manipulate  them,  you  could 
turn  the  cell  into  any  direction  of  locomotion 
that  you  pleased.  Now  suppose  there  came  a 
time  when  the  cell  responded  in  an  unusual  way 
to  a  stimulus.  You  know,  however,  by  hypo- 
thesis, all  of  the  possible  stimuli  from  without 
the  organism,  and  therefore  can  describe  what 
has  happened  only  by  saying  that  some  new 
factor  has  entered  into  the  field  and  has  neutral- 
ized or  overcome  the  opposition  of  the  stimulus 
which  you  projected.  Here,  I  believe,  we  have 
the  earliest  stage  of  life  in  which  we  may  speak 
of  the  presence  of  a  value. 

Now  it  is  very  easy  to  say  that  no  situation 
of  this  kind  ever  occurred.  I  think,  however, 
that  it  will  be  possible  to  show  that  something 
like  it  must  have  occurred.     Psychologists  tell 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   ORIGIN  41 

us  that  primitive  conscious  activity  is  marked 
by  rudimentary  elements  of  cognition,  feeling, 
and  will.  They  are  not  able  to  agree  which  of 
the  three  is  the  most  primitive  aspect,  but  some 
declare  that  all  of  them  must  be  considered 
equally  fundamental  —  the  will-aspect,  perhaps, 
being  associated  with  activity  in  general.  To 
have  rudimentary  aspects  of  cognition  and  feel- 
ing, however,  it  is  necessary  that  at  least  two 
sensations  be  related  internally,  and  that  there 
be  a  difference  felt  between  them.  Now  I  main- 
tain that  the  situation  in  which  this  could  have 
come  about  would  contain  a  relation  of  organ- 
ism to  environment  in  which  an  opposition  was 
somehow  circumvented  by  the  organism.  "  Feel- 
ing the  difference  between  two  stimuli "  would 
involve  an  independent  action  on  the  part  of  the 
organism.  We  know  that  life  has  developed  so 
that  living  beings  have  become  centers  of  con- 
scious activity.  There  must  have  been  some 
point  of  transition.  We  may  be  sure  that,  what- 
ever the  situation  may  have  been  in  its  entirety, 
it  included  the  phenomenon  of  an  opposition  of 
the  organism  to  an  environmental  stimulus  which 
failed  to  work  in  the  accustomed  way.  I  must 
add,  however,  that  no  portion  of  this  theory  is 


42      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

intended  to  conflict  in  any  way  with  a  strict 
doctrine  of  determinism.  It  is  not  that  the 
organism  acts  in  an  undetermined  fashion,  but" 
that  the  determining  factor  is  no  longer  in  the 
environment,  but  in  the  organism  itself. 

I  may  formulate  the  following  conclusions  as 
to  the  expression  of  the  appearance  of  the  earli- 
est stage  of  consciousness  in  terms  of  value: 

(a)  The  appearance  of  the  earliest  stage  of 
consciousness  is,  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
observer,  of  contributory  value  with  respect  to 
the  bringing  about  of  the  existence  of  value 
from    the    standpoint   of    the    organism    itself. 

(b)  This  is  true  because  this  earliest  stage  of 
consciousness  gives  birth  to  the  initial  require- 
ment of  value  from  the  standpoint  of  the  organ- 
ism, namely,  that  there  be  a  center  of  activity 
to  serve  as  the  basis  of  an  interest  that  is  di- 
rected outward,  (c)  The  significant  biological 
aspect  is  the  presence  of  a  situation  where  an 
opposition  of  some  stimulus  to  a  living  organism 
is  overcome  by  a  factor  that  is  the  product  of 
a  process  within  the  organism. 

Before  I  describe  the  origin  of  value  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  individual  himself,  it  may 
be  well  to  keep  the  observer's  point  of  view  for 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   ORIGIN  43 

a  moment,  in  order  to  determine  what  kind  of 
value  must  be  ascribed  to  the  later  developments 
of  conscious  activity  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
observer.  It  seems  to  me  that  there  is  an  a  priori 
answer  to  this  question.  All  values  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  observer  are  contributory. 
This  is  true  (a)  because  they  are  estimated, 
judged  values,  and  (b)  because  it  would  be 
absurd  to  speak  of  a  good  that  was  felt  by  an 
observer  with  respect  to  a  process  in  nature. 
One  doesn't  feel  the  good  of  a  rainstorm.  He 
estimates  its  good  with  reference  to  the  supply 
of  water  in  rivers  and  wells,  or  the  effect  of  it 
upon  the  crops.  The  immediate  values  of  felt 
coolness,  the  sparkle  of  light  on  the  globules, 
etc.,  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  process  as 
process. 

The  observer,  therefore,  in  making  a  survey 
of  the  development  of  conscious  activity  in  the 
individual  from  its  lowest  to  its  highest  forms, 
will  recognize  as  values  those  developments 
which  tend  toward  the  end  of  value  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  individual  himself.  Instinct, 
intelligence,  memory,  ideation,  sympathy,  etc., 
all  will  be  contributory,  from  the  observer's 
standpoint. 


44      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

Now  it  must  be  evident  that  the  observer's 
standpoint,  although  it  is  the  necessary  point  of 
view  of  the  critic  and  the  basis  of  all  discussion 
of  every  kind,  is  not  very  productive  as  a  method 
for  the  consideration  of  value.  We  need  to  take 
the  standpoint  of  the  individual  consciousness 
itself,  in  order  to  arrive  at  the  relations  between 
the  two  classes  of  value.  Two  ways  of  doing 
this  are  open:  (a)  We  may  become  intro- 
spective and  seek  the  relation  of  the  goods  that 
we  feel  to  the  goods  that  we  find  useful.  This 
method  was  that  which  gave  me  the  initial 
distinction  between  immediate  and  contributory 
values.  (b)  Although  our  discussion  itself 
must  remain  contributory  in  character,  we  can, 
however,  look  at  the  development  of  conscious 
activity  from  the  standpoint  of  the  individual 
himself.  We  view  the  process  as  a  whole,  yes, 
but  we  consider  how  one  particular  element  of 
the  whole  is  related  to  the  other  elements  of  the 
situation.  The  center  from  which  we  direct 
our  attention  to  surrounding  factors  is  the  cen- 
ter of  conscious  activity  that  has  come  into 
being  with  the  appearance  of  a  particular  con- 
sciousness. The  relations  between  this  center 
of  activity  and  its  environment  will  be  values 
if  they  contain  the  element  of  interest. 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   ORIGIN  45 

The  earliest  stage  of  consciousness,  as  we 
have  seen,  contains  a  difference  felt,  and  from 
the  observer's  standpoint  the  appearance  of  this 
stage  is  of  contributory  value.  Can  we  speak 
of  this  earliest  stage  of  consciousness  in  terms 
of  value  from  the  standpoint  of  the  organism? 
Perhaps  not  at  the  very  moment  of  appearance, 
for  the  felt  difference  has  no  relation  to  a  pre- 
exist ent  center  of  activity.  But  suppose  the 
difference  to  take  unto  itself  a  new  object  of 
discrimination.  Suppose  that  there  is  now  pres- 
ent, in  the  most  elementary  form  of  perception, 
recognition  of  three  differents  which  constitute 
a  little  environment.  Suppose,  as  we  must,  the 
presence  of  rudimentary  feeling.  It  seems  to 
me  that,  from  this  very  earliest  moment  when 
the  individual  merits  the  title  of  individual, 
there  is  a  situation  which  may  be  described  in 
terms  of  value  from  the  individuars  own  stand- 
point. There  is  a  center  of  activity;  the  com- 
parison between  the  elementary  perceptions  is 
contributory  toward  future  actions  from  that 
center;  they  are,  therefore,  contributory  values. 

§  5.  What  of  the  feeling-aspect?  From  the 
observer's  standpoint,  these  elements  are  of  con- 
tributory value.     Feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain, 


46      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

however  primitive,  would  act  as  warnings  or  as 
encouragement  to  the  organism  to  desist  from 
or  persist  in  certain  activities,  just  as  percep- 
tion of  "  diff erents,"  the  original  end  of  feel- 
ings, is  to  help  the  organism  get  on  with  his 
environment.  In  this  respect,  the  standpoints 
of  the  individual  himself  and  of  the  observer 
are  in  agreement.  But  the  fact  that  in  con- 
scious activity  every  cognitive  element  has  its 
accompanying  feeling-tone  or  feeling-attitude 
gives  a  different  color  to  the  standpoint  of  the 
individual.  The  sensation  which  I  get  by  touch- 
ing a  hot  stove  is  accompanied  by  a  feeling  of 
pain;  but  the  idea  of  the  stove  which  I  retain  is 
accompanied  by  a  feeling-attitude  which  is  more 
complex  than  the  pain  which  I  experienced,  for 
the  reason  that  the  idea  of  the  stove  is  some- 
thing more  than  hot-object.  The  various  sen- 
sations which  serve  as  the  basis  of  my  idea  of 
the  stove  enter  into  a  process  of  comparison 
with  the  ideas  of  past  sensations.  The  feeling- 
attitude  toward  the  idea  of  stove,  therefore,  is 
not  a  feeling  accompanying  a  "  simple  sensa- 
tion," but  one  accompanying  an  idea  that  is 
full  of  inferential  import  from  past  experience. 
Stated  in  a  proposition,  this  observation  would 


WITH    RESPECT    TO   ORIGIN  47 

read:  The  feeling-attitude  which  accompanies 
an  idea  is  different  from  the  feeling  which 
accompanies  a  simple  sensation. 

§  6.  How  can  this  distinction  best  be  ex- 
pressed? Feelings  are  feelings,  and  the  differ- 
ence to  which  I  refer  can  hardly  be  a  psycho- 
logical difference.  I  believe  that  it  can  best  be 
made  in  terms  of  value.  We  may  say  that  the 
feeling  which  accompanies  a  simple  sensation  is 
of  contributory  value  to  the  individual  (from 
the  standpoints  of  both  individual  and  observer), 
but  that  the  feeling  toward  the  idea  is  of  imme- 
diate value.  In  other  words,  when  the  cognitive 
process,  by  comparison  and  memory,  develops 
ideas,  there  arise  accompanying  feelings  which 
have  exceeded  the  function  of  feelings  which 
accompany  sensations.  The  latter  were  con- 
tributory to  the  welfare  of  the  individual;  the 
former  comprise  the  feeling-side  of  the  indi- 
vidual's relation  to  his  environment.  From  his 
conscious  activity  as  a  center,  cognitive  and 
feeling  elements  together  are  relating  that  cen- 
ter to  surrounding  reality;  his  environment 
grows  like  the  concentric  circles  of  ripples  which 
move  outward  from  the  place  where  a  stone  has 
struck  the  water. 


/ 


48      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

I  have  formulated  this  theory  with  reference 
to  a  mature  conscious  activity.  The  method 
of  introspection  facihtated  the  problem.  Now, 
however,  we  may  apply  the  theory  to  early  con- 
scious activity  which  cannot  be  examined  by 
introspection.  In  this  connection  we  shall  find 
it  equally  satisfying. 

§  7.  The  feeling  element  which  is  associated 
with  the  cognitive  element  in  the  very  earliest 
appearance  of  consciousness  is  wholly  contribu- 
tory from  the  standpoints  of  both  observer  and 
organism.  The  feeling  elements  that  accom- 
pany the  various  cognitive  elements  as  they 
arise,  are  likewise  contributory,  at  the  moment 
of  their  origin.  But  the  comparisons  between 
cognitive  elements  that  are  recorded  in  a  rudi- 
mentary memory  are  accompanied  by  feelings 
which,  though  contributory  from  the  observer's 
point  of  view,  are  the  psychological  basis  of  a 
new  kind  of  value,  immediate  in  character.  We 
might,  therefore,  speak  of  contributory  values 
as  the  stuff  out  of  which  immediate  values  arise. 

A  corollary  of  this  theory  of  immediate  value 
must  not  be  neglected.  It  follows  that,  in  the 
case  of  a  mature  consciousness,  one  must  dis- 
tinguish between  feelings  that  arise  unaccom- 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   ORIGIN  49 

panied  by  reflection,  and  those  which  have  been 
influenced  by  the  cognitive  processes.     For  ex- 
ample, I  must  distinguish  between  the  feeHng 
of  pain  that  comes  to  me  when  I  touch  a  hot 
stove  in  the  dark  and  the  disHke  for  that  feel- 
ing which  almost  instantaneously  follows.     The 
former  feeling  is  of  contributory  value  to  me  in 
prompting  me  to  remove  my  hand;  the  latter 
marks  my  attitude  toward  my  experience,  and 
is  an  immediate  value.      It  may  be  objected: 
Did  you  not  say,  however,  that  my  liking  for 
grapes  must  be  distinguished  from  my  thought 
about  that  liking,  the  actual  liking  being  imme- 
diate, and  the  thought  contributory?     Certainly, 
and  it  must  not  be  supposed  that,  by  a  feeling- 
attitude  which  accompanies  reflection,   I  mean 
the   reflection   itself.      The   distinction   here   is 
wholly  within  feeling.    In  the  example  of  grapes, 
my  liking  for  grapes  as  an  immediate  value  is 
to  be  distinguished  from  the  primitive  feeling 
accompanying  the  sensation  that  I  receive  when 
I  first  put  a  grape  into  my  mouth. 

§  8.  It  is  not  my  purpose  in  this  chapter  to 
go  beyond  a  discussion  of  the  interrelation  of 
values  with  respect  to  their  origin.  From  the 
consideration    of    their    origin,    however,    it    is 


50      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

possible  to  point  out  two  divergent  directions  in 
the  development  of  conscious  activity.     One  of 
these  starts  with  the  comparison  of  cognitive 
elements  in  the  primitive  organism  and  develops 
through  memory,  ideation,  intelligence,  intellec- 
tion, judgment,  etc.,  to  knowledge,  the  highest 
point  of  contributory  value.     The  other  direc- 
tion of  development  is  toward  a  growth  of  the 
individual's  environment  by  the  accumulation  of 
feeling-attitudes  which  accompany  the  various 
cognitive    elements.      These    two    functions    in 
conscious  activity  are  never  separated  in  any 
action,  but  they  are  nevertheless  always  distinct 
in   character.     And   although   feeling  is   never 
present  without  cognition,  it  is  not  necessary 
that  a  feeling-attitude  which  is  recalled  by  the 
recognition  of  an  object  be  accompanied  by  the 
same  cognitive  elements  that  were  the  original 
cause  of  the  attitude.     My  attitude  of  liking  or 
dislike  toward  a  man  may  have  followed  in  the 
first  instance  a  complicated  process  of  judgment 
in  which  I  sized  him  up  in  various  ways  —  his 
disposition,  the  color  of  his  hair,  etc.     When  I 
see  the  man  again,  the  perception  of  him  recalls 
my  attitude,  which  is  the  same  as  it  was  before, 
although  the  elements  which  enter  into  my  per- 
ception have  been  vastly  simplified. 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   ORIGIN  51 

I  believe  that  the  two  branches  of  conscious 
activity  which  I  have  described  embody  a  more 
fundamental  distinction  than  that  made  by  Berg- 
son  between  instinct  and  intelligence.  Bergson 
distinguishes  instinct  and  intelligence  as  being 
two  modes  of  life's  action  on  the  material  world, 
"  directly,  by  creating  an  organised  instrument 
to  work  with;  or  else  it  [life]  can  effect  it  in- 
directly through  an  organism  which,  instead  of 
possessing  the  required  instrument  naturally, 
will  itself  construct  it  by  fashioning  inorganic 
matter."  ^  According  to  Bergson,  intelligence 
is  characterized  by  its  ability  to  make  tools 
out  of  artificial  objects;  it  would  therefore  be 
contributory.  But  instinct  may  also  construct 
tools,*  so  that  it  must  also  be  counted  as  con- 
tributory. Later,  however,  Bergson  ^  identifies 
instinct  with  sympathy.  It  seems  to  me  that 
tool-constructing  (even  out  of  organic  matter 
only)  and  the  feeling-attitude  of  sympathy  are 
too  different  ever  to  be  united  in  one  term.  I 
therefore  believe  that  the  distinction  between 
instinct  and  intelligence  as  expounded  by  Berg- 
son cannot  be  fundamental. 

3  Bergson,  Henri,  Creative  Evolution,  trans.  Mitchell,   142. 
^Op.   cit.,   140.  ^Op.   cit.,   176. 


52      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

The  results  of  the  discussion  contained  in  this 
chapter  may  be  summarized  as  follows: 

§  I.  Neither  contributory  nor  immediate  val- 
ues require  the  presence  of  judgment  for  their 
existence. 

§  2.  There  are  two  possible  standpoints  from 
which  values  may  be  discussed,  that  of  the  ob- 
server and  that  of  the  organism  which  values. 

§  3.  From  the  observer's  standpoint,  the  ap- 
pearance of  consciousness  and  all  the  elements 
of  consciousness  are  contributory  in  value,  both 
as  to  their  origin  and  as  to  their  persistence. 

§  4.  The  biological  beginnings  of  value  lie 
in  this:  that  some  stimuli  are  dangerous  for  an 
organism,  and  the  organism  overcomes  them  by 
a  process  originating  within  itself. 

§  5.  Feeling  is  contributory  in  origin,  but 
the  feeling-attitudes  which  accompany  ideas 
rather  than  simple  sensations  are  immediate, 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  individual. 

§  6.  Cognition  and  feeling  relate  the  indi- 
vidual to  his  environment  in  ways  that  are  never 
isolated,  but  which  always  remain  distinct  in 
character. 

§  7.  Contributory  values  are  the  stuff  out  of 
which  immediate  values  arise. 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   ORIGIN  53 

§  8.  The  two  divergent  directions  of  the 
development  of  conscious  activity,  which  have 
been  described  as  leading  to  the  experiencing  of 
contributory  and  immediate  values  respectively, 
are  more  fundamentally  distinct  than  Bergson's 
division  into  instinct  and  intelligence. 


CHAPTER     IV 

THE     INTERRELATION     OF     VALUES 
WITH    RESPECT    TO    KNOWLEDGE 

THE  subject-matter  of  this  chapter  falls 
into  two  divisions.  As  in  the  discus- 
sion of  the  origin  of  values,  there  are 
here  also  two  possible  standpoints  which  may  be 
taken.  As  observer,  I  may  look  over  the  course 
of  evolution  and  observe  judgment  in  the  act 
itself;  I  rnay  view  the  circumstances  which  gave 
rise  to  judgment;  and  I  may  view  the  content 
of  judgment  in  its  relation  to  the  development 
of  value  in  the  individual.  Or,  from  the  stand- 
point of  the  individual  himself,  I  may  ask  what 
values  were  first  expressed  in  language  by  the 
individual,  how  the  conception  of  value  came  to 
develop  in  the  consciousness  of  the  individual, 
and  to  what  limit  the  process  of  evaluation  may 
be  carried. 

It  must  be  remembered,  although  it  need  not 
lead  to  confusion,  that  the  field  of  the  second 
division  proposed  for  discussion  is  less  inclusive 
than  the  first.  From  the  observer's  standpoint, 
I  consider  all  types  of  judgment,  not  alone  those 
judgments  which  state  values.    Judgment  is  here 

54 


WITH  RESPECT   TO   KNOWLEDGE         55 

regarded  in  its  aspect  as  the  climax  of  develop- 
ment of  the  cognitive  function.  Judgments  in 
general,  therefore,  will  be  contributory,  accord- 
ing to  the  rule  that  all  the  elements  of  conscious 
activity,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  observer, 
are  contributory  both  as  to  their  origin  and 
as  to  their  persistence/  From  the  individual's 
standpoint,  however,  our  attention  is  restricted 
to  those  cases  of  judgment  which  bring  to  ex- 
pression immediate  or  contributory  values. 

At  one  point,  it  must  be  said,  the  standpoints 
of  the  observer  and  the  individual  may  almost 
merge.  Such  a  phenomenon  was  not  possible 
in  the  case  of  the  origin  of  values,  because  there 
had  not  developed  a  process  of  conscious  reflec- 
tion. In  the  case  of  the  judgment,  however,  it 
is  possible  for  the  individual  to  look  back  on  the 
act  of  judgment  and  verify  the  result  of  the  act. 
So  that,  in  discussing  the  content  of  the  judg- 
ment, it  is  immaterial  whether  we  observers 
anticipate  the  individual  in  his  verification  or 
let  him  do  it  himself.  In  this  case,  therefore, 
the  distinction  between  the  two  standpoints, 
while  present,  is  immaterial  to  the  discussion. 
For  convenience  I  have  placed  this  section  of 
1  Page  43,  §3. 

5 


56      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

the  argument  under  the  same  heading  as  that 
of  the  act  of  judgment,  because  judgments  in 
general  are  treated  of  in  both  sections. 

I  may,  then,  divide  the  discussion  as  follows: 
I.  Judgments  as  values  (Standpoint  of  the 
observer:  A.  Acts  of  judgment  as  values; 
B.  Content  of  judgments  as  values  (Stand- 
points merge).  XL  Judgments  0/ values  (  Stand- 
point of  the  individual). 

I.  JUDGMENTS  AS  VALUES 
In  discussing  judgments  as  values,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  distinguish  between  the  act  of  judging 
and  the  content  of  the  judgment.  An  act  of 
judging  is  called  forth  in  obedience  to  stimuli 
in  a  particular  set  of  circumstances.  The  pres- 
ence or  absence  of  value  in  the  act  itself  must 
be  judged  with  reference  to  these  particular 
circumstances  and  not  to  any  later  usefulness 
of  the  judgment.  The  value  of  any  judgment, 
however,  may  also  be  determined  with  reference 
to  its  subsequent  effect  upon  the  activity  of  the 
individual  —  whether  it  is  found  to  be  service- 
able as  a  guide  for  future  action.  Value  in  this 
instance  is  determined  with  respect  to  its  con- 
tent. Each  of  these  cases  will  be  discussed  in 
turn. 


WITH  RESPECT   TO  KNOWLEDGE        57 

A.  Acts  of  Judgment  as  Values 
§  I.  The  act  of  judgment  has  been  contrasted 
with  the  content  of  the  judgment.  This  lan- 
guage, though  convenient,  is  inaccurate,  for  it 
is  evident  that  in  considering  the  act  of  judg- 
ment we  are  considering  the  judgment,  and  that 
the  judgment  without  content  would  not  be  a 
judgment.  What  I  mean,  therefore,  is  rather 
that  here  the  act  of  judgment  is  discussed  with 
its  content,  but  with  reference  only  to  the  par- 
ticular stimuli  which  call  it  forth.  For  example, 
if  I  discuss  the  judgment  "  It  is  a  fine  day " 
with  reference  to  the  act,  I  discuss  its  meaning 
with  regard  to  the  circumstances  which  caused 
me  to  make  it,  not  with  reference  to  the  thunder- 
storm which  came  up  during  the  afternoon. 
Just  as  the  act  of  judgment  can  be  approached 
only  from  the  standpoint  of  the  observer,  so  is 
the  discussion  of  the  content  as  caused  only  to 
be  carried  out  from  that  standpoint. 

§  2.  Since  from  the  standpoint  of  the  ob- 
server all  values  are  contributory,^  the  question 
is  not  as  to  what  kind  of  values  acts  of  judg- 
ment are,  but  whether  acts  of  judgment  are 
values  at  all.     The  answer  seems  to  follow  di- 

2  Page  43. 


58      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

rectly  from  a  point  made  in  a  preceding  chap- 
ter,^ that,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  observer, 
values  comprise  whatever  tends  to  the  develop- 
ment of  value  from  the  standpoint  of  the  indi- 
vidual himself.  Under  such  a  category  are 
included  all  the  developments  of  the  cognitive 
function  of  conscious  activity.  For  this  reason 
I  maintain  that  all  acts  of  judgment  are  con- 
tributory. 

(a)  But  there  may  be  some  doubt  expressed 
as  to  whether  certain  cases  of  acts  of  judgment 
may  be  deemed  contributory.  What  of  acts  of 
existential  judgment,  false  judgment,  and  theo- 
retical (vs.  "useful")  judgment?  These  dis- 
tinctions are  made  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
observer  with  reference  to  the  content,  however, 
and,  according  to  the  rule  just  laid  down,  the 
content  must  be  considered  here  only  with  ref- 
erence to  the  time  of  the  act  and  the  circum- 
stances which  caused  the  act.  In  such  a  light, 
it  will  be  seen  that  no  matter  what  the  content 
may  be,  the  act  of  judgment  must,  like  every 
other  act,  be  a  caused  act.  Furthermore,  it  is 
a  caused  act  within  the  cognitive  field  of  con- 
sciousness ;  that  is,  the  causal  process  takes  place 

3  Page  43. 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   KNOWLEDGE         59 

within  the  organism  itself.  Therefore  the  act 
of  judgment,  whatever  be  the  content,  always 
adds  to  the  functioning  of  conscious  activity, 
and,  since  whatever  adds  to  the  development 
of  interest  around  a  center  of  activity  directed 
outward  is  contributory,*  all  acts  of  judgment 
are  contributory. 

B.  Content  of  Judgments  as  Values 
It  was  comparatively  easy  to  maintain  that 
acts  of  judgment  are  contributory.  One  had 
merely  to  view  the  evolutionary  process  and 
see  a  series  of  caused  actions  directed  outward 
from  a  center  of  activity  called  consciousness. 
Every  element  of  this  process  is  seen  to  be  con- 
tributory to  its  smooth  working;  every  act  is 
the  overcoming  of  obstacles  that  impede  further 
action. 

When,  however,  we  come  to  the  consideration 
of  the  content  of  the  judgment  with  reference 
to  future  action  based  on  it,  the  case  is  more 
difficult.  It  may  appear  that  certain  acts  of 
judgment,  useful  at  the  time  of  judging  as  steps 
in  the  active  process,  are  valuable  only  as  acts, 
later  losing  their  value.     Judgment  is  different 

*  Pages  44-45. 


6o      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

from  lower  forms  of  cognition  in  that  it  may- 
be preserved  in  memory  and  expressed  by  an 
artificial  medium.  (Of  course,  the  terms  of 
judgment  may  also  be  remembered  and  ex- 
pressed. "  Ideation  "  would  be  more  accurate 
than  "judgment,"  here.)  The  question  of  the 
permanence  of  the  content  as  value  arises. 
When  is  the  content  valuable  as  well  as  the 
act?  The  test  is  the  future  usefulness  of  the 
content. 

The  individual  himself  has  now  arrived  at 
the  high  plane  of  judgment.^  He  may  there- 
fore discuss  the  matter  himself,  or  we  observers 
may  do  it  for  him;  the  two  standpoints  will  not 
differ  in  their  result. 

I  shall  endeavor  to  substantiate  the  following 
thesis : 

The  content  of  judgments  is  contributory 
when  the  judgments  are  true,  and  may  he  con- 
tributory when  the  judgments  are  false  but 
when  the  terms  of  the  judgments  are  signs  of 
real  entities. 

The  question  of  truth  or  falsity  was  imma- 
terial when  consideration  of  the  judgment  was 
restricted  to   the   act,    and   its   content   to   the 

«  Cf.  page  55. 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   KNOWLEDGE         6i 

particular  circumstances  which  called  it  forth. 
But  when  the  value  of  the  judgment  is  consid- 
ered with  reference  to  future  actions  on  the  part 
of  the  individual,  the  question  of  truth  or  falsity 
becomes  important.  If  I  find,  when  I  come  to 
verify  a  judgment,  that  I  have  been  wrong,  the 
content  of  that  judgment  will  not  be  as  useful 
to  me  as  it  would  have  been,  had  I  been  right 
in  my  judging.  "  It  will  not  rain  '*  may  serve 
to  overcome  my  hesitation  as  to  whether  I  shall 
take  an  umbrella,  but,  if  it  does  rain,  I  shall  not 
keep  dry. 

(i)  True  Judgments  Are  Contributory  as  to 
Content 
§  3.  We  have  already  ascertained  that  acts 
of  judgment  are  contributory.  Truth,  however, 
is  a  term  which  does  not  apply  to  judgment  in 
the  act.  At  what  point,  therefore,  it  may  be 
asked,  does  the  term  "  truth "  become  appli- 
cable? 

-  Of  course  the  answer  depends  upon  one's 
theory  of  the  judgment.  I  can  only  state  my 
position  as  a  basis  for  discussion.  I  hold  that 
truth  is  the  expression  in  the  judgment  of  real 
relations.      A   true  judgment  is  one  that   ex- 


62      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

presses  a  relation  between  real  terms.  It  is 
evident  that  two  requirements  must  be  fulfilled 
if  a  judgment  is  to  be  true:  the  terms  must  be 
signs  of  real  entities,  and  the  relation  between 
the  terms  must  be  a  real  relation. 

§  4.  Now  this  criterion  of  truth  is  an  ex- 
tremely hard  one.  It  may  take  a  judgment  a 
long  time  to  become  verified;  one  may  never  be 
quite  certain  about  the  truth  of  some  particular 
judgment.  On  the  other  hand,  some  judgments 
require  no  verification  at  all.  When  I  formu- 
late a  definition,  I  state  the  equality  of  two 
signs,  and  no  special  proof  or  verification  is 
necessary,  because  the  terms  are  signs  invented 
for  the  same  entity.  Such  a  definition  would 
be  a  mathematical  definition  of  a  circle,  a  line, 
etc.  It  may  easily  happen,  however,  that  the 
explanatory  term  of  the  definition  will  require 
some  measure  of  verification.  We  speak  of 
"  good  definitions  "  and  "  poor  definitions,"  ac- 
cording as  the  explanatory  term  marks  off  accu- 
rately a  special  portion  of  reality.  Thus,  if  I 
define  a  horse  to  be  a  four-legged  animal  or  a 
white  quadruped,  I  shall  not  form  a  good  defi- 
nition, because  the  explanatory  term  will  be 
either  too  inclusive  or  too  exclusive.     No  one 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   KNOWLEDGE         63 

would  deny  the  truth  of  the  proposition  "  The 
horse  is  a  four-legged  animal " ;  but  every  one 
would  say  that  the  proposition  "  The  horse  is  a 
white  quadruped  "  is  false.  The  former  judg- 
ment relates  terms  that  are  signs  of  real  entities, 
but  the  latter  judgment  relates  terms  between 
which  there  is  no  equality  as  respects  the  por- 
tions of  reality  for  which  they  stand.  One 
judgment  is  true,  the  other  false;  and  yet  they 
are  both  poor  definitions. 

There  is  apparently  some  confusion  here. 
"  Poor  definition  "  means  one  that  is  not  valu- 
able, or  as  valuable  as  it  might  be.  But  both 
true  and  false  definitions,  as  we  see,  may  be 
poor.  It  is  obvious,  then,  that  the  criteria  of 
truth  and  value  are  not  the  same.  The  criterion 
of  truth  has  been  mentioned.  It  is  now  neces- 
sary to  discuss  the  relation  of  truth  to  value, 
and  to  do  so,  we  must  discover  where  the  two 
criteria  dififer. 

§  5.  The  thesis  which  I  laid  down  was, 
'"  True  judgments  are  contributory."  This 
proposition  is  the  pragmatists'  "Truth  is  use- 
ful." It  by  no  means  follows  that  "  All  con- 
tributory judgments  are  true"  (the  converse). 
In  order  to  make  clear  the  distinction,  it  will  be 


64      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

necessary  to  discuss  the  end  to  which  judgments 
are  contributory  or  useful. 

Truth  itself  has  no  need  of  an  end;  it  is 
simply  the  expression  in  judgment  of  real  rela- 
tions. Some  authors  have  attempted  to  infer 
that  truth  is  an  end-in-itself,  a  given  value. 
This,  however,  is  illicit.  I  may  indeed  make 
truth  an  end,  and  it  will  thereby  become  a  given 
good,  an  immediate  value;  but,  according  to  the 
common  realistic  definition  to  which  I  adhere, 
truth  is  something  apart  from  the  interest  of 
any  individual.  It  does  not  arise  from  within 
the  organism;  it  is  rather  the  effect  in  con- 
sciousness of  what  is  brute  and  obstinate  in 
reality.  The  individual  consciousness  is  not 
forced  to  become  interested  in  any  part  of  real- 
ity except  that  with  which  it  comes  into  contact. 
It  may  find  the  truth ;  it  may  not ;  but  it  is  forced 
in  any  case  to  attach  value  to  its  environment. 

Truth,  therefore,  represents  the  accurate  re- 
lation of  portions  of  reality  in  the  judgment, 
while  value  represents  the  relation  of  portions 
of  reality  to  my  interest.  And  what  is  the 
nature  of  this  interest?  It  is  that  of  conscious 
activity  directed  toward  an  end  whose  character 
is  disclosed  in  the  evolutionary  process  itself: 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   KNOWLEDGE         65 

conscious  activity  tends  to  describe  and  inter- 
pret reality  in  terms  of  itself;  the  individual  by 
nature  is  ego-centric  from  his  instinct  of  self- 
preservation  to  his  most  altruistic  impulses. 
Note  that  ego-centric  does  not  mean  selfish;  it 
means  rather  that  the  individual  of  matured 
conscious  activity  feels  a  sympathy  toward, 
feels  drawn  toward  the  whole  universe,  that 
interest  from  the  individual  center  of  conscious 
activity  tends  to  direct  itself  outward  as  far  as 
possible.  Such  is  the  nature  of  the  end  to 
which  contributory  values  are  useful. 

§  6.  It  will  be  apparent,  therefore,  that, 
while  truth  in  itself  is  no  value  at  all,  true 
judgments,  proceeding  from  an  individual,  will 
always  be  contributory  to  putting  him  into  touch 
with  the  reality  which  opposes  him  and  which 
he  must  conquer  by  interpretation.  But  not 
only  does  it  not  follow  that  all  contributory 
judgments  are  true,  but  it  also  does  not  follow 
that  all  true  judgments  are  of  the  greatest,  or 
of  equal  contributory  value.  There  are  degrees 
of  contributory  value,  but  there  are  no  degrees 
of  truth.  One  truth  is  just  as  true  as  another, 
but  it  may  be  of  much  less  contributory  value. 
The  existential  judgment,  for  instance,  is  true 


66     VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

and  contributes  to  my  taking  stock  of  brute 
reality,  so  to  speak;  but  the  judgment  "Fire 
exists  "  is  not  so  contributory  as  "  Fire  burns  " 
—  yet  both  are  equally  true. 

(2)  False  Judgments  May  Be  Contributory 
When  Their  Terms  Are  Signs  of  Real 
Entities 

To  prove  this  portion  of  my  thesis,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  revert  for  a  moment  to  discussion 
of  the  act  of  judgment.  I  shall  ask,  "  What 
characterizes  an  act  of  judgment?" 

§  7.  Acts  of  judgment  were  proved  to  be 
contributory.®  My  proof  assumed  that,  in  the 
case  of  every  act  of  judgment,  there  is  always 
present  in  consciousness  a  causal  situation  of 
which  the  act  is  the  result.  We  may  accord- 
ingly find  cases  of  apparent  judgment  where 
there  are  no  acts  of  judgment,  properly  so- 
called.  A  parrot  may  be  taught  to  say,  "  This 
is  just  as  good!"  but  he  will  not  perform  an 
act  of  judgment,  because  conscious  interest  is 
lacking.  The  schoolboy  may  write  on  his  slate 
"  The  sun  shines  "  a  hundred  times,  and  there 
probably  is  only  one  act  of  judgment,  made  in 

«  Page  58. 


WITH  RESPECT   TO   KNOWLEDGE         67 

connection  with  the  first  writing.  A  proposi- 
tion, done  in  writing,  and  buried  in  the  Sahara 
desert,  forgotten  absolutely  {pro  argument 0) 
by  its  author,  and  never  again  seen  by  man,  is 
not  an  act  of  judgment.  In  none  of  these  cases 
is  a  value  present,  because  the  conscious  situa- 
tion is  lacking.  To  be  contributory,  judgment 
must  be  associated  with  interest,  and  this  inter- 
est may  be  either  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
observer  in  the  act  itself,  or  in  an  act  of  re-cog-  :\ 
nition  on  the  part  of  the  individual. 

§  8.  It  was  easy  to  show  that  acts  of  false 
judgment  are  contributory  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  observer,  as  well  as  acts  of  true  judg- 
ment. It  is  now  questioned  whether  the  con- 
tent of  the  false  judgment  remains  contributory 
after  the  act,  with  reference  to  further  action 
on  the  part  of  the  individual. 

From  the  preceding  discussion  it  is  apparent 
that  our  consideration  assumes  that  the  false 
judgment  is  related  to  future  action  on  the  part 
'  of  the  individual  —  otherwise  the  element  of 
interest  would  disappear.  Providing  that  its 
terms  have  reference  to  portions  of  reality,  the 
situation  of  the  false  judgment  is  that  the  indi- 
vidual has  stated  a  relation  between  signs  of 


68      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

real  entities  which  does  not  hold  in  reality.  Now 
the  end  to  which  judgments  are  contributory,  as 
we  have  found,  is  the  relation  of  reality  to  a 
center  of  conscious  activity.  By  the  false  judg- 
ment, the  individual  has  related  portions  of  real- 
ity in  terms  of  consciousness,  but  he  has  related 
them  falsely. 

Ideation  is  contributory,  along  with  the  other 
developments  of  the  cognitive  function.  There- 
fore, the  terms  of  the  false  judgment  are  con- 
tributory, because  they  relate  portions  of  reality 
to  a  center  of  conscious  activity.  It  is  asked 
whether  the  incorrect  relation  of  these  terms 
may  ever  be  contributory. 

My  answer  is,  "  Yes !  "  The  individual  thinks, 
believes  that  the  false  judgment  is  true  (falsity 
is,  therefore,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  observer, 
here  also).  He  acts  on  this  judgment  as  if  it 
were  true.  Later  he  may  discover  that  it  was 
false ;  he  may  never  discover  its  falsity.  Which- 
ever happens,  the  false  judgment  will  serve,  in 
all  probability,  as  a  basis  of  future  action.  We 
make  mistakes  in  our  judgment,  but  learn  by 
experience.  It  would  be  very  satisfying  if  we 
always  judged  correctly,  but  it  would  be  ghastly 
if  we  never  judged  except  when  we  were  sure 


WITH  RESPECT   TO  KNOWLEDGE         69 

that  we  were  judging  truly.  To  behave  in  such 
an  impossible  manner  would  necessitate  our  ac- 
cepting the  judgments  of  one  in  whom  we  had 
as  great  faith  as  we  have  in  our  perceptions. 
Independent  judgment  would  be  denied  to  us. 
We  could  never  make  our  own  verifications. 
If  we  never  made  mistakes,  we  never  should 
have  certainty  of  anything. 

§  9.  It  is  conceivable,  however,  that  a  false 
judgment  may  sometimes  have  the  opposite 
effect  of  blocking  future  activity  along  the  par- 
ticular lines  of  its  terms.  An  example  of  such 
a  judgment  would  be  an  obstinate  prejudice. 
An  obstinate  prejudice  implies  a  refusal  by  act 
of  will  to  proceed  in  verification.  Such  a  preju- 
dice could  not  be  called  contributory  (unless  we 
were  to  speak  of  it  as  a  negative  value,  con- 
tributory to  the  end  of  imbecility).  Mistakes, 
therefore,  no  more  than  true  judgments,  are 
ends  in  themselves;  but  both  are,  or  may  be, 
contributory  to  the  biological  end  of  value. 

(S)     Measurement  of  the  Degree  to  Which  a 
Judgment  is  Contributory 
§  10.     It  was  stated  in   §  6  ^  that,  although 
there  are  no  degrees  of  truth,  there  are  degrees 

7  Page  65. 


70      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

of  value.  In  the  present  connection,  it  will  be 
interesting  to  inquire  whether  there  is  some  way 
of  measuring  the  degree  to  which  a  judgment 
is  contributory.  This  investigation,  needless  to 
say,  is  quite  independent  of  that  as  to  what  de- 
grees of  value  the  individual  himself  fixes  in 
judgment.  The  latter  investigation  belongs  to 
the  section  treating  of  judgments  of  values. 
The  present  question  is  most  conveniently 
thought  of  as  from  the  standpoint  of  the  ob- 
server, although  there  would  be  nothing  to  pre- 
vent the  individual  himself  from  answering  it. 
Indeed,  if  he  wishes  to  coordinate  his  aims  in 
life,  he  will  think  very  seriously  of  this  matter, 
and  try  to  make  his  judgments  of  values  har- 
monize with  the  degree  to  which  his  judgments 
are  values.  That  is,  he  will  try  not  to  attribute 
greater  or  less  value  to  anything  in  judgment, 
than  the  judgment  actually  is  worth,  when  con- 
sidered with  reference  to  the  whole  career  of 
the  cognitive  function.  But,  as  I  have  before 
remarked,  attributing  value  in  judgments  is  only 
a  small  part  of  judging  in  general;  and  consid- 
eration of  the  degree  to  which  judgments  are 
valuable  is  a  larger  and  more  inclusive  subject 
than  that  of  the  degree  to  which  value-judg- 
ments are  valuable. 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   KNOWLEDGE         71 

A  common-sense  answer  to  our  question  would 
be  that  the  degree  to  which  a  contributory  judg- 
ment is  contributory  is  the  extent  to  which  it 
possesses  "  practicality."  But,  as  "  practical- 
ity "  is  a  general  term  including  a  number  of 
elements,  it  will  be  worth  while  to  analyze  it. 

There  appear  to  me  to  be  at  least  three  con- 
siderations involved  in  practicality,  (a)  To 
be  contributory,  a  judgment  must  be  concerned 
with  reality,  both  in  its  terms  and  usually  in  the 
relation  expressed  between  the  terms.  Near- 
ness, or  readiness  of  reference,  to  "  brute " 
reality  is  a  prominent  feature  here.  If  a  term 
is  too  far  away  from  the  portion  of  reality  of 
which  it  is  a  sign,  it  may  easily  have  lost  sharp- 
ness of  distinction ;  its  flavor  may  be  gone.  This 
is  the  reason  why  abstruse  subjects  are  often 
best  discussed  with  the  use  of  words  that  are 
metaphorical,  but  very  near  to  familiar  objects. 
The  effectiveness  and  permanent  application  of 
teaching  by  allegory  is  thus  explained.  If  very 
theoretical  terms  are  employed,  their  value  will 
often  be  proportionate  to  the  readiness  with 
which  they  may  be  referred  back  to  portions  of 
reality.  Thus,  a  formula  of  mechanics  may  be 
highly  technical,  but  may  be  extremely  valuable 
6 


72      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

because  of  the  ease  with  which  it  may  be  applied 
to  reality,  (b)  Another  factor  which  enters 
into  the  degree  to  which  judgments  of  con- 
tributory values  are  contributory  is  their  rela- 
tion to  the  special  environment  of  the  individual. 
A  judgment  may  be  very  useful  to  a  physician, 
but  comparatively  useless  to  an  artisan.  The 
biological  end  to  which  judgments  are  contribu- 
tory is  the  same  for  all  men,  but  the  field  of 
judgment  is  so  immense  that  different  indi- 
viduals must  work  from  different  centers  in 
the  field,  and  no  man  can  hope  to  attain  all 
knowledge.  Thus  the  practicality  of  a  judg- 
ment will  also  be  measured  with  reference  to 
its  possible  application  to  the  individual's  line 
of  activity,  (c)  What  applies  to  the  single 
individual  here  applies  also  to  the  human  race. 
Humanity  has  an  environment  distinct  from 
that  of  insects  or  birds,  and  the  degrees  of 
contributory  value  may  well  be  distinguished  by 
considering  the  degrees  to  which  needs  are 
common  to  mankind.  It  must  not  be  inferred, 
however,  that  we  have  knowledge  of  any  judg- 
ments that  do  not  affect  human  environment. 
Such  a  possibility  is  excluded  by  the  result  of 
our  study  of  the  origin  of  value  in  conscious- 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   KNOWLEDGE         73 

ness.  I  mean  merely  that  certain  judgments 
will  be  found  to  be  more,  or  less,  contributory 
to  mankind,  according  as  they  overcome  the 
oppositions  common  to  the  race  rather  than  to 
a  special  class  of  men. 

§  II.  Finally,  it  may  be  objected  that  it  is 
possible,  by  manipulation  of  terms,  to  arrive  at 
judgments  which  have  no  contributory  function 
at  all.  I  may  speak  of  these  as  theoretical  judg- 
ments. This  class  of  judgments  will  not  include 
those  judgments  which  may  be  referred  by  a 
round-about  way  to  reality,  or  to  those  which 
might  have  a  possible  application  at  some  future 
time,  but  only  to  those  which,  for  the  sake  of 
argument,  are  purely  speculative  and  unreal. 
If  there  are  any  such  judgments,  their  existence 
is  still  not  a  good  argument  against  my  theory 
of  values.  For,  together  with  my  general  ac- 
ceptance of  realism,  I  hold  that  judgments  are 
additive  to  reality;  i.e.,  they  are  portions  of 
reality  itself,  insofar  as  they  are  preserved  in 
memory.  The  extent  to  which  such  judgments 
are  contributory  will  be  the  degree  to  which  the 
individual  is  interested  in  the  imaginary  terms. 

Division  I  of  this  chapter  may  be  summarized 
as  follows: 


74      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

I.  Judgments  as  Values  (Standpoint  of  the 
Observer). 

A.  Acts  of  Judgment  as  Values. 

§  I.  More  accurately,  the  act  of  judgment  is 
here  discussed  with  its  content,  but  only  with 
reference  to  the  particular  stimuli  which  call  it 
forth. 

§  2.  Acts  of  judgment  are  a  development  of 
the  cognitive  function  of  consciousness.  All 
such  developments  are  contributory  values. 
Therefore,  acts  of  judgment  are  contributory 
values. 

(a)  Whatever  be  the  character  of  the  con- 
tent, an  act  of  judgment  is  a  caused  act  in  the 
sphere  of  conscious  activity;  hence  it  is  of  con- 
tributory value. 

B.  Content  of  Judgments  as  Values. 

This  topic  deals  with  the  future  usefulness 
of  the  content. 

(l)  True  judgments  are  contributory  as  to 
content. 

§  3.  For  a  judgment  to  be  true,  its  terms 
must  be  signs  of  real  entities,  and  the  relation 
between  the  terms  must  be  a  real  relation. 

§  4.     This  criterion  of  truth  is  not  the  cri- 


WITH  RESPECT  TO  KNOWLEDGE        75 

terion  of  value,  as  is  shown  by  the  illustration 
that  a  true  and  a  false  definition  may  be  equally 
''  poor." 

§  5.  Truth  has  no  end;  value  has  a  bio- 
logical end. 

§  6.  True  judgments,  however,  are  values 
because  they  contribute  to  the  biological  end  of 
value. 

(2)  False  judgments  may  be  contributory 
when  their  terms  are  signs  of  real  entities. 

§  7.  To  be  valuable,  a  judgment  must  involve 
interest. 

§  8.  The  terms  of  false  judgments,  when 
they  are  signs  of  real  entities,  are  contributory. 
The  false  relation  is  contributory  if  the  indi- 
vidual uses  it  as  the  basis  of  future  action; 
i.e.,  if  it  retains  the  individual's  interest. 

§  9.  Some  false  judgments  may  stifle  inter- 
est in  both  terms  and  relation.  These  might  be 
considered  to  be  of  negative  value. 

(3)  Measurement  of  the  degree  to  which  a 
judgment  is  contributory. 

§  10.  The  degree  to  which  the  content  of  a 
judgment  is  contributory  is  the  degree  of  its 
nearness  or  readiness  of  reference  to  reality. 


76   VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

its  nearness  to  the  special  environment  of  the 
judging  individual,  and  its  universality  of  ap- 
plication to  mankind. 

§  II.  The  content  of  purely  theoretical  or 
imaginary  judgments  is  contributory  in  propor- 
tion to  the  interest  of  the  individual  in  the  theo- 
retical terms. 

IL     JUDGMENTS    OF  VALUES 

We  now  come  to  the  discussion  of  judgments 
of  values  by  the  individual.  Let  us  gain  a  clear 
conception  of  the  subject-matter  of  this  division. 
It  is  quite  obvious  that  an  individual  may  make 
judgments  without  expressing  values  from  his 
own  standpoint.  He  cannot  make  a  judgment, 
of  course,  without  expressing  a  value  consid- 
ered from  the  observer's  standpoint.^  But  he 
may  make  judgments  that  involve  interest  to 
him  personally,  and  yet  not  think  of  his  interest. 
The  judgments  by  which  a  man  expresses  his 
needs  and  his  wants,  and  declares  what  is  con- 
tributory to  the  satisfaction  of  those  needs  and 
wants,  form  but  a  small  proportion  of  his  daily 
speech  and  thoughts.  The  confusion  that  is 
rife  in  this  branch  of  the  subject  is  largely  due 

« §§2-9. 


WITH  RESPECT   TO  KNOWLEDGE         'jj 

to  the  habit  of  some  of  mingling  the  standpoints 
of  the  observer  and  the  individual.  It  is  also 
due  to  the  practice  of  certain  writers  of  con- 
sidering truth  as  a  "  value-judgment."  Having 
refuted  this  theory  in  a  preceding  chapter/  we 
shall  do  well  to  keep  in  mind  the  fact  that,  in 
the  present  case,  we  are  dealing  with  only  a 
very  limited  class  of  judgments. 

Our  present  investigation  is  parallel,  in  a  way, 
with  that  of  the  origin  of  contributory  and  im- 
mediate values.  There  ^"  a  situation  was  sought 
where  immediate  and  contributory  values  first 
emerged  in  consciousness.  Here  we  seek  a  sit- 
uation where  values  first  become  expressed  in 
the  judgment,  where  the  individual  first  ex- 
presses his  own  interest.  The  former  investi- 
gation was  entirely  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
observer;  the  latter  will  be  from  that  of  the 
individual  himself. 

In  the  discussion  of  the  interrelation  of  values 
with  respect  to  their  origin,  the  data  considered 
were  biological.  In  the  present  investigation 
one  might  consider  facts  connected  with  the 
development  of  speech  observed  in  savage  tribes 

9  Chapter  II. 

10  Chapter  III. 


78      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

(phylogenetic),  or,  as  is  more  convenient,  facts 
may  be  adduced  with  reference  to  the  devel- 
opment of  speech  in  the  child  (ontogenetic). 
Introspection  may  aid  in  confirming  results  ob- 
tained by  the  other  methods. 

The  reason  why  we  are  concerned  with  the 
origin  of  immediate  and  contributory  judgments 
rather  than  with  their  interrelation  in  an  indi- 
vidual of  mature  growth,  is  that  we  recognize, 
at  the  start,  that  a  mature  individual  uses  two 
separate  and  distinct  kinds  of  judgments  of 
value,  immediate  and  contributory.  It  is  upon 
this  hypothesis  that  the  whole  discussion  rests. 

The  investigation  may  be  divided  conveniently 
into  two  parts: 

A.  Origin  of  immediate  judgments;  B.  Ori- 
gin of  contributory  judgments. 

A.  Origin  of  Immediate  Judgments 
§  12.  The  first  words  that  a  child  uses  are 
names  of  objects.  He  is  taught  words  that 
symbolize  certain  perceptions.  There  is  no  ques- 
tion of  expressing  value  here.  The  early  stages 
of  speech  are  just  as  mechanical  as  the  act  of 
perception  itself.  The  fixation  of  meaning  to 
certain  verbal  sounds  does  not  imply  that  the 


WITH  RESPECT   TO   KNOWLEDGE         79 

child  has  the  abihty  to  reflect  upon  that  mean- 
ing. He  names  the  objects  that  attract  his 
attention. 

A  young  child  has  wants  and  needs.  His 
attention  is  attracted  to  the  objects  that  satisfy 
these  wants.  Some  of  his  wants  are  necessary 
to  his  life  —  mother,  water.  But  he  may  reach 
out  his  hands  to  grasp  the  moon,  and  cry, 
"Moon!"  if  he  were  taught  the  word  that 
symbolizes  that  object.  Many  of  the  words 
that  he  first  learns  are  words  that  symbolize 
objects  that  he  wants  and  needs.  Some  of  them 
merely  satisfy  the  need  of  locating  himself  in 
his  immediate  environment.  But  in  no  case  is 
there  any  question  of  his  expressing  a  value. 

Identification  of  objects  with  symbols  of  ex- 
pression, therefore,  is  not  fixing  values  upon 
objects,  however  valuable  those  objects  may  be 
to  him  from  the  standpoint  of  an  observer.  But 
the  child  comes  to  learn  other  words.  Some  of 
these  may  express  feelings  of  desire,  as  "  want,'* 
"  like."  He  learns  to  combine  these  words  with 
certain  objects:  "  Love  mother  ";  "  Want  milk." 
The  case  as  regards  value  differs  here.  The 
child  is  now  expressing  a  feeling-attitude  in  a 
simple  form  of  judgment.     He  is  expressing  an 


8o      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

immediate  value  in  words.  He  recognizes  his 
personal  interest. 

Our  conclusion,  therefore,  with  respect  to  the 
origin  of  judgments  of  immediate  value  may  be 
expressed  in  the  following  proposition: 

The  individual  recognizes  his  interest  when  a 
situation  occurs  in  which  he  identifies  a  feeling- 
attitude  with  words. 

B.  Origin  of  Contributory  Judgments 
§  13.  I  have  illustrated  the  way  in  which  a 
judgment  of  immediate  value  may  be  expressed 
very  simply.  The  case  is  not  so  simple  with 
lespect  to  contributory  values.  The  child  has  a 
need;  let  us  say  he  is  thirsty.  He  may  have  the 
need  and  be  unable  to  connect  his  need  with 
speech ;  he  may  only  cry  or  make  foolish  sounds. 
He  may  know  the  substance  water  by  name,  and 
call  out  "  Water !  "  He  may  express  not  only 
the  object  of  his  desire,  but  the  desire  itself, 
and  say,  "Want  water."  (Here  we  have  the 
expression  of  an  immediate  value  in  the  judg- 
ment.) In  the  last  named  case,  he  connects  the 
object  of  desire  with  the  desire  itself,  but  he 
does  not  express  in  the  judgment  the  way  in 
which  the  object  will   satisfy  the  desire.     We 


WITH  RESPECT   TO  KNOWLEDGE         8i 

infer  that  when  he  gets  the  water  his  desire 
will  disappear;  but  he  does  not  express  the  fact 
that  the  water  is  for  the  purpose  of  satisfying 
the  desire,  that  the  water  will  be  the  means  of 
attaining  the  end  of  his  wish. 

In  the  judgment  "Want  water!"  there  is 
something  lacking  to  make  it  express  the  fact 
that  water  is  of  contributory  value.  The  need 
and  the  object  of  the  need  are  expressed,  but 
not  the  purpose  of  the  need.  To  have  the  latter, 
there  must  be  added  some  word  or  words  that 
will  symbolize  the  object  in  the  process  of  satis- 
fying the  need.  Such  symbolism  is  afforded  by 
expressions  of  purpose,  the  simplest  of  which  is 
the  infinitive  (with  to  or  in  ing).  "  Want  water 
to  drink  "  or  "  Want  water  for  drinking  "  ex- 
presses in  a  simple  way  (a)  the  desire,  {h)  the 
object  of  desire,  and  (c)  the  fact  that  the  object 
is  the  principal  means  of  satisfying  the  desire. 
The  third  is  attained  by  the  use  of  a  word  that 
shows  the  desire  in  process  of  fulfilment  by  the 
use  of  the  object.  Here  is  the  first  case  where 
a  contributory  value  finds  expression. 

Reflection  will  show  us  that  contributory  val- 
ues are  always  accompanied  in  their  expression 
by  some  statement  of  their  end.     They  are  con- 


82     VAI.UES  AND  THEIR  INTERREI.ATION 

tributory  to  something,  not  simply  given  as  good. 
The  satisfaction  of  thirst  is  an  immediate  value, 
given  as  good.  I  may  connect  that  value  with 
the  object  water,  however,  without  thinking 
specifically  of  water  as  "  good  for  "  satisfying 
my  thirst.  The  latter  process  is  the  outcome 
of  reasoning  about  my  desire.  It  contains  the 
reflection  that  the  object  that  I  already  want  is 
wanted  for  a  purpose  which  I  now  make  clear 
to  myself.  Thus  introspection  confirms  my 
previous  illustration. 

It  may  therefore  be  stated  as  a  proposition, 
that  the  individual  gives  expression  to  a  con- 
tributory value  first  when  he  uses  words  that 
show  how  an  object  of  desire  satisfies  the  end 
of  desire, 

§  14.  I  have  described  the  simplest  situa- 
tions in  which  the  individual  expresses  an  im- 
mediate and  a  contributory  value.  There  is  a 
further  stage  of  expression  of  contributory 
value.  This  comes  to  view  when  the  individual 
goes  beyond  his  own  desires  in  expressing  values 
by  judgment.  He  s^es  that  others  beside  him- 
self have  desires  and  that  they  may  be  satisfied 
by  certain  means.  Certain  desires  he  finds  to 
be   common   to   his   kind.      Contributory   value 


WITH  RESPECT   TO   KNOWLEDGE         83 

may  then  be  expressed  by  a  general  proposition, 
"  Water  is  good  to  drink/'  He  may  extend 
the  application  of  value  still  farther.  He  may 
apply  it  to  objects  which  further  the  processes 
of  nature,  and  may  say,  for  example,  "  The  soil 
is  good  for  nourishing  the  plant."  This  is  one 
way  in  which  contributory  values  may  become 
more  and  more  objective,  i.e.,  divorced  from  the 
individual  who  makes  the  evaluation.  So  that 
in  expressing  values  by  the  judgment,  we  may 
state  that  contributory  values  arise  in  intimate 
association  with  immediate  values,  but  that,  as 
the  power  of  expression  develops,  they  may  be- 
come entirely  free  from  immediate  values. 

This  division  of  the  chapter  may  be  sum- 
marized as  follows: 

A.  Origin  of  Immediate  Judgments. 

§  12.  The  individual  first  expresses  an  im- 
mediate value  when  a  situation  occurs  in  which 
he  symbolizes  a  feeling-attitude  by  a  form  of 
words. 

B.  Origin  of  Contributory  Judgments. 

§  13.  He  first  expresses  a  contributory  value 
when  he  uses  words  that  show  how  an  object 
of  desire  satisfies  the  end  of  desire. 


84      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

§  14.  Contributory  values  in  their  expres- 
sion in  the  judgment  arise  in  intimate  associa- 
tion with  immediate  values,  but,  as  the  power 
of  expression  develops,  they  become  free  from 
the  immediate,  so  that  the  individual  of  mature 
growth  may  express  in  the  judgment  two  dis- 
tinct classes  of  values,  immediate  and  contribu- 
tory. 


CHAPTER    V 

THE  INTERRELATION  OF  VALUES 
WITH  RESPECT  TO  THEIR  CO-EX- 
ISTENCE 

IN  Chapter  I,  two  classes  of  values  were 
defined  and  distinguished.  They  were  dis- 
covered by  introspection,  but  it  was  found 
that  there  is  a  psychological  basis  for  the  dis- 
tinction. Immediate  values  are  grounded  in 
the  feeling-aspect  of  consciousness;  contribu- 
tory, in  the  cognitive.  The  brief  treatment  of 
Chapter  I,  however,  is  inadequate  to  the  im- 
portance of  the  distinction.  In  this  chapter,  I 
purpose  more  fully  to  discuss  value-relations  of 
the  individual  to  his  environment.  To  do  this 
successfully,  it  will  be  necessary  first  to  inquire 
just  what  is  meant,  in  this  connection,  by  the 
term  "  environment." 

The  chapter  may  therefore  be  divided  into 
two  main  topics: 

I.  Environment;  II.  Environment  and  Values. 

L     ENVIRONMENT 
§1.     The   word    "environment"   is   not   re- 
stricted in  common  usage  to  the  surroundings 

85 


86     VAI.UES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

of  a  living  being.  We  speak  of  the  "  environs  " 
of  a  city,  using  an  almost  identical  word.  It 
would  be  perfectly  possible  to  speak  of  the  en- 
vironment of  a  chair  or  a  building.  But  most 
commonly  it  is  used  of  the  surroundings  of  a 
plant  or  animal;  that  is,  an  organism  is  con- 
trasted with  surrounding  organisms  or  objects. 
As  our  sphere  of  discussion  is  limited  to  the 
animal  kingdom,  we  may  at  the  outset  limit  its 
usage  to  the  contrast  between  an  animal  organ- 
ism and  its  surroundings. 

§  2.     How  much  of  an  organism's  surround- 
ings does  "  environment ''  include  ?     In  an  ex- 
tended sense  of  the  word,  we  might  say  that 
there  is  no  part  of  the  world  of  matter  and 
motion  that  does  not  belong  to  the  environment 
of  an  organism.     The  influence  of  physical  laws 
is   so    far-reaching   that   very   remote   physical 
disturbances  may  influence  an  organism  quite 
apart  from  his  knowledge.     The  conditions  of 
environment  may  be  altered  by  sun-spots,   by 
an  earthquake  thousands  of  miles  distant,  or  by 
the  temperature  of  currents  of  water  that  wash 
the  coast  nearest  an  inland  region.     Man's  en- 
vironment, in  a  sense,  is  the  world. 

We  see,  therefore,  that  environment  may  be 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   CO-EXISTENCE       87 

considered  to  include  a  great  deal.  This  most 
inclusive  use  of  the  word,  however,  cannot  be 
useful  to  us  in  a  discussion  of  value;  for,  by- 
adopting  it,  we  shall  only  find  a  synonym  for 
"  the  world."  It  is  desirable  for  us  to  restrict 
it  in  its  application.  Now  there  is  a  time-differ- 
ence between  the  stimuli  that  affect  an  organism 
from  its  environment.  The  sun  is  ultimately 
responsible  for  my  perception  of  light,  but  the 
immediate  cause  is  certain  Hght-waves  that 
strike  the  retina  of  the  eye.  There  is  a  point 
at  which  the  sensitive  protoplasm  of  an  organ- 
ism comes  into  contact  with  the  world  beyond 
itself;  there  are  immediate  stimuli  that  may 
be  contrasted  with  those  more  remote  in  time 
and  space.  It  is  to  these  immediate  stimuli 
that  I  shall  refer  when  I  speak  of  the  action 
of  environment  with  reference  to  an  organism. 
Environment  will  designate  that  part  of  the 
world  which  directly  influences  it,  that  part 
with  which  the  organism  comes  into  contact. 
-  §  3.  In  reference  to  a  very  primitive  organ- 
ism, this  conception  of  environment  is  perfectly 
clear.  No  explanation  was  necessary  when  the 
word  was  thus  used  in  Chapter  III.  There  the 
contrast  between  organism  and  environment  was 


88     VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

biological,  rather  than  psychological.  It  was 
clear  what  was  meant  by  saying  that  the  bio- 
logical indication  of  the  presence  of  value  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  organism  was  the  presence 
of  a  situation  in  which  the  organism  responded 
to  dangerous  stimuli  from  the  environment  by 
a  process  originating  within  itself.  The  earlier 
stages  of  conscious  activity  were  taken  in  their 
biological  significance,  and  they  were  described 
with  reference  to  the  acts  themselves. 

In  the  case  of  a  mature  individual,  however, 
there  is  a  complication.  Here  conscious  activity 
has  reached  a  highly  developed  form.  Is  it 
useful  for  us  still  to  maintain  the  biological 
standpoint?  When  I  speak  of  "my  environ- 
ment," am  I  using  the  phrase  in  the  biological 
or  the  psychological  sense?  The  answer  that  I 
give  to  these  questions  will  depend  largely  upon 
my  philosophical  pre-disposition.  The  problem 
of  the  relation  between  mind  and  body  comes  to 
the  fore.  And  I  am  in  danger  of  entering  into 
an  epistemological  tangle.  Let  us  examine  a 
few  of  the  ways  that  various  philosophers  may 
regard  "  environment." 

(a)  The  materialist,  or  the  instrumental 
pragmatist,  preserves  the  biological  standpoint 


WITH   RESPECT   TO  CO-EXISTENGE       89 

intact.  To  him  conscious  activity  is  a  function 
of  certain  cells  of  the  body,  and  "  conscious- 
ness "  is  as  much  a  part  of  him  as  his  hands 
or  his  feet.  The  relation  of  man  to  his  environ- 
ment is  the  relation  of  man  considered  as  body 
plus  conscious  activity. 

(b)  Those  who  make  a  difference  between 
mental  and  non-mental,  whether  they  be  inter- 
actionists  or  psycho-physical  parallelists,  may 
think  of  environment  as  the  relation  of  con- 
sciousness to  its  objects.  Environment  may 
mean  "  mental  environment ''  or  "  physical  en- 
vironment.'' It  may  have  to  do  with  the  rela- 
tion of  mind  to  its  objects  (psychological)  or 
the  relation  of  the  physical  organism  to  sur- 
rounding objects  (biological)  or  the  relation  of 
consciousness  to  objects  in  the  world  (psycho- 
physical). 

(c)  Spiritualists  (i.e.,  subjective  and  objec- 
tive idealists  and  the  like)  would  find  the  con- 
trast one  between  one  and  another  kind  of 
mental  entities.  But  the  nature  of  the  contrast 
between  organism  and  environment  would  vary 
with  the  degree  of  "objectivity"  attributed  to 
the  physical  world. 

§  4.     Now  beside  being  intellectually  dishon- 


90      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

est,  it  would  invalidate  my  reasoning  if  I  should 
use  the  contrast  between  organism  and  environ- 
ment first  in  one  sense,  then  in  another.  The 
question  of  philosophical  pre-disposition,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  not  nearly  so  important  as  that 
I  find  a  meaning  of  the  contrast  that  will  be 
most  useful  in  the  development  of  my  theory 
of  value. 

The  "process  originating  within  itself,''  which 
was  seen  to  be  the  biological  concomitant  of  the 
origin  of  value  from  the  individual's  standpoint, 
is  likely  to  be  agreed  to  be  a  very  rudimentary 
form  of  conscious  activity.  In  this  case,  there- 
fore, conscious  activity  was  described  wholly 
from  the  biological  point  of  view.  This  stand- 
point was  found  to  be  entirely  adequate  to  the 
discussion  of  my  theory  of  value.  Why  not, 
then,  keep  to  the  biological  standpoint  in  my 
discussion  of  the  values  of  a  mature  individual? 
It  will  be  seen  that,  in  man,  mature  conscious 
activity  can  still  be  described  in  terms  of  the 
standpoint  of  the  organism  without  trespassing 
beyond  the  biological  aspect. 

§  5.  This  point  of  view  is  nearest  like  that 
of  the  instrumental  pragmatists,  as  developed 
in   Creative  Intelligence.^     It  must  not  be  in- 

1  New  York,  191 7. 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   CO-EXISTENCE       91 

ferred,  however,  that  I  count  myself  one  of 
their  followers.  In  this  connection  there  are 
two  especial  points  of  difference  between  us. 

(a)  I  must  refuse  to  commit  myself  to  a 
decision  as  to  whether  existent  "  reality  "  is  a 
certain  or  an  uncertain  quantity.  By  "  reality  " 
I  mean  the  physical  world.  If,  however,  the 
term  be  taken  to  include  all  that  happens,  I 
should  agree  that  it  is  quantitatively  uncertain. 

(b)  As  a  logical  consequence  of  their  stand- 
point, the  instrumental  pragmatists  get  rid  of 
"  sensations  "  in  the  classical  use  of  that  term. 
Organisms  differ,  according  to  them,  chiefly  by 
the  "  emotional  tone  "  of  the  relation  of  "  or- 
ganic complexes "  to  other  things.^  While  I 
also  emphasize  the  importance  of  feeling-atti- 
tudes in  my  theory  of  value,  I  am  not  prepared 
to  say  that  the  cognitive  aspect  of  conscious 
activity  is  not  of  as  great  importance  to  value 
as  the  feeling-aspect.  That  is,  I  recognize  that 
the  standpoint  of  the  individual,  formed  by  the 
"  orientation ''  of  complex  relations  about  a 
center,  may  be  described  with  respect  to  the 
value  of  these  relations  apart  from  the  aspect 
of   their    "  emotional    tone."      Nevertheless,    it 

2  Cf.  Kallen,  in  Creative  Intelligence,  415-416. 


92      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

must  be  remembered  that  the  individual  ac- 
quired a  standpoint  of  his  own  only  when  his 
first  feeling-attitude  appeared.  But  once  the 
individual  has  attained  a  standpoint  of  his 
own,  what  were  formerly  relations  without  any 
"  emotional  tone  "  now  become  relations  of  in- 
terest to  the  individual  in  the  cognitive  aspect, 
without  reference  to  the  acquired  "  emotional 
tone." 

§  6.  In  §  2,  environment  was  defined  for 
our  purpose  as  those  things  which  act  directly 
upon  the  organism  as  stimuli,  that  with  which 
the  organism  is  in  direct  contact.  As  this  use 
of  the  word  was  adopted  for  our  convenience, 
we  must  be  careful  not  to  let  it  become  a  source 
of  annoyance.  It  would  be  such  if  we  conceived 
it  with  scientific  accuracy.  For  one  might  ask. 
If  my  conscious  activity  is  in  contact  with  that 
chair  by  means  of  light-waves  which  strike  the 
retina  of  my  eye,  are  the  waves  at  the  very  point 
where  they  meet  the  retina,  my  environment? 
This  would  be  to  make  a  practical  working  defi- 
nition worthless  by  over-refining  it.  Practically, 
we  shall  conceive  environment  to  extend  as  far 
as  our  perception  will  carry  us.  It  will  include 
sensational  experience,  and  also  that  amount  of 


WITH    RESPECT   TO   CO-EXISTENCE       93 

inferential  experience  which  is  a  part  of  our 
perception.  But  it  will  not  include  knowledge 
about  an  object  which  is  buried  in  memory  at 
the  time  of  my  perception.  Thus,  although  I 
know  that  the  wood  of  my  chair  came  from  a 
forest,  and  that  some  man  cut  the  tree  down 
and  sawed  it,  planed,  hammered,  and  polished 
it,  the  tree  in  the  forest,  the  woodcutter,  the 
saw-mill,  the  carpenter,  the  turner,  and  the 
polisher  will  not  be  included  in  my  environment 
so  far  as  my  perception  of  the  chair  is  con- 
cerned. If,  however,  the  thought  of  these  sug- 
gested itself  to  me  as  I  looked  at  the  chair,  they 
would  be  included  in  my  environment,  and  their 
importance  in  it  would  be  determined  by  the 
extent  to  which  I  am  familiar  with  them  in 
actual  experience.  They  would  be  much  more 
important  if,  for  instance,  I  had  seen  the  very 
tree  cut  down  and  the  whole  process  of  manu- 
facture of  the  chair,  than  if  I  had  only  read 
about  how  chairs  are  made. 

The  point  that  lies  behind  this  argument  is 
that  conscious  activity,  conceived  as  one  of  the 
functions  of  an  organism,  is  related  to  surround- 
ing objects  in  varying  degree,  just  as  other 
functions  of  the  organism  are  related  to  sur- 


94      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

rounding  matter.  The  peculiar  nature  of  con- 
scious activity  lies  in  the  fact  that  "  contact 
with  "  is  broader  and  freer  here  than  in  the 
case,  for  example,  of  a  muscle  or  a  hair.  The 
importance  of  this  difference  for  us  is  that 
value-relations  have  to  do  with  that  portion  of 
environment  with  which  conscious  activity  is  in 
contact. 

§  7.  Now  conscious  activity,  after  it  has 
emerged  from  what  I  called  in  Chapter  III  the 
"  earliest  stage  of  consciousness,"  is  in  contact 
with  environment  under  two  aspects,  cognition 
and  feeling.  I  wish  that  this  statement  might 
be  accepted  without  further  discussion,  but  I 
fear  that  it  will  be  necessary  to  digress  a  little 
and  treat  briefly  of  certain  disputes  among  psy- 
chologists. 

It  is  the  fashion  among  psychologists  to  an- 
alyze their  states  of  consciousness  to  find  out 
what  aspects  are  present,  and  which  may  exist 
apart  from  other  aspects.  For  example,  Titch- 
ener  asks,  "  Do  we  ever  attend  without  feel- 
ing? "  ^  He  answers.  Yes,  and  points  to  reflex, 
automatic,  and  ideo-motor  actions,  "  performed 
without  the  arousal  of  pleasantness-unpleasant- 

^Titchener,  E.  B.,  Lectures  on  the  Elementary  Psychology  of 
Feeling  and  Attention^  2^2)02. 


WITH   RESPECT   TO  CO-EXISTENCE       95 

ness  in  consciousness."  May  we,  on  the  other 
hand,  feel  without  attending?  Wundt  says  that 
we  may.  Titchener  says  not.  The  latter  adds, 
"  I  incline  rather  to  find  a  fairly  close  parallel 
between  degree  of  clearness  [his  criterion  of 
attention]  and  degree  of  pleasantness-unpleas- 
antness, and  thus  to  regard  the  relation  between 
affection  and  attention,  on  this  side,  not  as  ex- 
ternal, but  as  intrinsic." 

Another  dispute  relates  to  the  number  and 
nature  of  affective  qualities.  Wundt's  tri-dimen- 
sional  theory  of  feeling  postulates  pleasantness- 
unpleasantness,  excitement-tranquilisation,  and 
tension-relaxation  as  the  three  "  dimensions  of 
affection."  Thereupon  psychologists  introspect 
their  feelings.  Some,  as  Titchener,  find  only 
one  dimension.  The  tri-dimensionalists  speak 
slightingly  of  the  ''Dogma  der  Lust-Unlust- 
theorie." 

My  criticism  of  such  disputes,  of  which  there 
are  many,  is  twofold.  The  psychologists  who 
indulge  in  them  are  (a)  biased  by  a  predis- 
position to  hold  the  theory  of  psycho-physical 
parallelism.  Consequently,  conscious  activity  is 
not  conceived  by  them  in  the  act  itself,  but 
epiphenomenally.      The    stimuli    from    environ- 


96      VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

merit  are  conceived  as  affecting  the  physical 
part  of  the  organism,  while  it  becomes  of  inter- 
est to  inquire  what  happens  at  the  same  time 
in  consciousness.  Much  opportunity  is  thereby 
afforded  for  introspective  observation,  but  very 
little  hope  that  correct  conclusions  may  be 
reached.  Consciousness  is  conceived  as  follow- 
ing alongside  physical  processes.  It  is  assumed 
that  these  processes  may  throw  off  effects  in 
consciousness,  may  partly  do  so,  or  may  go 
along  blissfully  by  themselves. 

Again  (b),  the  nature  of  these  disputes  im- 
plies that  consciousness  may  be  divided  into 
"faculties.''  When  it  is  asked  whether  atten- 
tion may  exist  without  feeling,  the  unit  of  con- 
scious activity  is  set  aside.  Cognition,  feeling, 
and  attention  lose  their  character  as  aspects. 
The  mere  putting  of  such  a  question  almost 
assumes  that  attention  and  feeling  are  separate 
parts  of  consciousness  which  often  appear  to- 
gether, but  which  might  well  be  conceived  some- 
times to  be  separated,  only  one  appearing.  At- 
tention, throughout,  seems  to  be  regarded  as 
cognitive  attention.  At  least,  psychologists  in- 
trospect to  discover  whether  they  are  attending, 
and  the  introspective  process  is  certainly  cog- 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   CO-EXISTENCE       97 

nitive.  They  also  introspect  to  discover  whether 
they  are  feeHng  pleasantness  or  unpleasantness, 
and  assume  that,  if  they  could  not  discover  such 
a  feeling,  the  feeling  aspect  would  not  be  pres- 
ent. What  about  the  pleasant  feeling  of  strok- 
ing that  a  cat  sometimes  experiences?  Is  this 
dependent  upon  her  knowing  that  she  has  it? 

§  8.  Against  such  a  point  of  view  let  me 
place  a  theory  recommended  by  its  simplicity 
and  its  ability  to  fit  in  with  facts  of  observation. 

Conscious  activity  is  always  one  in  its  func- 
tioning. There  are  certain  distinct  aspects  of 
conscious  activity,  however,  and  sometimes  one 
of  these  is  more  prominent  than  another.  Such 
is  generally  the  case.  It  would  be  difficult  to 
conceive  of  a  situation  in  which  attention,  pleas- 
antness or  unpleasantness,  and  cognition  were 
present  in  the  same  degree.  Some  form  of  con- 
templation would  approach  nearest  to  this  con- 
dition, but  contemplatives  actually  advise  their 
disciples  to  keep  attention  away  from  feeling  as 
far  as  possible. 

But  where  conscious  activity  is  just  emerging 
from  non-conscious,  there  are  not  such  pro- 
nounced aspects.  Here  there  is  a  sensitive  con- 
dition which  doubtless  exhibits  the  rudiments  of 


98     VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

cognition,  feeling,  and  will;  but  none  of  these 
appears  in  a  prominent  way.  It  is  curious  how 
willing  some  psychologists  (except  those  who 
are  "  gefuhlsempfindungen "  theorists)  are  to 
admit  that  feeling  is  of  "  elemental  rank  in  con- 
sciousness "  *  but  yet  discuss  the  question  of 
whether  it  need  be  present  with  other  elements. 
I  think  that  this  is  due  to  the  epiphenomenalistic 
attitude  of  such  writers. 

In  later  stages  of  development,  one  aspect  of 
conscious  activity  is  more  prominent  than  others. 
The  mistake  of  many  psychologists  is  their  cheer- 
ful assumption  that,  with  the  prominence  of  one 
aspect  over  others,  the  others  disappear.  But 
conscious  activity  is  in  contact  with  environment 
as  a  whole,  not  in  a  divided  state.  There  is  no 
warrant  whatever  for  the  supposition  that,  in 
a  mature  conscious  individual,  aspects  of  con- 
scious activity  are  transitory,  flitting  on  and  off 
the  stage  of  consciousness.  This  view  reeks  of 
epiphenomenalism.  The  only  support  for  such 
a  theory  is  derived  from  introspection,  which 
cannot  be  depended  upon  in  this  connection,  as 
it  is  a  cognitive  process. 

§  9.     For  my  present  purpose,  the  importance 

*Titchener,  op.  cit.,  289. 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   CO-EXISTENCE       99 

of  my  theory  lies  in  the  fact  that,  if  it  be  a  true 
description  of  what  takes  place,  the  feeling- 
attitude,  or  the  "  affective  side "  of  conscious 
activity,  must  be  regarded  as  present,  even  when 
it  is  not  exhibited  by  feelings  of  pleasantness- 
unpleasantness.  The  latter  feelings  may  better 
be  regarded  as  cases  where  the  feeling  side  is 
uppermost  in  conscious  activity,  not  where  feel- 
ing is  absent. 

The  obvious  consequence  of  my  theory  is  that 
conscious  activity  is  related  to  environment  as 
directly  through  feeling  as  through  cognition. 
Logical  knowledge  may  well  be  the  best  instru- 
ment for  dealing  with  reality.  It  might  be  main- 
tained (though  this  is  open  to  question)  that 
cognition  is  the  sole  means  by  which  we  increase 
the  extent  of  our  contact  with  reality.  But  these 
admissions  will  in  no  way  prove  that  "  contact 
with  "  is  limited  to  the  cognitive  aspect  of  con- 
sciousness; they  will  not  remove  the  possibility 
that  our  "  contact  with  "  contains  elements  of 
feeling  which  have  never  resulted  from  cog- 
nition. Furthermore,  the  fact  that  we  increase 
our  contact  with  reality  through  cognition  does 
not  prove  that  the  feelings  which  are  aroused 
by  the  directive  influence  of  cognition  are  de- 


loo    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

pendent  in  their  whole  meaning  upon  the  cog- 
nitive processes.  They  may  have  an  independ- 
ent relation  to  reaHty  apart  from  cognition. 

This  doctrine  may  sound  strange,  and  yet  it 
fits  in  well  with  the  facts  of  experience.  It  tells 
me  that  the  portion  of  reality  with  which  I  am 
in  contact  is  not  restricted  to  what  I  am  con- 
scious of  through  sensations  and  ideas,  but  that 
it  also  includes  that  portion  with  which  I  am  in 
contact  through  the  feeling-element  of  conscious- 
ness. This  is  neither  to  say,  with  Rickert,  that 
knowledge  is  determined  through  the  feelings, 
nor  with  the  older  psychologists,  that  feeling  is 
dependent  upon  sensation.  I  mean  rather  that 
the  portion  of  reality  with  which  I  am  in  contact 
is  richer  and  fuller  in  my  experience  of  it  than 
the  knowledge  of  it  which  I  obtain  through  the 
senses ;  and  that,  in  defining  "  contact  with '' 
environment,  I  must  include  a  certain  relation 
to  reality  directly  by  feeling,  and  not  indirectly 
through  sensation.  In  the  higher  stages  of  con- 
scious activity,  the  presence  of  sensation  may 
be  the  only  path  to  the  broadening  of  environ- 
ment; our  experience  of  environment  is  always 
partly  sensational;  but  in  itself  environment  is 
more  than  relation  to  reality  through  sensation. 


WITH   RESPECT   TO  CQ-^XIS'ISlJ^CR     mi 

Of  course  this  has  nothing  whatever  to  do  with 
the  theory  that  we  can  obtain  knowledge  di- 
rectly through  feeling,  or  the  theory  that  we 
can  increase  our  "  contact  with  "  environment 
by  plunging  into  states  of  feeling  where  cog- 
nition is  at  a  minimum. 

I  may  give  a  few  examples  to  illustrate  direct 
contact  with  the  environment  through  the  feeling 
side  of  consciousness,  where  the  latter  predomi- 
nates over  the  cognitive  aspect.  Such  examples 
can  be  drawn  only  from  observation  of  the  rela- 
tion of  others  to  their  environment,  and  from 
self-analysis  based  on  knowledge  gained  after 
the  experience  that  is  instanced.  Both  of  these 
methods  of  illustration  apply  in  the  following 
case :  We  notice  in  the  experience  of  others  and 
recall  in  our  own  past  experience  that  we  often 
conceive  a  sudden  dislike  for  a  person  at  first 
meeting.  Later  on,  when  we  know  him  better, 
we  discover  why  we  dislike  him.  Traits  are 
exhibited  by  him,  opinions  expressed,  that  are 
foreign  to  our  point  of  view.  Cognition  has 
here  confirmed  the  impression  made  upon  us 
that  resulted  in  a  feeling-attitude.  Women  in 
general  are  reputed  to  be  more  "  intuitive  "  in 
this  way  than  men.     Again,  I  am  forced  very 


,ioi2    Vv^LUgS  ^\NP  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

often  to  act  when  I  am  ignorant  of  some  of 
the  circumstances  which  should  determine  my 
action.  On  such  occasions  I  either  guess  at 
the  best  course  of  action,  or  rely  on  a  "  feeUng 
for  "  one  course.  To  say  that  such  a  "  feeHng  " 
is  determined  wholly  by  the  general  texture  of 
my  ideas  and  feelings,  rather  than  by  some  kind 
of  contact  with  the  situation  in  hand,  is  to  be 
dogmatic,  and  to  beg  the  question. 

I  may  add  that  my  theory,  if  true,  would 
prove  to  be  of  the  greatest  service  to  religious 
apologists.  Feeling  and  emotion  have  been  em- 
phasized by  most  religions,  so  much  so,  in  fact, 
that  Arnold  defined  religion  as  "  morality  tinged 
with  emotion."  Now  if  the  emotion  associated 
with  a  religious  experience  (and  let  it  be  remem- 
bered that  I  believe  feeling  to  be  wholly  psycho- 
logical and  "subjective")  has  no  point  of  con- 
tact with  reality,  if,  that  is,  religious  emotion  is 
subordinate  and  a  by-product  of  consciousness, 
it  cannot  be  of  much  greater  importance  to 
religious  experience  than  as  a  stimulus  to  action. 
The  Christian  faith,  however,  makes  much  of 
love  between  God  and  man.  It  claims  that  God 
bestows  love  upon  his  creatures  and  that  man 
can  return  this  love.     From  the  Christian  point 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   CO-EXISTENCE     103 

of  view,  therefore,  emotion  is  a  way  of  being  in 
contact  with  environment.  I  do  not  say  coming 
into  contact  with  a  spiritual  world,  although 
mystics  and  quietists  make  much  of  it  as  a 
method.  In  point  of  fact.  Christian  teachers 
of  ascetic  theology  warn  their  pupils  not  to  try 
to  obtain  "  spiritual  sweetness,"  as  they  call  it. 
They  even  claim  that  "  spiritual  dryness  "  is  a 
stage  of  progress  in  advance  of  the  spiritual 
sweetness  that  is  likely  to  attend  the  first  efforts 
for  spiritual  progress. 

The  same  argument  that  is  advanced  with 
respect  to  contact  with  personalities  on  earth 
and  with  God,  may  also  be  applied  to  prayer 
and  to  communion  with  saints  and  angels.  It 
proves  nothing,  of  course.  It  only  shows  a 
possible  means  of  intercourse,  provided  that 
spiritual  beings  form  a  portion  of  reality.  It 
shows,  too,  how  a  worshipper  need  not  be  bound 
to  his  own  conceptions  of  the  spiritual  world  in 
order  to  worship  effectively  (that  is,  again,  pro- 
vided Christian  beliefs  are  grounded  in  reality). 
The  peasant  woman  of  limited  intelligence,  who 
gradually  comes  to  identify  the  Virgin  with  the 
grotesque  statue  in  front  of  which  she  is  pray- 
ing, may  not  pray  ineffectively.     The  experience 


^ 


104    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

is  always  richer  than  the  sensations  and  ideas 
that  are  derived  from  it. 

II.  ENVIRONMENT  AND  VALUES 
Having  built  a  foundation  by  discussion  of 
the  meaning  of  environment  and  of  the  relation 
of  an  organism  to  its  environment,  we  may  pro- 
ceed to  the  erection  of  a  theory  of  co-existent 
values.  I  think  that  it  will  scarcely  be  disputed 
that  whatever  is  of  interest  to  conscious  activity 
is  valuable  from  the  standpoint  of  that  conscious 
activity.  At  the  emergence  of  consciousness, 
the  individual  acquired  a  standpoint  of  his  own. 
Conscious  activity,  starting  in  a  rudimentary 
way,  develops  and  increases  the  scope  of  its 
function.  In  the  process  of  development,  it 
widens  in  its  contact  with  environment.  Its 
relations  to  environment  are  value  relations. 

§  10.  Everything  with  which  conscious  ac- 
tivity comes  into  contact  is  valuable  both  as 
contributory  and  as  immediate.  Inasmuch  as 
cognition  and  feeling  are  aspects  of  the  same 
consciousness,  objects  of  the  environment  will 
be  related  to  conscious  activity  both  as  cognitive 
and  affective.  From  the  cognitive  point  of 
view,  these  relations  are  relations  of  contribu- 


WITH   RESPECT   TO   CO-EXISTENCE     105 

tory  value.  The  objects  related  are  "good 
for"  some  purpose.  They  are  guide-posts  to 
conscious  activity  in  its  contact  with  environ- 
ment. They  help  it  find  its  way  in  and  among 
other  objects  with  which  it  is  not  in  contact. 
They  are  the  interests  of  consciousness  from 
one  point  of  view. 

But  conscious  activity  is  also  related  to  the 
objects  with  which  it  is  in  contact  from  the  feel- 
ing side.  These  relations  are  relations  of  imme- 
diate values.  It  is  not  necessary  that  pleasant- 
ness-unpleasantness be  recognized  to  make  ob- 
jects of  immediate  value.  All  that  is  necessary 
is  that  there  be  a  feeling-tone  of  conscious  activ- 
ity, and  this  affective  aspect  is  present  in  all  but 
the  earliest  stage  of  consciousness.  The  nestful 
of  eggs,  the  "  never-to-be-too-much-set-upon 
object"  of  the  hen  (James),  does  not  demand 
the  presence  of  recognition  of  pleasantness  on 
the  part  of  the  hen  to  make  it  of  immediate 
value  to  her.  She  probably  never  thought  of  it 
as  pleasant ;  it  was  only  "  never-to-be-too-much- 
set-upon."  Kallen '  gives  a  good  treatment  of 
immediate  values  as  relations  of  the  organism's 
conscious  activity  to  environment,  but  he  wholly 
disregards  the  contributory  aspect  of  value. 

'^  Creative  Intelligence,  412  ff. 


io6    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

§  II.  In  Chapter  III,  the  cognitive  and  feel- 
ing sides  of  conscious  activity  were  spoken  of 
as  two  directions  in  which  that  activity  has 
developed.  They  diverge  from  a  point  at  which 
conscious  activity  comes  into  contact  with  en- 
vironment. At  only  one  point  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  organism  is  this  divergence  from 
an  undifferentiated  conscious  activity  to  be  ob- 
served, namely,  at  the  first  appearance  of  con- 
sciousness in  an  organism.  But  since  the  indi- 
vidual comes  into  contact  with  new  factors  of 
environment  constantly,  it  becomes  of  interest 
to  inquire  just  how  new  relations  with  the  new 
objects  are  established. 

It  is  quite  conceivable  that  conscious  activity, 
a  single  function  exhibiting  two  aspects,  might 
react  to  stimuli  from  the  environment  at  one 
time  chiefly  in  one  aspect,  at  another,  chiefly  in 
another.  That  is,  in  the  case  of  a  mature  con- 
sciousness, we  cannot  speak  with  so  great  a 
confidence  of  a  recurrence  of  the  primitive  con- 
dition of  conscious  activity  whenever  a  new  con- 
tact with  environment  is  established.  Our  doubt 
is  confirmed  by  comparing  the  functions  of  other 
organs  and  organisms.  In  plants,  for  example, 
we   find   a   great   variety   of  highly   developed 


WITH   RESPECT   TO  CO-EXISTENCE     107 

organs  which  serve  special  adaptive  purposes. 
The  organs  which  perform  these  functions  took 
their  origin  from  cells  whose  protoplasm  was  ex- 
ceedingly sensitive  to  a  great  variety  of  stimuli. 
But  when  once  certain  cambial  cells  become 
differentiated  into  root,  stem,  leaf,  or  repro- 
ductive cells,  it  is  usually  very  hard  to  change 
their  direction  of  development.  Of  course  there 
are  exceptions :  some  of  the  hepatics  have  a  gen- 
erous susceptibility  to  regeneration  from  vege- 
tative cells,  and  we  all  know  how  the  shoots  of 
some  trees  may  be  stuck  into  the  ground  with 
the  result  that  root  cells  become  differentiated 
from  the  cambium,  and  a  tree  grows  up.  The 
latter  example,  of  course,  only  shows  the  un- 
differentiated character  of  cambial  tissue;  old 
cells  seldom  change  their  function. 

Now  the  fact  that  conscious  activity  has  two 
aspects  which  fluctuate  in  preponderance  shows 
that  the  sensitive  character  of  consciousness  is 
not  determined  in  growth  along  one  hard  and 
fast  line.  And  yet  this  is  not  to  say  that 
primitive  conscious  activity  must  necessarily  be 
reenacted  every  time  consciousness  is  stimulated 
by  a  new  environmental  factor.  Conscious  ac- 
tivity might  be  just  fluid  enough  to  respond  to 


io8    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

some  stimuli  on  the  cognitive  side,  and  to  others 
on  the  feeling  side.  It  is  extremely  difficult  to 
describe  what  I  mean  in  simple  language.  Per- 
haps a  very  imperfect  illustration  may  aid  me. 
Imagine  two  insulated  wires  wound  together, 
but  connected  at  one  end.  These  may  represent 
the  two  aspects  of  conscious  activity  taking  their 
origin  at  a  point  where  there  is  no  differentiation 
into  aspects,  but  continuing  together  inseparably 
after  differentiation  has  taken  place.  The  point 
of  connection,  however,  is  not  the  only  connec- 
tion with  environment.  Connection  occurs  at 
many  places  along  the  line.  The  question  is: 
Is  the  connection  with  new  points  made  by  each 
of  the  wound  wires  touching  the  environment 
at  various  points,  or  by  a  wire  at  each  point  that 
touches  the  new  factor  and  immediately  divides 
into  two  wires  that  make  connection  with  the 
main  wires? 

It  may  seem  that  I  am  asking  questions  which 
I  ought  not  to  ask  in  view  of  my  disapproval  of 
disputes  as  to  whether  we  can  attend  without 
feeling  or  feel  without  attending.  This  is  not 
so,  however.  It  is  not  a  question  of  what  con- 
scious activity  can  do,  but  of  how  the  environ- 
ment comes  into  connection  with  conscious  ac- 


WITH   RESPECT   TO  CO-EXISTENCE     109 

tivity.  Frankly,  I  do  not  know  how  this  real 
question  may  be  answered.  I  do  not  know  how 
to  apply  scientific  method  in  such  a  case,  and  I 
am  sure  that  the  method  of  introspection  would 
be  quite  inadequate,  because  one  cannot  even 
observe  the  feeling  side  of  consciousness  when 
that  aspect  is  not  predominant  and  exhibited  in 
consciousness  by  pleasantness  or  unpleasantness. 
At  least  I  may  be  permitted  to  speculate  on 
the  matter.  The  basis  for  my  own  belief  is  my 
view  of  the  nature  of  the  earliest  stage  of  con- 
sciousness. I  do  not  believe  in  James's  "  bloom- 
ing, buzzing  confusion."  It  seems  to  me  that 
this  is  far  too  complicated  for  the  earliest  stage 
of  consciousness.  It  would  better  describe  a 
mature  state  of  conscious  activity  which  never 
had  a  chance  to  function  in  some  strange  envi- 
ronment into  which  it  was  suddenly  plunged. 
Nor  do  I  believe  that  "  pure  sensations  "  are 
entirely  "simple"  (in  the  sense  of  single).  I 
believe  that  the  earliest  stage  of  conscious  activ- 
ity is  a  situation  where  at  least  two  factors  are 
discriminated  and  the  feeling  side  is  present, 
though  very  rudimentary.  (I  have  read  some- 
where that  Esquimaux  brought  to  Broadway, 
New  York  City,  did  not  seem  alarmed  by  the 


no    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

buzzing  confusion,  but  were  quite  unconcerned 
until  they  saw  some  skins  hanging  in  a  furrier's 
window. ) 

It  seems  probable  to  me  that,  when  a  new 
factor  of  environment  comes  into  contact  with 
conscious  activity,  something  of  the  same  nature 
occurs.  If  it  does,  it  is  so  quickly  connected 
with  memory  images  and  the  affective  stream 
that  to  notice  it,  even  in  its  cognitive  aspect,  is 
almost  impossible.  For  this  point  of  contact 
with  environment,  realized  at  the  origin  of  con- 
scious activity,  and  again  realized  over  and  over, 
as  new  factors  of  environment  come  into  relation 
with  consciousness,  I  know  no  better  term  than 
"  sensation,"  which  may  be  considered  in  this 
connection  to  include  the  affective  element  (sen- 
tire  means  almost  anything  in  the  way  of  per- 
ception or  affection).  When  sensation  occurs, 
the  sensitive  protoplasm  delays  in  its  course  be- 
fore responding  to  a  stimulus;  a  moment  passes 
and  it  blossoms  out  into  cognition  and  affection, 
and  is  associated  with  accumulated  memory 
images  in  the  main  stream.  Sensation,  thus 
considered,  would  be  the  bridge  between  cog- 
nition and  feeling. 

§  12.     New  values,  therefore,  the  outcome  of 


WITH   RESPECT   TO  CO-EXISTENCE     in 

new  relations  with  environment,  do  not  conflict 
with  old  values  in  respect  to  their  origin.  But 
they  are  modified  by  old  values  almost  as  soon 
as  they  appear.  If  this  were  not  so,  but  if,  on 
the  contrary,  new  values  retained  their  complete 
independence,  we  should  be  very  inconsistent  in 
our  views  of  life.  We  are  that,  and  it  is  just 
because  we  have  systems  of  value-relations  that 
are  more  or  less  isolated  one  from  another  that 
we  are  so.  This  inconsistency  may  be  trivial, 
or  it  may  reach  to  abnormal  proportions  where 
dissociation  of  personality  occurs. 

§  13.  So  far  as  value  is  concerned,  we  may 
see  that  the  advantage  of  a  mature  conscious- 
ness over  the  earliest  stage  of  consciousness  lies 
in  the  ability  of  the  former  to  control  new  values 
by  means  of  registered  memory-images.  This 
control,  I  believe,  though  direct  proof  would  be 
difficult,  also  comes  about  by  reference  of  new 
affective  elements  to  the  affective  side  of  mature 
conscious  activity.  But  the  main  control  is 
through  ideas;  and  one  chief  element  of  the 
process  of  "  gaining  experience  "  is  learning  to 
control  feelings  by  ideas.  The  experience  of 
the  primitive  organism  is  narrower  because  the 
cognitive  elements  are  simpler. 


112    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

§  14.  A  corollary,  requiring  no  proof,  is  that 
value-relations  with  the  same  objects  change 
according  as  the  objects  are  found  useful  in 
new  ways,  or  as  feeling-attitudes  toward  them 
change. 

§  15.  No  proof  also  is  needed  for  this  corol- 
lary: Every  object  with  which  conscious  activ- 
ity is  in  relation  is  of  both  contributory  and 
immediate  value,  but  there  is  no  constant  ratio 
between  the  contributory  and  immediate  values 
which  exist  by  the  relation  of  conscious  activity 
to  any  one  object. 

Chapter  V  may  be  summarized  as  follows : 
I.     Environment. 

§  I .  The  word  "  environment "  in  our  dis- 
cussion will  be  limited  in  its  use  to  the  sur- 
roundings of  an  animal  organism. 

§  2.  Environment  will  designate  that  part  of 
the  world  with  which  an  organism  comes  into 
direct  contact. 

§  3.  Whether  the  contrast  between  man  and 
his  environment  is  to  be  thought  of  wholly  from 
the  biological  point  of  view  depends  upon  one's 
philosophical  predisposition. 

(a)     The   materialist   and   the   instrumental 


WITH   RESPECT   TO  CO-EXISTENCE     113 

pragmatist  preserve  the  biological  point  of  view 
intact. 

(b)  Those  who  make  a  difference  between 
the  mental  and  the  non-mental  may  make  the 
contrast  psychological,  biological,  or  psycho- 
physical. 

(c)  Spiritualists  would  give  varying  an- 
swers, depending  upon  the  degree  of  "  objec- 
tivity '*  which  they  attribute  to  the  physical 
world. 

§  4.  In  man,  conscious  activity  may  still  be 
described  in  terms  of  the  standpoint  of  the 
organism  without  trespassing  beyond  the  bio- 
logical aspect. 

§  5.  This  viewpoint  is  nearest  like  that  of 
the  instrumental  pragmatists,  with  two  reserva- 
tions : 

(a)  I  do  not  commit  myself  to  a  decision 
as  to  whether  the  physical  world  is  certain  or 
uncertain  in  quantity. 

(b)  The  cognitive  aspect  of  conscious  ac- 
tivity must  not  be  minimized. 

§  6.  Our  use  of  "  environment  "  is  practical, 
rather  than  scrupulously  exact. 

§  7.  In  discussing  the  contrast  between  man 
and  his  environment  from  the  biological  point 


114    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

of  view,  we  must  take  care  not  to  conceive  con- 
sciousness as  epiphenomenal,  or  to  divide  con- 
scious activity  into  "  faculties." 

§  8.  Conscious  activity  is  always  one  in  op- 
eration, but  it  has  two  distinct  aspects,  one  of 
which  is  generally  more  prominent  than  the 
other. 

§  9.  Conscious  activity  is  related  to  envi- 
ronment as  directly  through  its  feeling-aspect 
as  through  cognition.  Some  practical  conse- 
quences. 

II.     Environment  and  Values. 

§  10.  Everything  with  which  conscious  ac- 
tivity comes  into  contact  is  valuable  from  both 
the  contributory  and  the  immediate  points  of 
view. 

§  II.  It  is  probably  true  that,  both  in  the 
case  of  the  origin  of  conscious  activity  and  in 
the  case  of  contact  of  an  existing  conscious 
activity  with  new  factors  of  environment,  sensa- 
tion is  the  bridge  between  cognition  and  feeling. 

§  12.  New  values  do  not  conflict  with  old 
values  so  far  as  origin  is  concerned,  but  the 
former  are  modified  by  the  latter. 

§  13.     The  advantage  of  a  mature  conscious- 


WITH   RESPECT   TO  CO-EXISTENCE     115 

ness  over  the  earliest  stage  of  consciousness,  so 
far  as  value  is  concerned,  is  the  ability  of  the 
former  to  control  new  values  on  the  basis  of 
past  experience. 

§  14.  Value-relations  with  the  same  objects 
change  according  as  the  objects  are  found  useful 
in  new  ways,  or  as  feeling-attitudes  toward  them 
change. 

§  15.  Every  object  with  which  conscious  ac- 
tivity is  in  relation,  is  of  both  contributory  and 
immediate  value;  but  there  is  no  constant  ratio 
between  the  contributory  and  immediate  values 
that  exist  by  virtue  of  the  relation  of  conscious 
activity  to  any  one  object. 


PART   II 
WINDELBAND'S    THEORY    OF    NORMS 


CHAPTER     VI 

SUBJECTIVE   AND   OBJECTIVE 

THE  terms  "  subjective  "  and  "  objec- 
tive/' applied  to  values,  have  pro- 
voked much  discussion.  They  may  be 
used  in  a  variety  of  ways,  and  a  part  of  the 
diversity  of  opinion  that  prevails  among  value- 
philosophers  is  due  to  their  slippery  nature. 
As  values  are  relations  of  interest  between 
conscious  activity  and  environment,  both  con- 
sciousness and  environment  are  factors  in  the 
experiencing  of  values.  I  might  think  chiefly 
of  the  objects  valued,  and  say  that  all  values 
are  objective;  or  I  might  think  chiefly  of  my 
conscious  activity  which  forms  or  finds  values, 
and  say  that  all  values  are  subjective.  There 
is  no  room  for  dispute  when  the  words  are  used 
in  so  general  a  way. 

Correct  application  of  the  terms  is  not  so 
easy,  however,  if  I  inquire  which  term  of  a 
value-relation  functions  chiefly  in  the  formation 
of  the  relation.  I  then  ask,  "  What  makes  a 
certain  object  valuable?     Is  it  valuable  because 

119 
9 


120    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

\^  it  contains  within  itself  the  power  to  enter  into 
a  value-relation?  Or  is  it  valuable  because  my 
conscious  activity  has  the  power  to  draw  it  into 
such  a  relation  ?  Do  I  make  it  valuable,  or  does 
it  compel  me  to  recognize  that  it  is  valuable  ?  " 

I  find  objects  to  be  of  contributory  value 
when  they  serve  certain  ends.  They  seem  to 
have  functions  within  themselves.  A  crowbar 
is  good  for  raising  a  stone  because  it  has  quali- 
ties of  strength  and  rigidity  that  permit  of  its 
being  used  as  a  lever.  Food  is  good  for  nour- 
ishment because  it  contains  substances  which 
have  the  ability  to  replenish  energy  in  animal 
cells.  Such  contributory  values  certainly  owe 
their  being  to  functions  of  the  objects  valued, 
and  it  is  natural  to  speak  of  such  values  as 
"  objective." 

Other  contributory  values  have  been  fixed  in 
an  arbitrary  way.  Save  for  a  general  agree- 
ment among  men,  a  dollar  bill  would  not  be 
good  for  the  purchase  of  a  certain  quantity  of 
a  commodity.  Here  the  value  of  the  bill  is  not 
inherent  in  the  nature  of  the  piece  of  paper  with 
a  certain  form  of  printing  on  it;  the  power  of 
purchase  is  not  a  function  of  the  object  as  such. 
And  yet,  when  men  have  agreed  that  a  dollar 


SUBJECTIVE   AND   OBJECTIVE  121 

bill  shall  have  a  definite  purchasing  value,  the 
power  of  purchase  has  become  a  function  of 
the  object.  Therefore  we  may  call  economic 
values  objective,  also. 

Judgments  were  found  to  be  contributory. 
They  have  the  power  of  putting  those  who  make 
them  or  those  who  learn  them  into  touch  with 
their  environment  in  such  a  way  that  conscious 
activity  makes  progress  when  it  judges,  as  it 
could  not  if  it  did  not  judge.  Judgments,  there- 
fore, have  functions  which  they  perform.  They 
may  also  be  considered  to  be  objective. 

All  contributory  values  may  be  termed  objec- 
tive. But  a  question  arises  when  we  come  to 
consider  immediate  values.  Are  the  things  that 
I  like,  want,  demand,  and  feel-toward,  valuable 
because  the  things  themselves  possess  the  func- 
tion of  satisfying  my  wants  and  demands?  I 
like  peaches.  Now  peaches,  considered  as  a 
food,  good  for  rebuilding  bodily  tissues,  are  of 
contributory  value.  But  there  is  another  kind 
of  value  associated  with  peaches,  when  I  con- 
sider simply  my  liking.  I  may  like  them;  an- 
other person  may  dislike  them.  They  would 
serve  as  wholesome  food  for  each  of  us.  The 
contributory  aspect  must  not  be  confused  with 


122    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

another  aspect  of  value,  that  of  my  taste  for 
them.  Is  this  taste  objective?  Do  the  peaches 
draw  me  irresistibly  to  themselves,  or  do  I  go 
to  them  because  my  conscious  activity  has  a 
peach-loving  quality? 

Most  persons  will  agree  that  tastes  for  certain 
foods  go  with  the  individual,  rather  than  with 
the  object.  They  will  agree  that  some  imme- 
diate values  are  not  objective,  but  subjective. 
There  are  certain  groups  of  values,  however, 
which  stand  in  doubt.  Is  a  work  of  art  beau- 
tiful because  I  have  a  taste  that  appreciates  it, 
although  others  might  not  agree  with  my  taste? 
Or  is  it  beautiful  because  it  conforms  to  a  norm 
of  beauty  quite  independent  of  my  taste,  and  to 
which  I  am  compelled  to  give  assent?  Are  cer- 
tain actions  that  I  contemplate  right  because  I 
think  of  them  in  that  way,  or  because  they  con- 
form to  standards  of  right  that  appeal  to  my 
conscience? 

An  analogous  question  arises  in  the  case  of 
"  secondary  qualities."  Are  these  objective  in 
the  Lockian  sense?  ^     Or  are  they,  not  "  powers 

1  Cf.  Locke,  John,  Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding, 
II,  VIII,  §  23 :  "  The  power  that  is  in  any  body,  by  reason  of  its 
insensible  primary  qualities,  to  operate  after  a  peculiar  manner  on 
any  of  our  senses,  and  thereby  produce  in  us  the  different  ideas 
•of  several  colors,  sounds,  smells,  tastes,  &c." 


SUBJECTIVE   AND    OBJECTIVE  123 

in  the  object,"  but  merely  the  forms  in  which 
primary  quahties  clothe  themselves  in  conscious 
activity?  Of  course  the  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion is  quite  independent  of  that  to  the  question 
whether  immediate  values  are  subjective  or  ob- 
jective. 

Rickert,  Windelband,  and  others  believe  that 
not  only  in  the  moral  and  aesthetic  spheres,  but 
also  in  the  logical  sphere,  there  are  to  be  found  ^ 
immediate  values  objective  in  character.  They 
argue  that  facts  imply  judgments,  that  feeling 
enters  into  the  determination  of  facts,  and  that 
truth  is  an  objective,  logical  norm.  Some  oiy^ 
the  inconsistencies  of  Rickert's  position  have 
already  been  discussed.^  The  standpoint  that\ 
recognition  of  truth  is,  in  the  last  analysis,  inde- 
pendent of  inference  and  perceptual  phenomena 
is  of  great  assistance  to  those  who  would  argue 
for  the  objective  character  of  immediate  values 
in  the  moral  and  aesthetic  spheres.  If  it  be 
true  that  existence  is  dependent  upon  knowledge 
(metaphysics  upon  epistemology,  the  Kantian 
position),  reality  and  "immediate  truth"  are 
the  same,  and  the  permanent  character  of  the 
logical  norms  will  argue  for  the  permanent  char- 

2  Chapter  II. 


124    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

acter  of  narms  in  other  regions.  Through  much 
of  the  following  discussion  it  is  impossible  not 
to  feel  that  the  battle  is  often  against  a  ghost 
that  has  already  been  laid  —  the  phantom  of 
Kantian  epistemology.  And  yet,  how  effectu- 
ally it  has  been  laid  is  open  to  doubt  when  we 
read  these  words  of  a  recent  writer :  "  All  that 
ought  to  be  common  property  since  the  days 
of  Kant  and  Fichte,  and  every  new  time  only 
demands  a  new  adjustment  of  these  funda- 
mental insights  to  the  changing  knowledge  of 
the  period/' ' 

The  attractiveness  of  the  position  that  there 
are  objective  immediate  values  seems  to  me  to 
lie,  not  in  the  support  of  the  theory  by  Kantian 
epistemology,  but  in  the  facts  ( i )  that  the  theory 
sets  forth  a  teleological  order  of  progress  and 
gives  permanence  to  man's  ideals,  (2)  that  there 
is  associated  with  it  the  conception  of  a  power 
in  nature  superior  to  the  blind  forces  whose  out- 
come is  natural  selection,  (3)  that  under  the 
theory  man  is  able  to  take  part  in  world-develop- 
ment, and  (4)  that  conscience  and  responsibility 
are  explained  as  directed  toward  actions  that 
are  of  more  than  contingent  import. 

3  Miinsterberg,  The  Eternal  Values,  49. 


SUBJECTIVE   AND   OBJECTIVE  125 

In  my  endeavor  to  determine  whether  there 
are  objective  immediate  values,  I  shall  choose 
for  careful  analysis  the  work  of  a  representa- 
tive of  the  objective  point  of  view.  Rickert's 
treatment  of  the  subject  is  most  acute  from 
the  logical  standpoint,  but  it  is  academic  and 
does  not  afford  the  broad  outlook  of  Windel- 
band's.  I  shall  therefore  examine  Windel- 
band's  arguments,  as  contained  in  the  two 
essays  of  "  Praeludien,"  entitled,  "  Immanuel 
Kant  "  *  and  "  Normen  und  Naturgesetze.'* ' 

*  Windelband,  Wilhelm,  Immanuel  Kant,  in  Praeludien,  5tb  ed., 
1915,  I,  1 12-146. 

5  Windelband,  Wilhelm,  Normen  und  Naturgesetse,  ibid.,  II, 
59-98. 


CHAPTER  VII 

Lx       THE  THEORY  OF  NORMS 

WINDELBAND'S  interest  in  the  prob- 
lem of  immediate  values  is  incidental 
to  his  interest  in  the  problem  of  free- 
dom of  the  will/  He  seeks  a  theory  which  will 
allow  freedom  and  which,  at  the  same  time,  will 
admit  within  its  scope  the  deterministic  forces 
which  operate  in  nature.  The  problem  of  free- 
dom, in  turn,  is  resolved  into  the  problem  of  the 

/^nature  of  accountability.^  Unless  we  felt  that 
we  were  accountable  for  our  actions,  we  should 
never  have  the  sense  of  acting  freely. 

Accountability,  according  to  Windelband,  is 
present  not  only  in  the  moral  field,  but  also  in 

^  the  fields  of  thought  and  feeling.^  In  the  latter, 
it  is  independent  of  any  expectation  of  reward 
or  punishment,  and  may  there  be  studied  in 
its  purity.  One  feels  that  there  are  commands 
which  one  ought  to  obey,  from  which,  in  the 
actual  process  of  thought  and  feeling,  he  often 
deviates.     There  is  not  only  a  moral  conscience, 

1  Windelband,  Praeludien.  II,  59. 
2M,  II,  60. 

3/rf.,    II,   64. 

126 


THE   THEORY    OF   NORMS  127 

but  also  a  logical  and  an  aesthetic  conscience.* 
Man  feels  a  duty  and  an  obligation  to  fulfil 
the  commands  given  him  in  the  three  fields. 
Windelband's  explanation  of  this  triple  con- 
science is  that  it  serves  a  pedagogical  purpose*^ 
in  leading  men  to  follow  those  rules  or  norms 
of  thinking,  feeling,  and  willing  which  are  char- 
acterized by  their  inherent  importance  over  all 
other  ways  of  thinking,  willing,  and  feeling. 
These  rules  are  norms  whose  realization  in 
human  nature  we  are  gradually  approaching  by 
a  kind  of  elimination  comparable  to,  but  not 
identical  with,  the  law  of  natural  selection.® 
The  feeling  of  obligation,  or  duty,  is  the  push 
that  we  receive  in  the  direction  of  fulfilling  a 
normal  demand,  the  nature  of  the  push  being 
an  attraction  from  the  norm  itself.^  The  feel- 
ing of  accountability  arises  when  we  realize  that 
our  characters  and  nothing  else  are  the  cause  of 
our  thoughts,  actions,  and  feelings,  and  remorse 
arises  if  we  feel  pain  in  the  knowledge  that  we 
could  not  have  acted  differently  from  the  way 
in  which  we  did  act.® 

*M,  II,  67.  6M,  II,  95. 

«Id.,  II,  74.  'Id.,  II,  80. 

«M,  11,  94. 


128    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

I  shall  divide  my  discussion  of  Windelband's 
position  into  a  number  of  sections,  as  follows: 

L     Kant  or  Realism? 
IL     Evolution  and  the  Norms. 

III.  The  Parallel  between  Denken,  Filhlen,  and 

Wollen. 

IV.  Independence   of   the   Norms    from   Par- 

ticular Consciousnesses. 
V.     Freedom  and  Responsibility. 

I.  KANT  OR  REALISM? 
Windelband,  in  common  with  others  who  de- 
fend an  objective  theory  of  immediate  value, 
founds  his  argument  on  what  he  believes  to  be 
basic  principles  of  philosophy  achieved  once  and 
for  all  by  the  Kantian  criticism.  The  essay 
Immanuel  Kant  is  in  praise  of  Kanf  s  critical 
view  over  the  older  Greek  view  of  knowledge 
as  a  subject-object  relation.  In  statement  of 
my  view,  I  cannot  do  better  than  to  refer  again 
to  the  essay  The  Emancipation  of  Metaphysics 
from  Epistemology,  by  Walter  T.  Marvin,  in 
The  New  Realism,^  The  particular  portion  of 
Marvin's  argument  which  I  wish  to  employ  in 

»  The  New  Realism,  New  York,  1912,  pp.  43-95. 


THE   THEORY    OF    NORMS  129 

my  criticism  of  Windelband  is  that  expressed 
in  the  title  of  the  fourth  chapter  of  his  essay, 
"  Epistemology  does  not  give,  but  presupposes, 
a  theory  of  reality." 

The  argument  of  Marvin  is  with  reference 
to  the  whole  Kantian  epistemology.  I  wish  to 
show,  however,  that,  after  accepting  the  Kantian 
standpoint,  Windelband  does  not  keep  to  it  con- 
sistently, but  places  the  norms  against  a  realistic 
background. 

§  I.  In  the  essay  Immanuel  Kant,^^  he  says, 
"  The  truth  is  that  Kant  has  defined  as  the 
problem  of  philosophy  reflection  on  the  basis 
of  the  principles  of  Reason,  i.e.,  the  absolute 
norms,  and  that  this  reflection,  far  from  being 
exhausted  by  the  rules  of  thinking,  only  finds 
its  conclusion  through  the  rules  of  willing  and 
feeling."  This  is  to  say  that  the  frame  in 
which  our  experience  is  cast  consists  of  norms 
of  willing  and  feeling  as  well  as  norms  of  think- 
ing. Taken  all  together,  the  norms  constitute 
the  rules  of  all  possible  experience. 

In  the  essay  Normen  und  Naturgesetse,  how- 
ever, we  find  quite  a  different  conception  of 
norms.     Here  "  Windelband  contrasts  the  laws 

10  Windelband,  Praeludien,  I,  141.  ^'^  Id.,  II,  72. 


I30    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

of  nature  with  the  norms.  Having  previously 
defined  laws  of  nature  in  Kantian  fashion  as 
"  those  general  judgments  about  the  succession 
of  psychical  events,  in  which  we  recognize  the 
existence  of  psychical  activity,  and  from  which 
we  are  able  to  derive  the  separate  facts  of  the 
psychical  life,"  ^^  he  speaks  of  the  operation  of 
the  norms  as  only  partly  identical  with  the  oper- 
ation of  the  laws  of  nature/^     He  says: 

All  norms  are  thus  special  forms  of  the  realization 
of  natural  laws.  The  system  of  norms  represents  a 
selection  out  of  the  infinite  manifoldness  of  the  forms 
of  combination  under  which,  according  to  the  individual 
circumstances,  the  natural  laws  of  the  psychical  life  can 
unfold  themselves.  The  laws  of  logic  are  a  selection 
from  the  possible  forms  of  the  association  of  ideas; 
the  laws  of  ethics  are  a  selection  from  the  possible  forms 
of  motivation;  the  laws  of  aesthetics  are  a  selection 
from  the  possible  forms  of  feeling  activity. 

In  this  essay,  norms  appear  as  a  selection  from 
a  manifold  of  possible  —  and  actual  —  experi- 
ences; in  the  former  essay,  they  are  the  con- 
ditions of  any  possible  experience  at  all.  This 
change  of  viewpoint,  however,  necessitates  drop- 

12  Windelband,  Praeludien,  II,  65.  ^^  Id.,  II,  72, 


THE   THEORY    OF    NORMS  131 

ping  the  Kantian  conception  of  norms  as  the 
framework  of  all  possible  experience,  and  shift- 
ing the  conception  to  that  of  norms  operating 
against  a  background  of  laws  of  nature. 

§  2.  Windelband  might  regard  the  laws  of 
nature  as  the  Kantian  framework  and  the  norms 
as  additional  laws  existing  together  with  them 
and  exerting  a  selective  influence  which  is  felt 
in  the  individual  through  the  triple  conscience. 
In  point  of  fact,  however,  he  steadfastly  re- 
gards the  norms  as  identical  With  the  Kantian 
''  Regeln"  His  treatment  brings  out  the  diffi- 
culty of  the  Kantian  position  in  the  matter  of 
defining  truth.  Where  reality  is  simply  the 
experienced,  the  conception  of  a  mechanistic  reg- 
ulation must  work  equally  well  in  false  as  in  true 
judgments.  And  where  Regeln  of  willing  and 
feeling  are  united  with  those  of  thinking,  as 
conditions  of  possible  experience,  "  truth "  is 
applied  to  all  experience  (in  some  way).  Win- 
delband says,  "  Thus,  in  the  greatest  philoso- 
phers, science  recognizes  by  her  side  the  ethical 
and  the  aesthetic  sense  as  determining  factors 
of  the  highest  truth."  ^*  Truth  here  is  consid- 
ered  to  have   epistemological   reference   to   all 

"/<f.,  I,  141. 


132    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

the  elements  of  experience.  In  the  other  essay, 
however,  it  is  the  logical  norms  alone  which  have 
the  '^  Zweck  der  Wahrheit."  ^^  It  is  again  evi- 
dent that  the  possible  content  of  experience  is 
here  thought  of  as  consisting  of  more  than  the 
known. 

§  3.  The  difificulty  of  Windelband's  theory  of 
norms  in  its  relation  to  the  Kantian  Regeln  is 
also  brought  out  in  his  discussion  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  norms  from  particular  con- 
sciousnesses/^ He  is  right  in  his  thesis  that  it 
is  not  necessary  for  the  individual  in  whom  the 
norms  are  working  to  be  aware  of  the  fact,  if 
the  norms  are  Kantian  Regeln]  but  how  will 
they  be  any  more  present  if  the  individual  is 
conscious  of  them?  It  is  not  the  consciousness 
or  the  lack  of  consciousness  of  the  norms  that 
primarily  causes  the  trouble,  but  the  position 
that  there  can  be  degrees  of  presence,  or,  rather, 
that  there  can  ever  be  absence.  The  difficulty 
of  the  Kantian  position  in  general  in  explaining 
why  it  is  that  the  Regeln  are  consciously  present 
as  Regeln  to  so  few  persons  is  a  different  objec- 
tion —  one  that  is  discussed  by  A.  J.  Balfour  in 

15  Windelband,  Praeludien.  II,  84. 
i«/(f.,  I,  83. 


THE   THEORY    OF   NORMS  133 

A  Defence  of  Philosophic  Doubt,  Chapter  VI. 
To  say  that  norms  exist  independently  of  any 
particular  consciousness,  in  the  full  sense  of 
independence,  would  be  Kantian  suicide. 

The  considerations  which  I  have  adduced 
seem  to  me  to  make  it  evident  that  Windelband 
has  at  least  unconsciously  modified  the  Kantian 
position  in  his  treatment  of  norms.  He  seems 
to  adopt  a  position  of  "  naive  realism " ;  the 
norms  and  the  laws  of  nature  must  work  to- 
gether in  reality.  In  giving  up  the  full  Kantian 
point  of  view,  Windelband's  theory  loses  some 
of  the  plausibility  that  it  gained  when  the  norms 
were  presented  in  the  guise  of  epistemological 
necessity,  but  the  theory  remains  an  attractive 
one.  We  are  now  compelled  to  assume  that 
norms  have  a  metaphysical  existence;  and,  once 
this  is  done,  there  is  always  the  possibility  of  a 
pre-established  harmony  between  the  psychic  and 
the  cosmic  processes.  I  am  not  sure  whether 
such  a  possibility  can  be  disproved.  The  safe 
line  of  argument,  the  one  adopted  here,  is  to 
show  that,  unless  the  assumption  of  the  meta- 
physical existence  of  norms  is  made  at  the  start, 
the  arguments  advanced  to  establish  that  exist- 
ence fail. 


134    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

IL  EVOLUTION  AND  THE  NORMS 
§  4.  Windelband  assumes  that  the  world  is 
actually  the  world  that  science  describes  to  us. 
It  has  objective  being;  the  law  of  causation  is 
its  binding  principle.  It  is  a  deterministic  uni- 
verse in  the  sense  that  the  causal  series  described 
by  science  is  the  actual  one  and  the  only  one 
possible.  The  causal  sequence  of  nature  tends 
to  become  known  to  man  by  natural  processes. 
Man  is  able  to  observe,  and  to  infer  the  nature 
of  the  factors  of  evolution  which  have  led  to 
the  present  result. 

Especially  conspicuous  to  man  is  the  inequal- 
ity which  exists  between  the  factors  of  evolu- 
tion. The  development  of  the  whole  is  pur- 
posive in  the  direction  of  the  triumph  of  the 
most  weighty  factors.  Nature  is  conceived  as 
a  mass  of  activities  of  which  some  few  are  des- 
tined to  survive,  either  because  of  their  fitness 
in  the  struggle  for  existence  (by  natural  selec- 
tion) or  because  of  their  inherent  importance. 
Windelband  observes  that  some  of  the  psychical 
factors  which  are  of  inherent  importance  also 
aid  in  the  struggle  for  existence,  as  for  ex- 
ample, cleverness,  and  the  transcendental  laws 
of  thought.^^     But  he  notes  that  others,  such  as 


THE   THEORY    OF    NORMS  135 

the  moral  and  aesthetic  factors,  are  of  indiffer- 
ent value  in  the  struggle  for  existence  and  are 
often  positively  detrimental.  He  accounts  for 
their  persistence  by  saying  that  they  must  have 
an  inherent  importance/^  A  distinction  between 
factors  of  quantitative  importance  in  the  physi- 
cal world  and  norms  of  qualitative  importance 
in  the  psychical  world  would  bring  out  Windel- 
band's  meaning. 

Strictly  speaking,  the  comparison  between 
physical  and  psychical  factors  in  evolution  is 
not  a  parallel.  The  world  is  a  unity,  and  the 
field  of  struggle  the  same  for  each  group  of 
factors.  (The  unity  here  is  the  fact  that  there 
is  only  one  evolution  in  the  physical  world.) 
The  working  out  of  the  causal  process  produces 
a  great  variety  of  organisms  and  psychical  char- 
acters. The  important  characters  become  fixed 
gradually  by  the  weeding  out  of  the  others. 
The  wide  variation  in  importance  between  the 
different  characters  necessitates  the  elimination 
of  the  less  important  characters.  Saying  that 
there  is  a  difference  of  "  importance "  is  ex- 
pressed in  another  way  by  saying  that  nature 
is  purposeful  in  developing  certain  characters 

"  Windelband,  Praeludien,  II,  76  if.  "  j^,,  H,  80. 

10 


136    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

at  the  expense  of  certain  others.  These  im- 
portant factors,  as  we  have  seen,  are  of  a  differ- 
ent nature  in  the  physical  and  psychical  worlds. 
The  most  pregnant  criticism  of  such  a  view 
of  evolution  lies  in  a  consideration  of  its  work- 
ability. The  difficulty  rests  in  the  incompati- 
bility of  two  sets  of  factors:  factors  whose 
survival-value  is  determined  by  their  quanti- 
tative strength,  and  factors  whose  importance 
is  due  to  a  qualitative  intensity.  Windelband 
observes  that,  at  the  present  stage  of  evolution, 
these  factors  are  often  in  opposition,  and,  one 
may  ask,  what  hope  is  there  of  a  reconciliation? 
Sooner  or  later  there  must  be  a  reckoning;  and, 
judging  from  the  fact  that  the  realization  of 
psychical  factors  is  dependent  upon  the  presence 
of  favorable  physical  processes,  we  vshould  infer 
that,  no  matter  how  qualitatively  important  the 
psychical  factors  may  be,  the  latter  will  always 
be  at  the  mercy  of  the  former.  The  persistence 
of  psychical  development  up  to  the  present  time 
argues  for  its  persistence  and  co-existence  with 
the  physical  in  the  future;  but  Windelband  needs 
to  show  by  what  natural  process  the  realization 
of  the  norms  is  assured.  "  Inherent  impor- 
tance "  is  insufficient. 


THE   THEORY    OF    NORMS  137 

To  me  it  seems  that  it  makes  no  difference 
how  closely  the  two  sets  of  factors  may  be  asso- 
ciated. A  particular  case  of  "  right-and-its- 
circumstances  "  would,  under  the  theory,  have 
a  greater  survival-value  than  other  groups  of 
circumstances  not  containing  "  right."  But  it 
is  not  conceivable  that  the  circumstances  asso- 
ciated with  right  should  always  contain  quanti- 
tative factoral  preeminence.  Therefore,  it  would 
have  to  be  the  qualitative  factor  often  that 
effected  the  survival-value,  and  there  would  be 
bound  to  be  the  clash  between  quantitative  and 
qualitative  factors  which  I  have  described. 

III.  THE  PARALLEL  BETWEEN  DEN- 
KEN,  FUHLEN,   AND  WOLLEN 

A.  The  Parallel  between  Denken  and 
WOLLEN 
§  5.  Windelband  says  that,  just  as  in  Denken 
there  is  but  one  correct  thought,  so  in  Wollen 
there  is  but  one  right  action.'^  This,  however, 
is  no  true  parallel.  "  Thing-to-be-thought  "  is 
made  parallel  with  "  moral  decision  " ;  the  true 
parallel  would  be  between  "  thing-to-be-thought " 

i»  Windelband,  Praeludien,  II,  63  ff. 


138    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

and  "  thing- to-be-done."  But  there  is  never  one 
objective  action  which  is  right  independently  of 
the  doer;  there  is  no  right  or  wrong  with  refer- 
ence to  the  matter  of  moral  decision.  Buying 
two  $5  seats  at  the  opera  is  not  right  or  wrong 
in  itself,  but  for  a  particular  person  under  par- 
ticular circumstances. 

The  fault  of  the  parallel  is  in  the  supposition 
that  there  is  the  same  possibility  of  latitude  in 
thought  as  in  action.  We  should  be  obliged  to 
think  according  to  the  Kantian  norms,  if  they 
exist.  Parallel  with  such  norms  would  be  norms 
of  willing  which  would  compel  us  to  act  in  ways 
regulated  by  them.  In  either  case  there  is  no 
choice  open  to  us,  no  case  where  the  norms 
might  not  operate. 

The  Kantian  epistemology  has  no  place  for 
incorrect  thinking.  According  to  it,  objects  of 
consciousness  are  particular  groupings  of  em- 
pirical representations  according  to  the  laws  of 
the  understanding.  Incorrect  thinking,  accord- 
ing to  some  of  Kant's  followers,  is  unclear 
arrangement  of  our  perceptions.  I  ask  whether, 
when  we  are  compelled  to  make  a  moral  de- 
cision, of  the  various  alternatives  presented, 
one,  the  moral,  attracts  us  because  it  is  so  much 
clearer  than  any  other? 


THE   THEORY    OF   NORMS  139 

§  6.  Windelband's  theory,  in  that  it  assures 
independence  of  one  another  to  the  several 
series  of  norms,  unwarrantably  isolates  cog- 
nition, feeling,  and  will.  Thought,  aesthetic 
feeling,  and  moral  decision  may  well  be  taken 
as  types  of  highest  development  of  these  "  fac- 
ulties"; but,  even  in  their  highest  develop- 
ment, they  can  never  become  independent.  The 
grounds  of  this  objection  are  found  in  two  con- 
siderations, (a)  Windelband  speaks  of  truth 
as  the  "  end  "  of  thought.  "  End,''  however, 
is  a  word  used  properly  only  where  activity  is 
present.  As  long  as  there  is  thought-activity, 
so  long  must  the  active  (will)  element  be  asso- 
ciated with  the  cognitive.  Complete  disassoci- 
ation  would  be  possible  only  in  the  case  of 
absolute  passivity  of  thought,  a  condition  which 
would  be  indistinguishable  from  unconscious- 
ness, (b)  If  the  norms  of  moral  decision  were 
independent  of  those  of  cognition,  we  should 
have  a  situation  where  moral  laws  were  present 
without  any  matter  on  which  they  might  act; 
or  the  matter  of  moral  decisions  would  be  that 
of  empirical  representations.  The  former  sup- 
position is  absurd;  under  the  latter,  it  would 
be  necessary  for  the  perceptions  to  be  arranged 


140    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

in  consciousness  according  to  the  laws  of  the 
understanding,  before  they  could  be  of  service 
for  moral  decision.  In  such  a  case,  the  norms 
of  morality  would  be  dependent  on  the  logical 
norms. 

B.     The  Relation  of  Fvhlbn  to  Dbnkbn 

AND    WOLLEN 

I   shall   discuss   this   portion   of   the   subject 
together  with  the  following  section. 

IV.       THE     INDEPENDENCE     OF     THE 
NORMS  OF  PARTICULAR  CON- 
SCIOUSNESSES 
Windelband  constantly  writes  as  if  he  believed 
that  the  norms  were  operating  in  a  world  of 
matter  and  motion.     This  presupposition  leads 
him  to  try  to  prove  that  they  exist  quite  inde- 
pendently  of   particular   consciousnesses.'"      In 
his  proof,  he  makes  much  of  the  very  portion 
of  the  Kantian  position  which  has  been  assailed 
most  vigorously,  namely,  the  varying  degree  to 
which  the  norms  are  present  to  the  conscious- 
ness of  individuals.     The  fact  that  most  men 
have  but  a  hazy  idea  of  norms  of  truth,  beauty, 

20  Windelband,  Praeludien,  II,  8i  ff. 


THE   THEORY   OF   NORMS  141 

and  morality  is  taken  to  argue  for  independent, 
objective  existence.  Before  presenting  Windel- 
band's  arguments,  it  may  be  asked  whether  the 
independent,  objective  existence  of  norms  which 
may  at  one  time  not  be  present  to  the  conscious- 
ness of  a  particular  individual,  and  again  at 
another  time  may  be  present,  does  not  pre- 
suppose that  there  are  objective  entities  which 
may  pass  to  and  from  the  knowing  situation? 
And  if  so,  is  not  this  to  take  away  from  con- 
sciousness the  sole  privilege  of  organizing  the 
material  of  empirical  representations?  Does 
not  this  lead  to  realism? 

A.  Single  Laws  of  Logic,  Morality,  and 
Beauty 

It  is  argued  that  the  norms,  when  actualized, 
exist  independently  of  the  consciousness  in  which 
the  actualization  occurs.  Windelband  presents 
two  proofs,  the  one  based  on  our  judgment  of 
their  actualization  in  others,  the  other  derived 
from  our  appreciation  of  their  actualization  in 
ourselves. 

§  7.  Norms  are  independent  of  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  one  in  whom  they  are  actualized 
because  we  give  our  approval  or  disapproval  to 


142    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

such  a  one  whether  or  not  he  is  conscious  of 
such  a  realization  in  himself.^^ 

This  argument  is  most  plausible  in  the  case 
of  Denken.  If  we  assume  a  realistic  back- 
ground and  the  current  presuppositions  of  sci- 
ence, we  think  of  facts  and  the  relations  between 
facts  as  quite  valid  no  matter  whether  there 
exist  any  perceiving  consciousness  at  all.  If 
we  superimpose  an  idealistic  epistemology,  we 
still  grant  that  the  existence  of  a  stable  world 
stands  or  falls  by  the  constancy  and  similarity 
of  factual  impressions. 

The  case  of  Wollen,  however,  is  different. 
That  we  are  loath  to  give  actions  independent 
of  conscious  moral  decision  any  ethical  value  so 
far  as  the  agent  is  concerned,  is  shown  by  the 
fact  that  we  do  not  grant  that  such  actions  have 
moral  merit.  Our  praise  or  blame  in  such  cases 
is  the  result  of  comparison  with  our  own  stand- 
ards. Without  this  comparison,  there  would 
be  no  "  beautiful  souls  "  who  act  morally  from 
nature.  I  do  not  mean  that,  if  the  absolute 
value  of  our  own  moral  standards  be  granted, 
such  "  souls  "  are  not  beautiful,  but  that,  with- 
out recognition  of  their  beauty  by  us,  they  would 

21  Windelband,  Praeludien,  II,  8l. 


THE   THEORY    OF    NORMS  143 

have  no  moral  value  whatever.  It  is  useless  for 
Windelband  to  show  that  moral  actions  may  be 
independent  of  the  consciousness  of  the  agent, 
unless  he  can  also  show  that  they  are  independ- 
ent of  the  consciousness  of  others  at  the  same 
time.  And  what  we  assume  as  to  independent 
existence  in  the  case  of  the  objects  of  thought, 
is  insuperably  difficult  if  applied  to  the  case  of 
moral  laws,  where  divergence  of  opinion  is  so 
wide.  Without  any  implication  that  moral  laws 
and  aesthetic  judgments  stand  upon  a  similar 
basis,  we  may  say  that  the  same  argument  ap- 
plies equally  well  to  the  consideration  of  uncon- 
scious creation  of  beauty. 

§  8.  Some  norms  may  excite  approval  or 
disapproval  in  the  consciousness  of  the  agent 
upon  realization,  without  their  actually  being 
present  to  his  consciousness.^^ 

We  can  create  a  beautiful  object  or  appreciate 
a  work  of  art  without  thinking  of  aesthetic 
norms,  which  are  rules  of  criticism.  This  is 
very  true.  But  in  his  desire  to  avoid  a  sub- 
jectivistic  basis  of  logic  and  ethic,  Windelband 
has  overreached  himself  a  little  in  applying  the 
same  arguments  to  aesthetic.     In  the  case  of 

22M,  II,  83. 


144    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

aesthetic  judgments,  there  is  a  simple  explana- 
tion of  the  phenomenon  which  he  mentions, 
which  entirely  obviates  the  necessity  of  attrib- 
uting independence  of  consciousness  to  the 
norms.  According  to  this  view,  aesthetic  pleas- 
ure originates  only  when  a  cognitive  element 
of  consciousness  stresses  one  aspect  of  feeling 
over  other  aspects.  The  more  attention  that  is 
paid  to  special  features  of  the  object  appreci- 
ated, and  the  more  these  special  features  are 
associated  with  other  ideas  in  the  mind,  the 
greater  the  development  of  aesthetic  feeling. 
Aesthetic  rules  may  be  formed  upon  introspec- 
tion, but  they  are  merely  the  coming  to  self- 
consciousness  of  cognitive  elements  which  were 
already  present,  although  so  tied  up  with  the 
feeling  elements  that  they  were  not  separately 
recognized.  Of  course  we  do  not  need  to  have 
rules  in  order  to  feel  beauty.  Rules  are  the 
outcome  of  reflection  over  shades  of  feeling. 
But  it  is  also  true  that  the  study  of  some  aes- 
thetic system  will  aid  very  materially  in  later 
combinations  of  cognition  and  feeling  in  aes- 
thetic appreciation.  One  is  not  born  a  com- 
poser of  beautiful  music.  No  matter  what  may 
be  the  extent  of  the  gift  of  musical  feeling,  it 


THE   THEORY   OF    NORMS  145 

is  necessary  that  the  cognitive  elements  of  har- 
mony be  learned  by  hearing  good  music  in  which 
the  harmony  is  present,  and  generally  by  a  study 
of  theory.  Beethoven,  born  on  an  island  where 
no  music  was  ever  heard,  would  likely  have 
beaten  a  drum. 

In  the  case  of  aesthetic  feeling,  Windelband 
argued  from  the  truth  that  artistic  creation  and 
aesthetic  appreciation  do  not  demand  conscious- 
ness of  norms  of  beauty.  But  this  apparent 
independence  does  not  hold  true  of  logical  and 
moral  norms,  as  Windelband  himself  admits. 
Here,  he  says,  the  norms  are  concerned  with  the 
"  deciding  moment "  ^^  in  the  process,  and  so 
are  of  the  very  greatest  value  to  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  agent.  We  are  not  likely  to  perform 
a  moral  act,  unless  we  are  conscious  of  a  stand- 
ard of  morality  in  deference  to  which  we  choose 
to  act  in  one  way  rather  than  in  another! 

B.     Realms   of  Laws   of   Logic,    Morality, 

AND   Beauty 

It  may  be  objected,  in  reply  to  my  criticism  of 

Windelband's  parallel  between  Denken,  Fuhlen, 

and  Wollen,  that  it  is  difficult  to  demonstrate 

23  Windelband,  Praeludien,  II,  84. 


146    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

paiallelism  between  single  laws  of  thought, 
single  moral  decisions,  and  single  appreciations 
of  beauty;  but  that  it  would  be  easier  to  defend 
the  existence  of  three  realms  of  laws  of  logic, 
morality,  and  beauty.  Perhaps  the  inconsist- 
ency of  the  parallel  is  only  apparent,  and  results 
from  a  different  kind  of  relation  of  each  of  the 
realms  to  an  individual,  rather  than  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  three  realms  themselves. 

It  is  puzzling  to  know  how  we  are  to  conceive 
the  three  realms  of  norms.  In  what  does  their 
objectivity  consist?  If  we  adopt  the  Kantian 
standpoint,  we  might  consider  a  moral  norm 
objective  in  the  same  sense  that  the  laws  of  the 
understanding  are  objective.  The  moral  norm 
in  question  would  accompany  the  logical  laws 
by  which  the  whole  situation  is  conceived,  and 
the  whole  would  be  a  "  right-situation.''  But 
this  objectivity  would  not  be  ontological,  but 
epistemological. 

From  the  standpoint  of  realism,  it  is  possible 
to  assume  that  there  is  a  pre-established  har- 
mony between  the  psychological  recognition  of 
a  right  action  and  an  objective  "  right "  in- 
herent in  a  teleological  universe  —  however  the 
inherent  "  right "  may  collide  at  times  with  fac- 


THE   THEORY   OF    NORMS  147 

tors  of  natural  selection.  This  position,  how- 
ever, is  one  that  Windelband  does  not  adopt. 
He  is  anxious  to  put  the  norms  on  the  same 
footing  with  the  laws  of  nature,  and  makes  his 
appeal  to  the  Kantian  standpoint. 

§  9.  In  order  to  show  that  there  are  three 
realms  of  norms  influencing  the  logical,  moral, 
and  aesthetic  "  faculties  "  of  man,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  demonstrate  that  there  is  a  choice  pre- 
sented, and  that  the  norms  point  toward  an 
action,  thought,  or  feeling  which  would  not  be 
indicated  clearly  without  them.  Windelband's 
effort  to  prove  the  existence  of  such  a  choice  is 
made  in  connection  with  his  attempted  demon-  ^ 
stration  of  a  moral,  a  logical,  and  an  aesthetic 
conscience,  and  with  his  belief  that  the  factors 
operating  in  natural  selection  are  inadequate  to 
explain  the  facts. 

(a)  He  claims  that  the  existence  of  a  moral 
conscience  in  individuals  cannot  be  accounted 
for  by  the  law  of  survival.^*  For,  he  says,  in 
order  to  effect  a  moral  purpose,  a  man  can  use 
only  a  part  of  the  means  at  his  disposal.  Other 
possible  actions  are  forbidden  him.  Further- 
more, the  older  a  civilization  grows,   the  less 

2*  Windelband,  Praeludien,  II,  77. 


148    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

moral  it  becomes,  a  fact  which  shows  that  nat- 
ural selection  does  not  operate  here  in  choosing 
a  factor  of  permanent  advantage/^  But  he  says 
that  in  the  case  of  nations  the  moral  value  is 
identical  with  the  survival  value. 

It  seems  to  me  that  this  argument  overlooks 
a  whole  field  of  inquiry,  in  which  moral  con- 
science has  been  described  in  wholly  psycho- 
logical terms.  Man  became  conscious  of  actions 
that  were  at  first  instinctive,  and  the  memory 
of  previous  actions  furnished  circumstances  to 
be  considered  by  the  side  of  later  actions.  Com- 
pare, for  example,  J.  S.  Mill's  description  of 
conscience.^®  This  theory  is  strengthened  in 
consideration  of  the  fact  that  consciences  are 
so  dififerent,  resting  as  they  do  upon  different 
psychological  equipments.  Moral  conscience 
would  seem  to  be  a  very  imperfect  instrument 
whose  function  it  is  to  indicate  our  needs  with 
reference  to  action.  It  would  be  easier  to  argue 
for  metaphysical  objectivity,  if  we  found  more 
uniformity  in  moral  consciences.  Moral  laws, 
framed  at  first  in  accordance  with  instincts, 
might  well  have  been  possessed  of  survival  value 

25  Windelband,  Praeludien,  II,  79. 

2<^Mill,  J.  S.,  Utilitarianism,  Everyman  ed.,  New  York,  1910, 
p.  26. 


THE   THEORY    OF   NORMS  149 

for  primitive  man.  Windelband  seems  to  be 
under  the  impression  that  survival-values,  to  be 
such,  must  be  operative  through  the  whole  of 
their  existence  —  which  is  not  true. 

(b)  Moreover,  Windelband's  argument  by 
the  use  of  the  term  "  moral  decision  "  is  faulty. 
When  we  speak  of  moral  decision,  we  have 
emerged  from  the  strictly  psychological  field  of 
inquiry  into  the  logical  field.  Moral  decision, 
however  quickly  we  may  make  it,  is  a  matter 
of  judgment.  Moral  choice  is  the  outcome  of 
deliberation  (Aristotle).  In  his  discussion  of 
conscience  in  evolution  and  moral  decision,  it 
seems  to  me  that  Windelband  has  deviated  from 
the  point  at  issue.  We  are  trying  to  determine 
whether  there  is  ontological  objectivity  in  an 
action  that  is  felt  as  right.  Moral  decision, 
brought  about  by  standards  of  right,  the  out- 
come of  education,  is  concerned  with  mediate, 
not  immediate  values.  If  there  are  such  onto- 
logical entities  as  moral  norms,  they  must  oper- 
ate immediately,  in  the  case  of  felt  right;  as, 
for  instance,  when  I  feel  that  such  and  such  an 
action  is  right  in  itself. 

Now  when  I  become  introspective,  I  do  not 
find  any  feeling  of  conscience  immediately  in- 


I50    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

dining  me  to  a  way  of  acting.  I  find  no  actions 
which  seem  right  or  wrong  in  themselves.  In 
every  case  where  conscience  enters,  I  find  that 
I  have  been  weighing  possible  actions,  however 
brief  may  have  been  the  process.  I  find  my- 
self discriminating  between  different  interests. 
Therefore,  I  cannot  help  concluding  that  actions 
in  themselves  are  indifferent,  and  that  moral 
distinctions  are  mediate.  It  is  true  that  I  am 
inclined  to  follow  instincts,  but  I  cannot  find 
any  moral  quality  as  distinguished  from  instinct. 
I  may  say  that  moral  distinctions  grew  out  of 
my  instincts,  but  nothing  leads  me  to  suppose 
that  the  distinctions  themselves  are  anything 
but  derivative.  And,  inasmuch  as  actions  are 
meaningless  from  the  standpoint  of  morality, 
when  divorced  from  choice  and  deliberation,  I 
conclude  that  the  ontological  objectivity  of  moral 
norms  can  only  be  defended  by  the  supposition 
of  a  pre-established  harmony. 

§  lo.  Windelband  says  that  logical  norms 
lead  us  to  truth. ^^  Now  from  the  Kantian 
standpoint  this  position  is  more  easily  defended 
than  from  that  of  realism.  If  logical  laws  and 
physical  phenomena  are  all  considered  epistemo- 

27  Windelband,  Praeludien,  II,  84. 


THE   THEORY    OF   NORMS  151 

logically,  one  may  be  objective  in  the  same  sense 
as  the  other.  There  is  some  difficulty  in  dis- 
covering any  epistemological  falsity  at  all,  how- 
ever, for  everything  just  is. 

But  Windelband  uses  the  Kantian  argument 
to  make  his  position  plausible  at  the  start.  Then 
he  switches  over  to  the  Lockian  conception  of 
knowledge  as  true  knowledge.  According  to 
the  latter  conception,  he  thinks  of  the  psycho- 
logical processes  as  having  a  great  number  of 
possibilities  of  association  of  "  ideas  "  in  vari- 
ous ways  in  any  one  situation.  That  which 
leads  the  mind  to  prefer  one  over  all  the  other 
possibilities  is  the  quality  of  normality  which 
it  possesses.  Thus  the  norms  of  thought  are 
neither  identical  with  nor  contrary  to  the  gen- 
eral laws  of  association  of  ideas.  I  do  not  see 
how  we  can  admit  these  possibilities  of  associ- 
ation if  we  keep  to  the  Kantian  standpoint. 
According  to  Kant,  we  have  to  think  according 
to  these  laws.  I  repeat,  the  position  of  Windel- 
band here  is  more  in  accord  with  Locke,  and 
we  must  consider  the  matter  in  connection  with 
the  implied  realistic  background. 

Where  is  truth?  If  it  is  the  real  as  the  object 
of  judgment,  as  the  realists  tell  us,  I  cannot  see 
11 


152    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

where  logical  norms  are  demanded.  In  such  a 
case,  we  should  be  led  to  truth  simply  by  what, 
in  the  last  analysis,  is  perception  —  of  objects 
and  relations.  To  suppose  the  existence  of 
norms  would  be  to  believe  that  there  is  a  special 
conspiracy  on  the  part  of  nature  to  bring  organic 
beings  into  harmony  with  it  from  their  psycho- 
logical standpoint.  From  the  standpoint  of  evo- 
lution this  would  be  a  hysteron  proteron;  and  it 
would  render  natural  selection  useless.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  truth  is  in  the  judgment,  it  would 
seem  to  be  mediate,  insofar  as  there  is  presented 
the  possibility  of  a  number  of  judgments.  But 
a  logical  truth  of  this  kind,  based  on  inference, 
is  something  quite  different  from  immediate  ap- 
proval of  a  correct  thought.  And  logical  truth 
ultimately  traces  back  to  perceptual  phenomena, 
unless  an  idealistic  complication  is  introduced. 
I  cannot,  therefore,  see  the  necessity  of  suppos- 
ing ontologically  objective  norms  of  thinking. 
Epistemologically,  they  may  be  defended  (with 
a  problem  as  to  the  nature  of  the  false  idea). 
§  II.  The  strongest  argument  for  ontologi- 
cal  objectivity  is  found  in  the  case  of  so-called 
aesthetic  norms.  We  recall  James's  discussion 
of  the  place  of  affectional  facts. ^®     Beauty,  as 

28  James,  William,  Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism,  137-154. 


THE   THEORY   OF   NORMS  153 

well  as  color  and  secondary  qualities  in  general, 
can  be  thought  of  as  a  quality  of  the  object. 
A  beautiful  vase  so  functions  as  to  produce  a 
feeling  of  immediate  pleasure.  I  cannot  prove 
that  the  beauty  is  entirely  subjective  any  more 
than  I  can  prove  that  secondary,  or  even  pri- 
mary, qualities  are  entirely  subjective.  The 
pleasure  of  beauty  may  be  only  incidental. 
Why,  then,  does  it  seem  more  reasonable,  ac- 
cording to  my  view,  to  consider  the  beauty  as 
wholly  psychological? 

Windelband  says  that  one  reason  for  con- 
sidering aesthetic  norms  objective  is  the  fact 
that  aesthetic  appreciations  cannot  be  accounted 
for  on  the  basis  of  their  survival  by  a  process 
of  natural  selection. ^^  He  implies  that  there 
would  be  no  need  of  supposing  the  existence  of 
these  norms,  if  such  an  account  could  be  given. 
He  says  that,  although  it  is  true  that  there  has 
been  a  gradual  development  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem in  the  case  of  organic  nature,  it  is  also  true 
that  the  over-development  of  aesthetic  ability  is 
apt  to  be  weakening,  rather  than  strengthening. 

Now  it  seems  to  me  that  the  preservation  of 
aesthetic  capabilities  may  be  accounted  for  by 

29  Windelband,  Praeludien,  II,  79. 


154    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

natural  selection.  It  has  been  observed  that  our 
aesthetic  appreciations  and  our  laws  of  beauty- 
follow  closely  along  the  line  of  the  structure  of 
natural  objects.  Those  organisms  which  har- 
monized with  their  environment  would  tend  to 
survive.  This  would  not  preclude  the  possi- 
bility of  later  aesthetic  development  beyond  the 
point  of  usefulness  of  the  aesthetic  factor  as  a 
survival  value.  A  quite  theoretical  volume  of 
appreciations  might  survive,  for  evolution  casts 
off  only  dangerous  developments,  not  harmless 
ones.  If  over-refinement  led  to  weakness,  the 
survival-value  would  assert  itself  on  occasion. 
The  primitive  colors  carry  with  them  more 
aesthetic  delight  to  an  uncultured  people  than 
the  more  delicate  shades.  The  rare  colors  givt 
pleasure  only  to  the  "  highbrow.''  Primitive 
colors,  furthermore,  are  associated  with  many 
objects  which  have  survival-reference.  The 
warm  colors,  yellow  and  red,  have  pleasure 
associated  with  them  perhaps  because  of  their 
connection  with  the  light  of  the  sun  and  the 
warmth  of  fires.  Cold  blue  is  associated  with 
the  sea  and  sky;  black,  with  the  treacherous 
night.  Observe,  too,  that  the  same  object  of 
appreciation  may  affect  different  individuals  in 


THE   THEORY    OF   NORMS  155 

wholly  different  ways.  The  general  uniformity 
of  taste  may  be  accounted  for  on  the  principle 
of  harmony  of  organic  with  inorganic  nature. 
Even  so,  beauty  might  be  considered  to  be 
ontologically  objective.  In  such  a  case,  nature 
would  have  to  be  regarded  as  conspiring  to  give 
aesthetic  pleasure  to  some  of  its  organic  com- 
ponents. Beauty,  to  be  ontologically  objective, 
must  be  a  principle  in  nature  distinct  from  the 
utility  which  operates  in  natural  selection;  that 
is,  it  must  be  so,  if  we  are  ever  to  prove  its 
existence,  for,  of  course,  we  might  have  faith 
in  eternal  beauty  without  the  least  bit  of  evi- 
dence to  prove  that  it  exists.  However,  the 
psychological  explanation  seems  to  me  to  be 
entirely  adequate,  and  the  proofs  advanced  to 
establish  an  over-personal  beauty  seem  incon- 
clusive. Therefore,  it  seems  wisest  to  adhere 
to  the  simpler  viewpoint. 

V.     FREEDOM    AND   RESPONSIBILITY 

§  12.     After  having  attempted  to  show  how    y 
norms  and  natural  laws  may  fit  into  a  single 
system,  Windelband  seeks  to  remove  the  Kantian 
dualism  of  a  region  of  freedom  and  a  region  of 
natural  law.     His  method  is  a  consideration  of 


156    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

the  meaning  of  freedom.  He  aims  to  show 
that  freedom  and  determinism  are  not  incom- 
patible.    He  says, 

Freedom  is  the  determination  of  the  empirical  con- 
sciousness by  consciousness  of  the  norm.  .  .  .  This 
freedom  is  in  no  wise  a  mysterious  ability  to  do  some- 
thing for  which  no  cause  is  present;  it  demands  no 
exception  to  the  continuity  determined  by  nature  of  the 
phenomena  of  the  life  of  the  soul;  but  it  is  rather  the 
ripest  product  of  natural  necessity,  that  through  which 
the  empirical  consciousness  places  itself  under  the  law 
of  the  consciousness  of  the  norm.^^ 

Aside  from  the  notion  of  norms,  I  find  myself 
in  cordial  agreement  with  Windelband  in  his 
contention  that  freedom  and  determinism  are 
not  incompatible.  But  Windelband  seems  to 
feel  that  norms  somehow  help  to  a  reconcilia- 
tion, and  in  this  I  cannot  agree  with  him.  He 
seems  to  feel  that  freedom  can  be  explained  as 
a  type  of  determination  according  to  norms.  It 
appears  to  me  that  nature  is  here  regarded  as 
static  before  possibilities  of  determination,  on 
the  one  hand,  according  to  quantitative  factors 
of  evolution,   and,  on  the  other,   according  to 

30  Windelband,  Praeludien,  II,  88. 


THE   THEORY   OF    NORMS  157 

normal,  qualitative  factors.  Now  if  the  Kantian 
dualism  is  to  disappear,  it  seems  most  natural 
that  quantitative  and  normal  factors  should 
work  themselves  out  in  a  single  system  along 
deterministic  lines.  The  theory,  however,  shows 
no  reason  why  normal  factors  should  prevail. 
This  was  my  first  criticism  of  norms,  here  re- 
peated with  special  reference  to  the  discussion 
of  freedom. 

I  do  not  think  that  the  reader  of  Windelband's 
arguments  will  be  satisfied  with  his  definition  of 
freedom  after  a  consideration  of  his  subsequent 
discussion.  Windelband  escapes  the  main  prob- 
lem of  freedom  by  identifying  freedom  with  a 
certain  kind  of  determined  processes,  A  human 
being  cannot  act  outside  of  natural  law  in  the 
carrying  out  of  any  plan.  The  means  at  his 
disposal  are  determined  from  the  start;  and,  if 
he  follows  out  a  certain  course  of  action,  there 
is  a  chain  of  causation  to  whose  links  he  must 
conform.  When  Windelband  places  freedom 
in  a  course  of  action  determined  according  to 
consciousness  of  a  norm,  he  appears  to  place  it 
right  in  the  causal  series. 

It  may  be  seen,  however,  that  the  issue  does 
not  lie  here-     Windelband  speaks  of  the  em- 


158    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

pirical  consciousness  "  placing  itself "  (sich 
stellt)  under  the  law  of  consciousness  of  the 
norm.  In  the  next  sentence  he  defines  freedom 
as  the  "  autonomy  "  with  which  the  individual 
consciousness  makes  of  a  norm,  known  and 
recognized  by  it,  a  maxim  of  action.  Now  this 
autonomy  by  which  the  individual  consciousness 
is  able  to  put  itself  under  the  determination  of 
one  of  several  possible  courses  of  action  is  a 
different  sort  of  freedom  from  that  of  the  pre- 
ceding definition  of  freedom  as  the  "  determi- 
nation of  the  empirical  consciousness  through 
the  consciousness  of  the  norm."  In  the  case  of 
the  definition  just  quoted,  nature  is  viewed  as 
a  battlefield  wherein  different  laws,  natural  and 
normal,  come  into  collision.  The  natural  laws 
war  among  themselves,  and  the  issue  is  decided 
by  natural  selection.  The  addition  of  norms 
to  the  forms  of  the  evolution-process  merely 
increases  the  number  of  laws  which  are  at  war. 
Now  I  take  it  that  there  are  degrees  of  power 
among  the  factors  of  evolution,  and  that  these 
degrees  of  importance  are  constant  throughout 
the  process  of  nature,  so  that  there  results  a 
causal  continuity. 

By    Windelband's    first    definition,    freedom 


THE   THEORY    OF   NORMS  159 

would  consist  in  the  consciousness  of  the  trans- 
ference of  the  action  of  an  individual  from  one 
type  of  mechanistic  series  to  another  type  of 
mechanistic  series.  "  Freedom  is  nothing  other 
than  the  consciousness  of  this  determining  power 
which  the  known  and  recognized  norm  is  able 
to  exercise  over  the  thinking  faculty  and  de- 
cision of  the  will."  I  interpret  this  to  mean 
that  norms  are  laws  which  exist  only  in  relation 
to  conscious  beings;  that  natural  laws  reign 
supreme  in  inorganic  nature;  but  that  the  indi- 
vidual conscious  being  is  able  to  escape  from 
the  tyranny  of  an  implacable  mechanism  by 
placing  himself  under  the  rule  of  higher  laws 
which  become  operative  only  through  the  me- 
dium of  consciousness.  Now  the  important 
idea  of  this  exposition  is  that  consciousness 
makes  a  difference  in  the  deterministic  course 
of  nature.  Certain  laws,  norms,  become  oper- 
ative only  when  organisms  become  conscious  of 
them.  It  is  difficult,  however,  to  see  how  aware- 
ness of  norms,  however  influential  a  factor  it 
may  be,  can  itself  be  termed  freedom,  on  the 
plea  that  this  factor  of  awareness  initiates  cer- 
tain new  deterministic  lines.  The  awareness 
simply  becomes  one  new   factor.     This  fits  in 


i6o    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

well  with  the  argument  for  determinism,  but  it 
ill  accords  with  the  admission  of  freedom.    Free- 
^    dom  seems   to  have  become  identified  with   a 
process  of  awareness. 

The  plausibility  of  Windelband's  argument 
seems  to  lie  in  the  implicit  assumption  of  another 
kind  of  freedom  for  the  individual  in  addition 
to  the  one  which  he  has  defined.  This  second 
kind  of  freedom  is  expressed  by  his  use  of  the 
words  "  autonomy  ''  and  "  places  itself."  Free- 
dom, according  to  this  second  conception,  is 
something  within  the  factor  of  awareness,  not 
identical  with  it.  Freedom  is  the  ability  of  one 
who  is  aware  to  accept  or  reject  the  normal  way 
of  acting.  Decision  of  the  will  is  a  decision 
involving  choice  of  action  on  the  part  of  the  one 
who  is  aware.  I  do  not  feel  that  Windelband 
has  escaped  the  real  problem  of  freedom  by  the 
method  which  he  has  employed.  The  old  dis- 
cussion of  whether  the  will  is  free  comes  again 
to  the  fore;  it  has  been  buried  only  temporarily. 
How  can  a  conscious  being  "  place  himself  '* 
under  the  rule  of  one  of  several  kingdoms  of 
law?  Windelband's  only  implied  answer  is, 
"  Through  being  conscious."  He  seems  to  feel 
that  it  is  the  peculiar  glory  of  a  conscious  being 


THE   THEORY    OF    NORMS  i6i 

to  be  able  to  make  selective  choice  of  factors 
which  shall  govern  his  action.  He  seems  to  feel 
that,  by  making  norms  part  of  a  determined 
system,  he  has  made  freedom  intelligible.  But 
the  real  dispute,  it  seems  to  me,  is  not  over  the 
question  as  to  how  courses  of  action  work  out 
(as,  for  instance,  whether  or  not  they  are  in 
causal  series),  but  over  how  the  individual  is 
able  to  choose  one  course  of  action  rather  than 
another,  it  being  taken  for  granted  that  any 
course  is  determined  in  the  process.  And  I 
cannot  see  how  the  introduction  of  norms  helps 
the  situation  at  all.  It  only  adds  a  complication 
to  the  factoral-complex  of  possible  actions  — 
about  whose  possibility  it  is  mainly  disputed. 

This  is  no  essay  on  determinism,  indetermin- 
ism,  and  freedom,  but  a  discussion  of  the  rela- 
tion of  Windelband's  conception  of  norms  to  his 
conception  of  freedom.  I  think  that  it  has  been 
shown  that  the  assumption  of  norms  only  em- 
barrasses the  discussion,  and  that  without  norms 
we  can  as  easily  suppose  several  courses  of 
possible  action,  any  one  of  which  may  be  com- 
pletely determined  in  the  process.  There  is 
nothing  to  be  gained  by  printing  one  of  these 
courses  of  action  in  red  letters! 


i62    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

Windelband  fears  that  his  notion  of  freedom 
will  be  challenged  on  the  ground  that  it  does  not 
do  justice  to  the  feeling  of  responsibility  and  to 
the  existence  of  responsibility  in  general.^^  He 
feels  it  important,  therefore,  to  examine  the 
notion  of  responsibility.  As  he  has  been  trying 
to  reconcile  the  concept  of  freedom  with  some 
kind  of  determinism,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
reconcile  responsibility  with  his  theory  of  deter- 
mination by  norms.  He  feels  that  the  crux  of 
the  question  lies  in  the  admission  that  acts  of 
moral  decision  are  caused.  But,  at  the  outset, 
he  finds  that  causation  and  responsibility  are 
not  incompatible.  In  fact,  if  moral  actions  were 
not  caused,  there  could  be  no  responsibility;  all 
would  be  mere  chance.  We  are  only  respon- 
sible when  we  cause  our  actions.  Wherein, 
then,  lies  our  feeling  of  repugnance  in  the  mat- 
ter of  making  responsibility  contain  causation? 
Windelband  feels  that  it  lies  in  the  notion  of 
necessity  which  we  must  attribute  to  cause  and 
effect,  if  causation  is  to  have  any  "objective 
character."  He  proceeds  to  analyze  the  con- 
cept of  necessity  (as  distinguished  from  the 
time-relation  of  succession,  discussed  by  Hume) 

31  Windelband,  Praeludien,  II,  88. 


THE   THEORY    OF    NORMS  163 

into  two  meanings.  One  of  these,  the  meaning 
of  Wirkens,  "  power,"  is  not  further  discussed. 
The  other  is  said  to  be  that  of  logical  dependence 
of  the  special  on  the  general,  Gesetzmdssigkeit , 
"  according-to-lawness."  ^^  Now  our  repugnance 
in  the  matter  of  admitting  causation  into  the 
conception  of  responsibility  is  evidently  a  feel- 
ing that  Gesetzmdssigkeit  destroys  freedom. 
Windelband  quotes  the  work  of  Rickert  in  con- 
nection with  the  analysis  of  Ursdchlichkeit,  to 
the  effect  that  many  acts  which  are  caused  do 
not  have  a  general  law  behind  them.  Such 
are  all  individual  actions  which  never  recur 
under  exactly  the  same  conditions.  Therefore, 
Gesetzmdssigkeit  and  Ursdchlichkeit  are  not 
co-extensive;  and,  if  this  be  true,  responsibility 
would  sometimes  have  to  do  with  causal  rela- 
tions which  are  not  predetermined  according  to 
a  general  law.  Windelband  does  not  examine 
Rickert's  arguments,  but  passes  to  a  consider- 
ation as  to  where  one  finds  the  idea  of  necessary 
connection  in  the  case  of  unique  actions.  He 
says  that  a  man's  willing  and  acting  are  caused 
by  his  character.^^     The  obedience  to  law  in  the 

32  M,  II,  90. 

33  Id.,  II,  92. 


i64    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

case  of  unique  actions  is  found  in  the  nature  of 
character  which  sets  forth  a  logical  law  of  gen- 
eral nature;  viz.,  if  the  circumstances  were  to 
be  repeated  (whether  they  are  actually  repeated 
or  not),  the  man  would  act  thus  and  so.  Thus, 
"all  effecting  (Wirksamkeit)  has  epistemologi- 
cal  meaning,  and  the  logical  form  of  Gesetz- 
mdssigkeit,  even  if  its  factual  non-repetition  or 
inability  to  be  repeated  excludes  methodologi- 
cally its  comparison  with  other  examples."  ^* 
Therefore,  the  causal  relation  is  never  present 
without  Geset^mdssigkeit,  even  if  this  be  only 
epistemological. 

It  is  somewhat  puzzling  to  gather  the  precise 
significance  which  Windelband  wishes  us  to 
attach  to  his  analysis  of  causation.  If  Rickert's 
position  were  sound,  causation  would  be  relieved 
of  some  of  the  burden  imposed  on  it  by  deter- 
minism; and  responsibility  would  be  affected 
similarly  by  a  softening  of  the  conception  of 
causality.  Windelband,  however,  feels  the  need 
of  retaining  the  notion  of  necessary  connection 
in  some  sense,  and  he  endeavors  to  soften  the 
sense  of  Gesetsmdssigkeit.  This  he  does  by 
showing  that,  in  cases  of  unique  action,  obedi- 

3*  Windelband,  Praeludien,  II,  92. 


THE   THEORY    OF   NORMS  165 

ence  to  law  is  only  to  be  understood  epistemo- 
logically.  Supporting  himself  on  the  Kantian 
epistemology,  Windelband  is  able  to  juggle  terms 
between  the  laws  of  phenomena  and  logical  laws, 
with  an  ontological  implication  that,  as  the  one 
realm  is  as  real  as  the  other,  it  is  permissible  to 
take  from  each  in  building  up  a  theory. 

My  criticism  of  the  analysis  of  causation  is 
that  it  is  not  to  the  point.  It  is  certainly  true 
that  the  causal  relation  exists  between  the  act 
of  moral  decision  and  the  subsequent  action  that 
is  carried  out,  but  the  question  is  as  to  whether 
the  causal  relation  exists  between  the  norm  and 
the  act  of  decision.  We  may  represent  the 
matter  more  clearly  by  the  use  of  symbols.  Let 
n  stand  for  norm,  b  for  the  act  of  moral  decision 
of  a  conscious  being,  c  for  the  subsequent  action, 
R  for  relation,  and  C  for  causal.  Now  my 
position  is  that  responsibility  certainly  involves 
b — RC — c.  This  is  well  established  by  Windel- 
band. The  important  question,  however,  is  not 
what  kind  of  causal  relation  this  may  be,  but 
whether  there  is  another  causal  relation  between 
n  and  b;  is  n — RC — b  true,  in  other  words? 
Windelband  escapes  consideration  of  this  prob- 
lem by  using  the  ambiguous  term  "  character '' 


i66    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

to  cover  both  the  norm  and  the  act  of  decision, 
nb.  He  thinks  that  the  difficulty  connected  with 
causation  is  settled  by  showing  that  nb — RC — c. 
But  the  matter  is  not  settled  by  saying  that 
"  character  determines  willing  and  acting."  He 
proves  that  an  act  of  moral  decision  determines 
a  subsequent  action,  by  virtue  of  the  "  charac- 
ter ''  of  the  agent,  and  then  assumes  that  there 
is  no  question  as  to  determination  within  "  char- 
acter," which  contains  at  least  the  important 
elements  of  the  act  of  moral  decision  and  the 
presence  of  the  norm. 

The  point  at  issue  is.  Does  the  presence  of 
the  norm  in  the  "  character  "  determine  the  act 
of  decision?  This  question  can  not  be  discussed 
without  coming  dangerously  near  assuming  the 
discarded  notion  of  **  states  of  consciousness." 
A  more  psychological  statement  of  the  point  at 
issue  would  be,  Has  a  conscious  being  ability  to 
reject  or  accept  or  choose  between  conscious 
impulses?  This  is  the  question  whose  answer 
is  the  answer  as  to  whether  man  has  freedom 
or  not. 

This  question  is  discussed  subsequently  by 
Windelband,  and  I  shall  criticize  his  treatment 
of  it.     He  says  that  another  objection  brought 


THE   THEORY    OF    NORMS  167 

against  the  association  of  responsibility  with 
causal  necessity  in  the  case  of  willing  and  act- 
ing, is  the  fact  that,  by  popular  usage,  respon- 
sibility always  implies  the  belief  that  a  man 
could  have  acted  otherwise  than  he  really  did 
act.^'  Whereupon  Windelband  answers  that  the 
possibility  of  a  variety  of  actions  in  a  situation 
is  true  only  of  man  ''  in  ahstracto  '* ;  that  a  man 
""  in  concreto  *'  could  act  otherwise  only  if  he 
were  otherwise.  It  is  because  his  character  is 
such  as  it  is  and  because  it  has  caused  certain 
actions  that  we  judge  a  man  responsible  for 
what  he  has  done. 

Windelband  here  expressly  denies  that  a  man 
ha^s  any  choice  of  possible  actions.  With  it  he 
implies  that  a  man  has  no  choice  of  possible 
decisions.  The  latter  denial,  to  my  mind,  is 
the  denial  of  the  only  kind  of  freedom  that  is 
worth  anything.  Observe  two  things.  Note 
the  confusion  running  through  the  argument 
with  respect  to  willing  and  acting.  Windel- 
band's  original  discussion  had  to  do  with  the 
parallel  between  Denken,  Wollen,  and  FUhlen. 
Now,  when  he  is  temporarily  discussing  Wollen 
alone,    a    stranger   has    made   his    appearance, 

35  Windelband,  Praeludien,  II,  93. 
12 


i68    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

Handeln.  We  now  read  of  Wollen  and  Han- 
deln.  They  are  spoken  of  in  the  same  breath, 
and  it  is  just  because  of  this  juxtaposition  that 
Windelband  can  profit  by  his  confusion  between 
an  act  of  decision  of  the  will  {Wollen)  and  the 
physical  process  {Handeln)  which  follows  the 
act  of  decision. 

Observe,  in  the  second  place,  that  responsi- 
bility as  interpreted  by  Windelband  is  here 
brought  in  to  prove  that  a  man  has  no  choice 
of  possible  actions.  This  goes  well  if  we  take 
it  literally:  a  man  can  be  responsible  only  for  a 
causally  determined  action.  But  how  can  he  be 
responsible  for  an  act  of  decision  if  it  be  caus- 
ally determined?  If  an  act  of  decision  of  the 
will  is  the  effect  of  a  determining  cause,  respon- 
sibility for  the  decision  must  rest  with  the  cause, 
not  with  the  man  himself. 

Windelband  has  said  that  a  man  cannot  act 
otherwise  than  is  determined  by  his  character. 
His  proof,  as  we  have  seen,  relies  upon  use  of 
the  term  "  character  "  in  an  ambiguous  sense. 
The  difficulty  in  the  matter  of  application  of 
responsibility  to  the  cause  is  now  discussed  by 
him  as  a  new  difficulty.  He  now  asks,  What 
is  responsible  for  the  character:  circumstances, 


'J^HE   THEORY    OF    NORMS  169 

society,  or  God?  How  can  the  individual  be 
responsible  for  his  character?  '' Als  ob  es  noch 
irgendwie  auszudenken  ware,  was  das  Indi- 
viduum  im  Unterschiede  von  seinem  Charakter 
noch  sein  konnte!"^^  In  such  a  case,  Windel- 
band  says,  a  man's  character  would  have  to  be 
doubled;  he  would  have  to  have  an  empirical 
and  an  intelligible  character,  and  thus  we  should 
have  a  metaphysical  conception  which  would  not 
agree  with  the  causal  element  of  the  conception 
of  responsibility.  Windelband's  solution  is  to 
locate  responsibility  in  the  judgment  whereby 
we  transfer  our  approval  or  disapproval  of  a 
function  to  the  individual  who  functions." 

Windelband's  main  problem  was  to  reconcile 
freedom  with  determinism.  He  found  that,  in 
order  to  do  so,  he  would  have  to  give  an  account 
of  responsibility  which  would  do  full  justice  to 
it.  His  method  was  to  show  that  causation  and 
responsibility  are  not  incompatible.  We  should 
suppose  that  he  would  find  responsibility  some- 
where in  the  series  of  causation,  but  he  discovers 
that  the  problem  of  infinite  regress  is  involved. 
He  therefore  concludes  that,  although  causation 
in  moral  action  is  always  associated  with  respon- 
se windeiband,  Praeludien,  II,  94.      ^"^  Id,,  II,  95. 


170    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

sibility,  responsibility  is  only  applied  metaphor- 
ically to  the  person;  that  it  is  only  a  way  of 
passing  judgment  on  a  portion  of  the  causal 
series;  that  itself  it  is  not  a  part  of  the  causal 
series  at  all.  How  does  this  agree  with  Win- 
delband's  method  of  showing  that  responsibility 
is  not  incompatible  with  determinism  by  norms 
on  the  ground  that  responsibility  always  involves 
the  notion  of  causation  ?  If  this  notion  of  caus- 
ation is  found  ultimately  to  be  of  only  meta- 
phorical application,  has  the  objection  to  Win- 
delband's  definition  of  freedom  been  removed 
by  the  location  of  a  metaphorical  causation  in 
responsibility  ? 

As  to  his  objection  that  a  man's  character 
would  have  to  be  doubled  in  order  to  make  it 
possible  for  him  to  change  his  character,  I  would 
reply  that  there  is  no  more  a  problem  here  than 
there  is  in  the  facts  that  a  conscious  being  pre- 
serves the  memory  of  former  experiences,  or 
that  one  can  make  a  judgment  of  approval  or 
disapproval.  The  problem  is  contained  in  the 
question  as  to  whether  he  can  ever  decide  in 
favor  of  the  less  prominent  factor. 

Windelband,  as  we  have  seen,  has  finally 
located  responsibility  in  the  judgment,  and  he 


THE   THEORY    OF   NORMS  171 

believes  that  it  is  a  great  pedagogical  means  of 
getting  oneself  and  others  into  the  way  of  obedi- 
ence to  norms.  These  laws,  by  their  "  inherent 
importance,"  are  destined  ultimately  to  prevail, 
and  responsibility  is  one  factor  in  the  process  by 
which  they  reach  supremacy  in  the  lives  of  indi- 
viduals. If  it  were  not  for  Windelband's  appli- 
cation of  the  term  "  responsibility  "  to  persons 
rather  than  to  functions,  I  should  be  inclined 
to  suppose  that  responsibility,  like  norms,  was 
taken  to  be  one  more  factor  in  the  evolutionary 
process.  He  may,  indeed,  regard  it  in  this  light. 
Judgments,  then,  would  be  determined,  and  we 
should  have  here  simply  a  case  of  a  very  prag- 
matic function  of  the  intellect  in  cooperation 
with  the  rest  of  the  order  of  nature.  But  the 
memory  of  Windelband's  use  of  the  expressions 
"  autonomy  "  and  "  places  itself,"  together  with 
his  apparent  belief  that  responsibility  is  not 
entirely  a  delusive  thing,  leads  me  to  wonder 
whether  he  does  not,  in  effect,  locate  freedom 
in  the  judgment.  Does  he  not  assume  (though 
it  is  out  of  harmony  with  his  arguments)  that 
we  can  approve  or  disapprove  according  to  our 
will,  and  that  we  can  put  ourselves  under  the 
rule  of  one  or  another  set  of  factors?     That  we 


^ 


172    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

can  teach  others  by  our  exercise  of  judgment  of 
their  actions?  That  we  can  do  this  in  some 
real  sense  and  not  merely  in  conformity  with  a 
causal  process? 

Unless  something  of  this  sort  is  felt  by 
Windelband,  I  cannot  see  how  the  ethical  sig- 
nificance of  his  doctrine  is  other  than  ''"  laissez 
faire/'  If  we  have  no  real  ability  to  bring  the 
norms  to  bear  on  our  lives  and  the  lives  of  others, 
but  just  take  part  in  the  whole  process  of  evolu- 
tion, with  responsibility  as  a  natural  phenom- 
enon at  work  with  the  other  factors,  responsi- 
bility can  be  no  more  than  a  very  involuntary 
pedagogical  instrument,  and  the  less  mankind 
knows  about  Windelband's  theory  the  better  — 
that  is,  if  it  is  not  true! 

Windelband's  general  position  is  character- 
ized by  passivity  on  the  part  of  the  individual 
to  the  forces  which  shape  the  course  of  develop- 
ment of  body  and  mind.  To  be  sure,  he  defends 
moral  decision,  and  describes  man  as  struggling 
upward,  but  the  more  powerful  the  attraction 
from  the  norms  and  the  more  merciless  the  evo- 
lutionary factors,  the  more  evident  it  becomes 
that,  so  far  as  man  is  concerned,  his  battle  is 


THE   THEORY    OF   NORMS  173 

only  a  sham  battle  after  all.  Now  that  we  have 
shown  that  obligation  and  responsibility  cannot 
serve  the  pedagogical  purpose  which  Windel- 
band  ascribes  to  them,  they  become  a  mockery 
to  life.  We  look  over  the  universe,  and,  indeed, 
we  see  duty  and  responsibility  as  factors  in  the 
world-process,  but  the  teleological  goal  toward 
which  we  are  moving  seems  to  contain  all  the 
life-activity  within  itself.  The  whole  world 
seems  as  if  it  were  being  pulled  toward  that 
high  goal.  The  struggle  is  between  more  and 
less  powerful  factors  in  the  process.  We  feel 
that  in  Windelband's  view  human  beings  are 
the  tools  of  factors. 

Without  the  support  of  any  philosophy,  one 
feels  the  need  of  a  view  of  the  universe  by  which 
he  may  take  some  part  in  the  struggle,  and  help 
toward  the  attainment  of  the  goal.  The  pop- 
ular idea  of  moral  responsibility  has  some  such 
background  as  this.  We  feel  that  the  individual 
ought  to  have  the  means  of  doing  some  of  the 
.eliminating.  We  feel  that  a  deterministic  world 
is  but  one  side  of  the  truth. 

Although  nothing  in  the  previous  discussion 
offer  a  basis  for  belief  in  such  a  different  kind 
of  universe,  we  may  at  least  feel  encouraged 


174    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERREI.ATION 

that  it  is  not  without  the  bounds  of  possibility, 
if  Windelband's  theory  has  been  proved  incon- 
sistent and  untenable. 


CONCLUSION 

f^   I    ^HE  course  of  our   discussion  has  led 
from  the  definition  of  two  classes  of 


1 


values,  immediate  and  contributory, 
and  the  discovery  of  their  psychological  basis  in 
feeling  and  cognition,  to  a  description  of  their 
natural  history.  First  their  origin  in  the  earli- 
est stages  of  consciousness  was  described.  The 
two  types  of  valuing  were  held  to  signify  two 
divergent  directions  of  development  of  con- 
scious activity.  It  was  emphasized,  however, 
that  neither  of  these  ever  occurs  in  isolation 
from  the  other,  but  that,  rather,  one  was  more 
prominent  at  a  given  time  than  the  other. 

Next  the  relation  of  the  judgment  to  values 
was  discussed.  In  the  act  itself,  it  was  found 
that  all  judgments  are  contributory.  The  value 
of  the  content  of  the  judgment,  however,  de- 
pends upon  the  future  usefulness  of  the  content. 
All  trvie  judgments  were  found  to  be  contribu- 
tory as  to  content,  and  also  certain  false  judg- 
ments. The  comparatively  small  group  of  judg- 
ments of  value  was  treated  briefly.  It  was  noted 
that  immediate  values  first  find  expression  in 

175 


176    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

the  judgment,  and  that  the  expression  of  con- 
tributory values  grows  out  of  judgments  of 
immediate  values.  At  a  subsequent  stage  of 
development,  however,  contributory  values  be- 
come free  from  previous  cognition  of  the  means 
as  immediate  values. 

Chapter  V  carried  on  the  natural  history  of 
values  by  discussing  their  interrelation.  This 
topic  concerned  the  relation  of  the  individual  to 
his  environment  through  the  expansion  of  his 
interests.  The  biological  point  of  view  was 
adhered  to,  and  it  was  discovered  that  con- 
scious activity  is  related  to  environment  directly 
through  feeling  and  cognition.  Thereupon  it 
was  shown  how  everything  with  which  con- 
scious activity  comes  into  contact  is  valuable 
both  from  the  immediate  and  from  the  con- 
tributory points  of  view.  Some  practical  con- 
sequences of  this  fact  were  deduced. 

Early  in  our  discussion  (Chapter  II),  we  dis- 
posed of  a  theory  which  claimed  to  prove  the 
existence  of  ontologically  objective  norms  of 
truth.  Part  II  examined  in  detail  Windelband's 
theory  of  norms.  The  writer  believes  that  he 
has  proved  that  Windelband's  position,  in  spite 
of  its  containing  broad  and  suggestive  state- 


CONCLUSION  177 

ments,  is  self-contradictory,  confused  in  outline, 
and  untenable.  It  is  desirable,  in  conclusion,  to 
indicate  our  attitude  toward  those  moral  and 
aesthetic  values  which  are  so  commonly  recog- 
nized by  human  beings. 

We  must  bear  in  mind  that  we  seek  an  in- 
terpretation that  is  psychological  and  biological. 
All  values  and  standards  of  value,  it  is  true,  in- 
asmuch as  they  are  entities  of  one  kind  or 
another,  must  have  their  place  in  a  metaphysical 
account  of  the  universe.  But  throughout  this 
book  it  has  been  our  care  to  disentangle  the 
psychological  and  the  biological  from  the  meta- 
physical, and  to  deal  with  only  the  former.  In 
a  complete  account  of  values,  the  metaphysical 
side  must  not  be  neglected,  but  we  have  not  at- 
tempted to  give  a  complete  account.  Our  attack 
on  Windelband's  position  is  not  so  much  an 
attack  on  the  theory  that  there  are  ontologically 
objective  norms  of  thinking,  willing,  and  feel- 
ing, as  an  attack  on  the  attempt  to  demonstrate 
.  the  existence  of  such  norms  from  psychological 
data. 

We  have  referred  to  J.  S.  MilFs  description  of 
conscience\     This    description    is    an   excellent 

1  Page  148. 


178    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

psychological  account  of  the  growth  of  stan- 
dards of  moral  value.     It  runs  as  follows : 

The  internal  sanction  of  duty,  whatever  our  standard 
of  duty  may  be,  is  one  and  the  same — a  feeling  in  our 
own  mind ;  a  pain,  more  or  less  intense,  attendant  on  vio- 
lation of  duty,  which  in  properly  cultivated  moral  natures 
rises,  in  the  more  serious  cases,  into  shrinking  from  it 
as  an  impossibility.  This  feeling,  when  disinterested, 
and  connecting  itself  with  the  pure  idea  of  duty,  and 
not  with  some  particular  form  of  it,  or  with  any  of  the 
merely  accessory  circumstances,  is  the  essence  of  Con- 
science; though  in  that  complex  phenomenon  as  it 
actually  exists,  the  simple  fact  is  in  general  all  encrusted 
over  with  collateral  associations,  derived  from  sym- 
pathy, from  love,  and  still  more  from  fear ;  from  all  the 
forms  of  religious  feeling;  from  the  recollections  of 
childhood  and  of  all  our  past  life;  from  self-esteem, 
desire  of  the  esteem   of   others,   and   occasionally   even 

self-abasement Its  binding  force,  however, 

consists  in  the  existence  of  a  mass  of  feeling  which  must 
be  broken  through  in  order  to  do  what  violates  our 
standard  of  right,  and  which,  if  we  do  nevertheless 
violate  that  standard,  will  probably  have  to  be  encoun- 
tered afterwards  in  the  form  of  remorse.  Whatever 
theory  we  have  of  the  nature  or  origin  of  conscience, 
this  is  what  essentially  constitutes  it. 

In  terms  of  our  theory  of  values  it  is  evident 
that  any  individual  act  demanded  by  conscience 
in  view  of  a  standard  of  morality  is  related  to 


CONCLUSION  179 

consciousness  in  two  ways.  First  there  is  the 
feeling-aspect.  Mill  well  describes  how  the  feel- 
ing commonly  called  "conscience"  arises  as  the 
consequence  of  certain  inhibitions  and  asso- 
ciated ideas.  While  the  peculiar  character  of 
the  feeling  of  conscience  is  thus  dependent  upon 
the  matter  to  which  the  feeling  is  attached,  it  is 
no  less  true  that,  as  one  aspect  of  the  relation 
of  the  individual  to  the  act,  the  feeling  of  con- 
science, like  other  feelings,  is  a  relation  of  im- 
mediate value.  Obedience  to  the  dictate  of  con- 
science brings  with  it  a  feeling  of  pleasure;  dis- 
obedience results  in  a  feeling  of  the  unpleasant. 
The  associated  matter  has  not  changed  feeling 
to  something  new  and  original;  it  has  merely 
heightened  and  intensified  it. 

In  the  second  place,  any  act  the  fulfilment  of 
which  is  demanded  by  conscience,  is  related  to 
consciousness  also  on  the  cognitive  side.  Here 
must  be  taken  into  account  moral  judgment. 
Any  act  that  is  the  outcome  of  a  decision  in  view 
of  some  moral  standard  and  is  not  merely  a 
habitual  response  prompted  by  some  former  de- 
cision, involves  moral  choice  and  deliberation. 
Here  there  is  a  rivalry  among  possible  courses 
of  action,  and  some  principle  of  action  emerges. 


i8o    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

Such  principles  are  always  judgments  of  values. 
What  A.  J.  Balfour^  calls  "subordinate  ethical 
propositions''  are  judgments  of  contributory 
values\  "I  ought  to  make  a  true  statement  in 
this  particular  instance"  may  be  subordinate  to 
the  "fundamental"  ethical  proposition  "I  ought 
to  speak  the  truth."  The  fundamental  propo- 
sition, however,  is  a  judgment  of  immediate 
value.  The  word  "ought"  simply  indicates  that 
the  feeling  of  liking  is  associated  with  a  group 
of  psychological  factors  in  such  a  way  that  we 
name  it  a  feeling  of  obligation. 

Two  correlated  topics  require  brief  mention. 
First,  the  psychological  processes  involved  in  the 
formation  of  standards  do  not  necessitate  our 
consideration.  They  are  identical  with  the  de- 
velopment of  concepts  as  described  in  any 
elementary  psychology.  Secondly,  the  point  of 
view  that  we  have  adopted  in  no  wise  conflicts 
with  the  logical  account  of  ethical  propositions 

^  A.  J.  Balfour,  A  Defence  of  Philosophic  Doubt,  342. 

*If  it  be  objected  that  the  "subordinate"  ethical  propo- 
sition contains  the  word  "ought"  as  well  as  the  "funda- 
mental" proposition,  and  that  therefore  it  too  is  a  judgment 
of  immediate  value,  let  it  be  remembered  that  we  defined 
an  immediate  value  as  a  given  good,  "intrinsic,  self-sufficient'' 
(page  8).  According  to  Mr.  Balfour's  definition  of  a  ''sub- 
ordinate" ethical  proposition,  the  ought  of  such  a  proposition 
is  not  self-sufficient,  but  ever  dependent  upon  the  intrinsic 
ought  of  its  "fundamental"  proposition. 


CONCLUSION  i8i 

given  so  acutely  by  Balfour.  In  reference  to 
the  fundamental  ethical  proposition,  we  do  not 
have  to  explain  why  we  have  such  immediate 
values,  any  more  than  we  have  to  explain  why 
there  are  such  entities  as  value  relations  at  all. 
It  is  interesting,  however,  to  observe  that 
logically,  if  certain  statements  of  obligation  are 
a  priori,  so  also  is  there  a  contributory  factor 
present  in  every  a  priori  statement  of  obligation. 
"I  ought  to  speak  the  truth"  means — if  it  have 
any  meaning  at  all  for  any  individual — "I  ought 
to  say  words  that  are  contributory  to  truth- 
telling." 

There  are  two  principal  methods  of  investi- 
gation of  aesthetic  facts  which  are  pursued  by 
philosophers  of  aesthetics.  One  method  is  satis- 
fied with  a  wholly  empirical,  psychological  treat- 
ment of  the  facts  of  appreciation  of  the  beautiful 
as  exhibited  in  individuals  and  races.  A  phil- 
osopher who  finds  his  whole  interest  in  this 
standpoint  will  be  concerned  with  questions  re- 
lating to  the  origin  and  development  of  such 
appreciations.  I  have  already  suggested*  that 
natural  selection  may  be  a  potent  factor  in  the 

*  Pages  153-154- 


i82    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERREI.ATION 

determination  of  what  is  recognized  as  beauti- 
ful. Among  cultured  persons,  however,  the 
great  mass  of  aesthetic  appreciations  has  lost  its 
survival-reference.  Just  how  far  this  is  true 
would  be  a  matter  for  empirical  investigation. 
An  empirical  inquiry  will  also  be  concerned  with 
an  investigation  of  such  principles  as  may  be 
found  to  underlie  the  "secondary"  systems  of 
later  development.  Throughout  the  whole 
course  of  an  empirical  treatment,  it  should  be 
borne  in  mind  that,  psychologically  speaking, 
the  aesthetic  experience  is  one  of  feeling,  not  of 
cognition.  But  an  empirical  account  will  pass 
beyond  a  mere  assignment  of  experiences  to  a 
particular  aspect  of  consciousness,  to  a  con- 
sideration of  the  cognitive  elements  to  which  the 
feeling-experiences  are  attached.  Only  on  this 
basis  are  we  justified  in  introducing  such  sub- 
jects as  relation  to  natural  selection,  develop- 
ment of  aesthetic  standards,  etc.  If  an  em- 
pirical account  is  to  be  given,  however,  let  it  be 
wholly  empirical,  and  let  care  be  taken  not  to 
allow  metaphysical  assumptions  to  creep  into  the 
discussion. 

On  the  other  hand,  quite  a  different  treatment 
is  possible.     The  aesthetic  philosopher  may  con- 


CONCLUSION  183 

sider  the  metaphysical  significance  of  the  em- 
pirical facts  of  aesthetic  appreciation.  The 
psychological  investigator  need  not  be  hostile  to 
his  metaphysical  coworker;  he  would  better  be 
his  friend.  But  it  should  be  understood  that  the 
two  methods  are  quite  separate  and  distinct. 
What,  then  are  the  principles  according  to  which 
the  aesthetic  metaphysician  shall  proceed? 

They  are  the  same  as  those  employed  by  other 
metaphysical  philosophers.  In  our  day  there 
has  been  much  protest  against  the  cut  and  dried 
systems  of  the  older  philosophers,  and  a  cor- 
responding satisfaction  in  everything  that  pre- 
tends to  empiricism.  I  believe,  however,  that  the 
only  justification  of  this  point  of  view  lies  in  the 
facts  that  classical  metaphysics  had  at  its  dis- 
posal fewer  scientific  facts  than  are  now  avail- 
able, and  that  it  often  was  willing  to  neglect  such 
facts  as  were  then  known.  With  a  sober  view  of 
the  known  facts,  however,  it  is  still  a  legitimate 
human  impulse  to  want  to  transcend  the  facts 
in  some  measure  and  to  ground  the  contingent 
in  what  is  permanent.  The  philosophic  impulse 
of  Rickert  and  Windelband  must  be  recognized 
as  valid  and  admirable;  fault  is  to  be  found  only 
with  their  method — their  attempt  to  deduce 
metaphysical  truths  from  psychological  data. 

IS 


i84    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

The  problem  of  a  satisfactory  and  valid 
method  in  metaphysical  research  would  seem  to 
resolve  itself  into  the  question  of  how  to  utilize 
empirical  data  without  utilizing  them  wrongly. 
We  may  make  the  following  suggestions:  Let 
the  metaphysican  frankly  base  his  system  upon 
a  dogmatism.  Let  him  announce  his  faith  in 
the  "real"  existence  of  what  he  cannot  prove  to 
exist  in  the  way  in  which  he  assumes  its  exis- 
tence. Let  him  work  out  to  the  full  all  the  im- 
plications that  arise  from  his  assumptions.  But 
he  should  not  be  content  to  rest  his  faith  in  arbi- 
trary assumptions,  even  though  he  must  neces- 
sarily be  arbitrary  in  the  act  of  assuming.  He 
should  look  over  the  body  of  facts  that  are 
known  in  his  particular  field.  Then  let  him 
make  bold  guesses  as  to  some  trans-empirical 
reference  of  certain  of  the  facts  of  observation. 

It  may  be  objected  that  any  dogmatic  method 
is  a  waste  of  time  because  it  can  never  reach 
ascertainable  facts.  Against  the  objection  it 
may  be  urged  that,  empirically  speaking,  it  is  a 
human  impulse  to  want  to  transcend  the  facts, 
and  that,  indeed,  the  roots  of  all  scientific  re- 
search are  embedded  in  metaphysical  assump- 
tions.    It  is  entirely  possible,  also,  that,  in  the 


CONCLUSION  185 

future,  some  metaphysical  system  may  be  ac- 
cepted generally  as  being  more  comprehensive 
than  any  other,  in  view  of  all  the  facts  known 
in  every  field  of  human  experience.  The  build- 
ing of  many  systems,  therefore,  would  be  con- 
tributory to  the  formulation  of  such  an  inclusive 
system.  While  inclusiveness  would  not  be  a 
guarantee  of  truth,  such  a  system,  nevertheless, 
might  claim  the  same  degree  of  certainty  as  that 
attained  in  the  formulation  of  laws  of  nature. 

There  is,  therefore,  a  wide  field  of  investi- 
gation in  ethic  and  aesthetic  for  the  meta- 
physician to  explore.  If  he  be  frank  and  sincere 
as  to  the  element  of  dogmatism  in  his  system, 
there  is  no  reason  why  he  might  not  attempt  to 
correlate  a  realm  of  norms  of  beauty  with  a 
realm  of  ethical  values.  Let  him,  however,  not 
attempt  to  extend  expirical  data  from  psy- 
chology and  biology  into  a  trans-empirical  realm 
of  being,  without  recognizing  the  necessity  of 
dogmatism. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  OF  WORKS  CITED ' 

Balfour,  Arthur  James. 

A  Defence  of  Philosophic  Doubt,  being  an 
essay  on  the  Foundations  of  Belief.  By  Arthur 
James  Balfour,  M.A.,  M.P.  London.  Mac- 
millan  and  Co.     1879.     •     •     • 

Bergson,  Henri. 

Creative  Evolution.  By  Henri  Bergson.  . 
.  .  Authorized  translation  by  Arthur  Mitchell, 
Ph.D.  New  York.  Henry  Holt  and  Company. 
1911. 

Dewey,  John. 

Essays  in  Experimental  Logic.  By  John 
Dewey.  The  University  of  Chicago  Press. 
Chicago,  Illinois.     [1916.] 

James,  William. 

Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism.     By  William 

James.     Longmans,   Green,  and  Co 

New  York.     .     .     .     1912. 


*  A  good  general  bibliography  of  the  subject  of  values  is 
to  be  found  in  The  Philosophical  Status  of  Values^  by  J.  E. 
Dashiell,  1913,  New  York  (Columbia  dissertation).  Cf.  the 
citations  in  Valuation^  Its  Nature  and  Laws,  by  W.  M.  Urban, 
1909,  London  and  New  York. 

187 


i88    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

Locke,  John. 

An  Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding. 
By  John  Locke.  Collated  and  annotated,  with 
Prolegomena,  biographical,  critical,  and  his- 
torical, by  Alexander  Campbell  Eraser.  .  .  . 
In  two  volumes.  .  .  .  Oxford  at  the  Claren- 
don Press.     M.  DCCC.  XCIV. 

Kallen,  Horace  M. 

Value  and  Existence  in  Philosophy,  Art,  and 
Religion.     By  Horace  M.  Kallen. 

Being  pages  40Q-467  in: 

Creative  Intelligence.  Essays  in  the  Prag- 
matic Attitude.  By  John  Dewey,  Addison  W. 
Moore,  Harold  Chapman  Brown,  George  H. 
Mead,  Boyd  H.  Bode,  Henry  Waldgrave  Stuart, 
James  Hayden  Tufts,  Horace  M.  Kallen.  New 
York.     Henry  Holt  and  Company.     [191 7.] 

Marvin,  Walter  T. 

The  Emancipation  of  Metaphysics  from  Epis- 
temology.     By  Walter  T.  Marvin. 

Being  pages  48-Q5  in: 

The  New  Realism.  Cooperative  Studies  in 
Philosophy.  By  Edwin  B.  Holt,  Walter  T. 
Marvin,   William  Pepperrell   Montague,   Ralph 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  189 

Barton  Perry,  Walter  B.  Pitkin,  and  Edward 
Gleason  Spaulding.  New  York.  The  Mac- 
millan  Company.     19 12.     .     .     . 

Mill,  John  Stuart. 

Utilitarianism.  By  John  Stuart  Mill.  Four- 
teenth impression.  Longmans,  Green  and  Co. 
.     .     .     London,  New  York  and  Bombay.    1901. 

MUNSTERBERG,  HuGO. 

The  Eternal  Values  by  Hugo  Miinsterberg. 
Boston  and  New  York.  Houghton  Mifflin  Com- 
pany.   The  Riverside  Press.    Cambridge.    1909. 

RiCKERT,  HeINRICH. 

Der  Gegenstand  der  Erkenntnis.  Einfiihrung 
in  die  Transzendentalphilosophie.  Von  Hein- 
rich  Rickert,  Professor  an  der  Universitat 
Freiburg  i.  B.  Zweite,  verbesserte  und  er- 
weiterte  Auflage.  Tiibingen  und  Leipzig. 
.      .      1904. 

Russell,  Bertrand. 

Our  Knowledge  of  the  External  World  as  a 
Field  for  Scientific  Method  in  Philosophy.  By 
Bertrand  Russell,   M.A.,   F.R.S.     .     .     .     The 


I90    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 

Open    Court    Publishing    Company.     Chicago. 
London.     .     .     .     1914. 

TiTCHENER,  Edward  Bradford. 

Lectures  on  the  Elementary  Psychology  of 
Feeling  and  Attention.  By  Edward  Bradford 
Titchener.  New  York.  The  Macmillan  Com- 
pany.    1908.     ... 

WiNDELBAND,  WiLHELM. 

Praludien.     Aufsatze   und   Reden   zur   Phil- 
osophic  und   ihrer    Geschichte.     Von   Wilhelm 
Windelband.       Fiinfte,       erweiterte      Auflage. 
[Two  volumes.]     .     .     .     Tubingen. 
1915. 


INDEX 


Accountability,  126-127 ;  see 
Responsibility. 

Act,  judgment  in  the,  54,  *57- 
59,  *66-67. 

Actualization  of  norms,  141. 

Additive  character  of  judg- 
ments, 73. 

Agent;  see  Standpoint  of  indi- 
vidual. 

Aesthetic  values :  subjective 
or  objective?  16,  122;  their 
presence  to  individual  con- 
sciousness, 143- 14s ;  argu- 
ment for  their  objectivity, 
152-155 ;  empirical  and  meta- 
physical treatment  of,  181- 
183. 

Affection,  Wundt's  dimensions 
of,  95. 

Allegory,  use  of,  71. 

Anthropocentric  attitude  re- 
jected, 37-38. 

Appreciation  in  relation  to 
valuation,  22. 

Aristotle,  149. 

Aspects  of  conscious  activity 
never  isolated,  *I2,  41,  50, 
♦96-98,  104. 

Association,  151. 

Attention  and  feeling,  94-96. 

"Autonomy,"  160,  171. 

Awareness  of  norms,  159. 

Balfour,    Arthur    James,    132- 
133,  180. 


Beauty:  subjective  or  objec- 
tive? 16;  see  Feeling, 
Aesthetic. 

Beethoven,  145. 

Bergson,  51;  (implied  refer- 
ence to,)    lOI. 

Biological  concomitants  of 
values,  "^2)7,  88,  90. 

Causal  sequence  of  natural 
phenomena,  134,  157. 

Causation  and  responsibility, 
162-172. 

Cause :  distinguished  from 
means  and  from  con- 
tributory values,  34;  of 
judgment  in  the  act,  *57,  66. 

Character,  Windelband's  anal- 
ysis of,  163-172. 

Choice,  said  to  be  determined 
by  the  functioning  of  norms, 
147-150;   see  Freedom. 

Civilization,  growth  of,  in 
reference  to  norms,  147-149. 

Classification:  of  values,  7-8; 
of  disputed  values,  15-16. 

Clearness :  a  criterion  of  at- 
tention, 95;  a  neo-Kantian 
criterion  of  truth,  138. 

Cognition :  as  psychological 
basis  of  contributory  values, 
9;  an  aspect  of  conscious 
activity,  96-98;  and  growth 
of  the  environment,  99;  and 


191 


192    VAI.UES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 


aesthetics,  144-145;  and  con- 
science, 179-180. 

Cognitive  elements :  may  be 
different  in  memory  from 
the  original  perception,  50; 
in  relation  to  feeling,  91-92. 

Colors,  154. 

Concepts  and  standards  of 
value,  180. 

Conscience,  124,  126-127,  148- 
150,    177-180. 

Consciousness :  earliest  stage 
of,  (r)  in  reference  to 
value,  36,  106,  (2)  in  refer- 
ence to  the  conditions  which 
cause  us  to  ascribe  value  to 
it,  37,  45  ff.,  (3)  in  reference 
to  its  aspects,  97-98;  and 
environment,  88-89,  93-112; 
one  in  its  functioning,  *97- 
98,  108-109,  139,  166;  mature 
stage  of,  III;  of  individuals 
with     reference     to     norms, 

132-133,  140-155. 

Contact  with  environment :  in 
reference  to  interest,  64;  in 
reference  to  determination 
of  the  environment,  86-87, 
92-93;  two  aspects  of,  94- 
-112;  new,  106-111. 

Contemplation,  97. 

Content:  of  judgments,  55,  59- 
73;  of  false  judgments,  67- 
69. 

Contributory:  acts  of  judg- 
ment are,  59;  content  of 
judgment  may  be,  59  ff.,  con- 
tributory judgments  ex- 
pressed in  language,  80-83; 
contributory  relation  of  the 


individual  to  environment, 
104-112;  contributory  values 
are  objective,  119-121;  con- 
tributory element  in  the 
fundamental  ethical  propo- 
sition, 181. 

Creative  Intelligence,  90. 

Criteria  of  truth  and  value,  63. 

Definitions,  62-63. 

Degrees  of  contributory  value, 

65,  69-73. 

Desire:  object  of,  78-83;  end 
of,  80-83. 

Determinism,  42;  its  relation 
to    freedom,    155-172. 

Dewey,  John,  26. 

Directions  of  the  develop- 
ment of  conscious  activity, 
50. 

Dissociation  of  personality, 
III. 

Dogmatism,  184-185. 

Duty,   178. 

Education,  149. 

Ego-centric,  65. 

Emphasis:  different  in  the 
several  aspects  of  conscious 
activity,  12. 

Empirical  account  of  aesthetic 
values,  181-182. 

"Empirical"  consciousness,  158. 

End:  of  judgments  as  values, 
64,  68,  69;  of  desire  ex- 
pressed in  judgment,  80-83; 
of  contributory  values,  7-14, 
120;  of  thought,  139. 

Environment :  simplest  form 
of,  containing  value-relation. 


INDEX 


193 


45;  growth  of,  47;  special, 
of  individual  and  race,  72-73 ; 
definition  of,  85-93;  relation 
of,  to  conscious  activity,  98; 
and  values,  104-112. 

Epiphenomenalism,  95-98. 

Epistemology :  in  reference  to 
metaphysics,  *24,  123,  *I28- 
133 ;  in  reference  to  the 
psycho-physical  problem,  88; 
and  truth,  131-132,  150-152, 
idealistic,  142;  and  ob- 
jectivity, 146;  and  obedience 
to  law,  164-165. 

Error,  explained  with  diffi- 
culty in  Kantian  terms,  *i3r- 
132,  138,  151- 

Esquimaux,  109-110. 

Ethical  propositions,  180. 

Evolution :  end  of  valuation 
in,  64-65;  and  norms,  134- 
137. 

"Experience",  gaining  of,   in. 

Expression  of  values:  see 
Language. 

"Faculty-psychology"  depre- 
cated, 96-97;  see  Aspects. 

False  judgments  may  be  con- 
tributory, 60,  66-69. 

Feeling:  as  basis  of  immediate 
values,  10;  in  reference  to 
sensations  and  ideas,  *45- 
51,  91-92;  expressed  in  lan- 
guage, 79-80;  and  attention, 
94-95;  its  part  in  conscious 
experience,  95-104;  see 
Aesthetic,  Conscience. 

Fichte,  Johann  Gottlieb,  124. 


Freedom,   126,  *  155- 172. 
Freedom,  value  in  relation  to, 

1 19-125. 
Future  action  and  judgments, 

59-73- 

Goal  of  the  universe,  173. 
Hume,   David,   162. 

Idealism,  69. 

Immediate  values :  self-suffi- 
cient, 10;  independent  of 
cognition,  35 ;  arise  out  of 
contributory  values,  48;  ex- 
pressed in  judgment,  78-80; 
and  relation  of  the  indi- 
vidual to  his  environment, 
105-112;  subjective  or  ob- 
jective?   121-125. 

Impulse :  often  associated 
with  feeling  in  immediate 
values,  11-12;  egoistic  and 
altruistic,  65. 

Independence:  of  contributory 
values,  13;  of  norms  from 
particular  consciousnesses, 
132-133,  *I40-I5S- 

Inference :  in  reference  to  en- 
vironment, 92-93 ;  truth 
alleged  to  be  independent  of, 
123. 

Instinct,   150. 

Interactionism,  89. 

Interest:  incidental  to  truth  of 
judgments,  30,  64;  necessary 
to  all  valuation,  35 ;  in  refer- 
ence to  the  origin  of  values, 
*38   ff.,  92;   in  reference  to 


194    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERREI.ATION 


judgment,  59,  "^dy,  77,  79: 
in  reference  to  moral 
choice,  150. 
Interrelation  of  values,  (i) 
with  respect  to  origin,  31- 
53,  (2)  with  respect  to 
knowledge,  54-84,  (3)  with 
respect   to   co-existence,   85- 

115. 
Introspection,  95-98,  109. 

Intuition,  loi. 

James,  William,  26,  105,  109, 
122,   151,   152. 

Judgment:  acts  of,  57-59;  con- 
tent of,  59-73;  and  memory, 
60;  when  present,  66-67; 
and  moral  choice,  149-150; 
and  truth,  152;  and  respon- 
sibility, 169-172;  moral,  179- 
r8o. 

Judgments :  are  all  of  con- 
tributory value,  *i6-i7,  121 ; 
existential,  23,  26,  65;  not 
essential  to  valuation,  10, 
32-33;  in  reference  to 
standpoint,  54;  as  the 
climax  of  development  of 
the  cognitive  function,  55; 
as  values,  56-76;  true,  *6i- 
66,  131-132;  false,  *66-69, 
131-132;  of  values,  70,  ="76- 
83;  origin  of,  77-83;  in  form 
of  general  propositions,  82- 
83. 

Kallen,  Horace  M.,  105. 
Kant,  Immanuel,  123-124,  128- 
133. 


Knowledge:  not  essential  to 
the  presence  of  values,  10, 
32-33;  the  interrelation  of 
values  with  respect  to,  54- 
84;  logical,  the  best  instru- 
ment for  dealing  with 
reality,  99;  not  determined 
by  feeling,  loo-ioi. 

Language,        expression        of 

values  in,  54-55,  *76-83. 
Laws    of   nature    in    reference 

to  norms,  129-133. 
Locke,  John,  122,  151. 
Logical        values        so-called : 

see     Judgment,     Knowledge, 

Norms,  Truth. 

Marvin,  Walter  T.,  24,  128-129. 

Materialism,  88-89. 

Matter  of  moral  decisions, 
137-140. 

Metaphysical  account  of 
values,  177,  *r82-i85. 

Method  of  metaphysical  re- 
search, 183-185. 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  148,  177- 
178. 

Mind  and  body,  88-89,  172. 

Moral  values :  subjective  or 
objective?  16,  122;  and 
natural  selection,  137;  paral- 
leled by  Windelband  with 
other  norms,  137-140;  and 
moral  decisions,  142-143, 
148-150. 

Miinsterberg,  Hugo,  124. 

Music,  144-145. 


INDEX 


195 


Natural  selection,  124,  *I34- 
137,  *I47-I5S,  158. 

Necessity:  of  judgment,  22, 
27 ;  Windelband's  analysis 
of,  162-164. 

Norms:  Rickert's  views  of, 
*2o-30,  123 ;  Windelband's 
theory  of,  126-174;  defined, 
126-127;  relation  to  Kant, 
128-133;  and  evolution,  134- 
137;  three  kinds  of,  137-140; 
independence  of,  from  par- 
ticular consciousnesses,  132- 
133,  *f40-r55;  degrees  of 
presence  of,  132,  140-141 ; 
in  reference  to  freedom  and 
responsibility,   155-172. 

Objective :  in  reference  to  in- 
dependence, 14;  meaning  of, 
119-123;  attractiveness  of 
the  theory  of  objective  im- 
mediate values,  124;  see 
Norms,  Realms. 

Obligation,   feeling  of,   180. 

Observer:  see  Standpoint. 

Opposition:  removal  of,  in 
Fiihlen,  Denken,  and  Wol- 
len,  29;  overcoming  of,  by  a 
primitive  organism,  40. 

Origin:  of  values,  31-53;  is 
from  the  observer's  stand- 
point, 35;  of  judgments,  77- 
83;  of  immediate  values,  78- 
80;  of  contributory  values, 
80-83. 

"Ought,"  meaning  of,  180. 

Parallelism  of  realms  of 
norms:  see  Realms. 


Perception:  and  judgment,  22, 
28;  and  environment,  92- 
93;  and  truth,  123,  152. 

Permanence  of  content  of 
judgments  as  values,  60. 

Plants,  106-107. 

Pleasantness-unpleasantness, 
95-104;  the  "dimension"  of 
feeling,  95;  always  present 
in  conscious  activity,  96-98; 
practical  consequences  of 
our  theory,  99-104;  in  refer- 
ence to  conscience,  178-179. 

Practicality     and      judgments, 

71-73. 
Pragmatism,  88-92. 
Pre-disposition,     philosophical, 

88-89. 
Pre-established   harmony,    133, 

146,  150,  152,  155. 
Protoplasm,  40,  87,  no. 
Psychology:     basis     of    values 

in,     10-12;     concerned     with 

Sein,   24;    and   environment, 

88-89;  and  conscience,  148. 
Psycho-physical  parallelism,  89, 

95-98. 
Purpose :    expressions   of,   81 ; 

in  nature,  135-136. 

Qualitative  and  quantitative 
importance  of  norms,  135- 
137,  156-157. 

Realism :        in      Windelband's 

theory,      *I29-I33,      140-141, 

151 ;  "naive,"  133. 
Reality:  quantitative  aspect  of, 

91 ;    my  contact   with,   *ioo- 

104,  ir2. 


196    VALUES  AND  THEIR  INTERRELATION 


Realms  of  norms,  145-155. 

Recognition,  alleged  to  be  a 
factor  in  immediate  valu- 
ation, 20-21. 

Reflection,  feelings  accom- 
panying, 49. 

Relation  of  false  terms,  68-69. 

Relations,  real,  61-64. 

Religion,  102-104. 

Responsibility,  124,  126-127, 
*i55-r72. 

Rickert,  Heinrich,  *2i-30,  100, 
123,  125,  163,  183. 

Russell,  Bertrand,  26. 

Secondary  qualities,   122-123. 

Selection  and  norms,  130-131. 

Sensation:  "simple,"  46,  109; 
a  pragmatic  use  of,  91 ;  in 
reference  to  environment, 
92-93;  as  not  exhaustive  of 
the  possibilities  of  relation 
with  the  environment,  100; 
definition  of,  no. 

Situation,  earliest  value-,  38-42. 

Sollen  and  Sein,  23  ff. 
Spectator:  see  Standpoint. 
Spiritualism,  89. 

Standards  of  value,  177-178; 
see  Norms. 

Standpoint:  of  individual  (i) 
defined,  34,  (2)  in  expression 
of  values,  76;  of  observer 
defined,  34;  of  individual 
and  observer  compared  as 
methods,  44;  in  reference  to 
judgment,    54    ff. ;    merging 


of,  in  judgment,  55,  60,  70; 
confusion  of,  by  some 
writers,  76;  development  of 
the  individual's,  104-112. 

Stimuli :  calling  forth  judg- 
ment, 57;  in  reference  to  a 
definition  of  environment, 
87,  92-95,   106- 1 12. 

Subjective:  in  reference  to  de- 
pendence, 14;  meaning  of 
the  term,   1 19-122. 

Survival-value,  136;  see  Nat- 
ural. 

Terms:     and    relations,   27-28; 

of  judgment,  60-73. 
Theoretical  judgments,  73. 

Titchener,  Edward  Bradford, 
94- 

Truth :  is  it  a  value  ?  15,  123 ; 
as  immediate,  25 ;  involves 
inference,  26;  of  judgments 
in  reference  to  value,  60-66; 
Kantian  difficulty  in  refer- 
ence to,  131-132;  and  norms, 
150-152. 

Uncognized  values,  34-35. 

Unity  of  conscious  activity : 
see  Aspects. 

Usefulness  of  judgments:  see 
Contributory. 

Value:  relational  character  of, 
9-ro,  119;  and  truth,  63-66; 
alteration  of,  112;  function 
and,   1 19- 120. 


INDEX 


197 


Values:  two  classes  of,  3-4,  7- 
8;  from  standpoint  of  ob- 
server are  contributory,  43; 
present  in  earliest  stage  of 
consciousness,  48;  acts  of 
judgment  as,  57-59;  content 
of  judgments  as,  59-73;  co- 
existence of,  85-112;  and 
environment,  104-112;  new, 
iio-iii;  see  Aesthetic,  Con- 
tributory,     Feeling,      Inter- 


relation, Judgment,  Know- 
ledge, Logical,  Moral, 
Norms,  Origin. 

Verification :  of  contributory 
values,  13,  20;  of  judgments, 
55,  61-62;  implies  the  possi- 
bility of  false  judgments,  69. 

Windelband,  Wilhelm,  126-174, 
183. 


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